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ABSTRACT
STATE POWER AND RECORD-KEEPING:
THE HISTORY OF INDIVIDUALIZED SURVEILLANCE
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1935
PAMELA SANKAR
CAROLYN MARVIN

This dissertation charts the emergence of
individualized record-keeping in the United States by
tracing the history of criminal identification records and
the invention of statistically-based identification systems,
which the state applied to the population in general. The
dissertation ties the invention of these individualized
record-keeping systems to the development of a state
surveillance capacity and its need for fixed, official
identities. The dissertation situates this investigation in
the history of writing and argues that to understand the
roots of writing's power in contemporary society,
essentialist assertions about writing's utility and
superiority must be replaced with investigations of how
writing was transformed into a critical source of state
power. Of particular interest here is how the construction
of centralized, state-administered records extended and
elevated the state's organizational memory.
vi

The dissertation starts with a detailed examination of
the earliest US reform prison where the link between
individual identities and state surveillance was first
forged. It continues with an analysis of the emergence of
state identification practices from local into national
arenas that focuses on the appearance of practices
associated with preventive policing in the mid-1800s. The
dissertation then describes the invention and application of
statistically-based identification methods, including
criminal anthropometry and fingerprinting. These statistical
methods could be applied reliably to large populations and
thus allowed the state to expand its identification
interests beyond criminals to the population at large. The
dissertation closes with a description of the construction
of the US national fingerprint system. In describing each of
these phases, the dissertation analyzes both the motives
which inspired proponents of improved identification systems
and the actions they took to invent, refine, and deploy new
methods to serve those motives. This analysis locates the
power of writing in complex record-keeping practices,
usually invisible because so commonplace, and re-casts state
record-keeping systems from by-products of pragmatic
bureaucratic activity into intentionally created, carefully
fostered reservoirs of state power.
vii
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Chapter One
An Overview:
Writing, Record-keeping, and the Modern State

To be hungry is human. To ... not have
[identity] papers is inhuman. It is against
nature's laws. That's the point.

It seems to me the sailor's [identity] card,
and not the sun, is the center of the universe. I
am positive that the great war [World War I] was
fought, not for democracy or justice, but for no
other reason than that a cop, or an immigration
officer, may have the legal right to ask you ... to
show him your sailor's card, or what have you.
Before the war nobody asked you for a passport.
The Death Ship
B. Traven
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Introduction
A young American sailor is stranded, without identity
papers, in the port of Antwerp, soon after World War I. He
speaks to us from his position of entanglement in an
unfamiliar Catch-22. He cannot get papers--a passport or
travel permit--without already having papers--a birth
certificate or work license. He despairs of ever returning
home. He has been caught in a particular moment in European
history, when empires suddenly broke into nation-states,
hazy frontiers crystallized into fixed, adjudicated borders,
and subjects became either citizens or displaced persons.
Those who could obtain the proper identity papers could
proceed with their lives. Those who could not do so, were
consigned to a shadow existence of illegal jobs and forged
documents--a peripheral orbit outside of "nature's laws" and
far from the new "center of the universe."
The young sailor has correctly pinpointed World War I
as a watershed event in the evolution of state-run
identification systems. For both the United States and
Europe, the war marks the moment when central governments
began to develop plans that would require all inhabitants to
enroll in a centralized identification record-keeping
system. Although the US never actually implemented an
official universal identification system, it extended
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separate requirements to so many sub-groups within the
nation's population that, over time, it built a de facto,
national identification system. Previously, only criminals
had been subject to this type of individualized
surveillance. Criminal identification record-keeping systems
of varying sizes and types had been functioning since the
late 1700s. These criminal identification systems provided
both the theoretical and practical models for non-criminal,
or civilian systems. How and why the US government invented
and implemented centralized identification record-keeping
systems, first for criminals, and then for the population as
a whole is the subject of this dissertation.
Over the years, state-run identification systems have
assumed many forms, including rogues' galleries, passports,
fingerprint records, social security numbers, and driver's
licenses.1 The function of these systems is to delineate and
enforce a single official identity through which an
individual must conduct his or her affairs, and on which the
state can rely for monitoring that conduct. The applications
of state-run identification systems are numerous and are
centrally implicated in the conduct of daily affairs. These
applications include: the dispersal of social and economic
benefits (such as voting rights, tax assessment, or welfare
payments), the social control of geographic mobility (for
example, policies concerning immigration, conscription, and
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drivers' licensing), and the monitoring of social deviance
(through compilation of official and unofficial dossiers).2
Furthermore, the state's near monopolistic control over the
information stored in these systems, and in its other vast
archives, gives the state an advantage in many activities
related to constructing and interpreting the past. The state
has created and continues to own many of the accounts on
which a wide variety of histories--institutional or
alternative--must rely.
For communications researchers, state-run
identification record-keeping systems hold special interest
for several reasons. Most importantly, the history of these
systems provides fertile ground for exploring the
relationship between political power and the means of
communication. Here that exploration concerns how officials
shaped the means of communication necessary to sustain
surveillance activities essential to the emergence of the
modern state.3
The modern state is marked by several distinctive
features, two of which--only recently seen as interrelated-are of special interest here.4 First, in contrast to earlier
polities where there was little or no direct contact between
ruled and ruler, the modern state is marked by direct,
continual, and specific contact between the state and its
subjects. This contact allows the state to exert forceful
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and precise control over its population. This control, which
is exercised directly over individuals in both their
economic and political activities, provides a critical
source of the modern state's power.5
Second, to a far greater degree than any prior polity,
the modern state relies on writing to deploy and
consolidate its authority. This emphasis is evident in its
legal codes, voting procedures, national archives, and
founding constitutions. Indeed, as the authors of one book
on the topic concluded,

n •••

the [modern) State ... is the

written word. n 6 It should come as no surprise then, that in
trying to consolidate its power over one of its most
critical resources--control over individual economic
productivity and political expression--the state relies on
writing. It has done so, in large part, through the creation
of centralized individualized record-keeping systems.
Prior to the late 1800s, individual identification,
whether in a personal or bureaucratic setting, rested
primarily on vouching and only marginally on records. In
order to extend its authority over individuals, the state
began to construct, legitimate, and refine record-keeping
systems capable of distinguishing individual identity and
monitoring conduct. Examining the history of this activity
provides a fruitful way to study the role of communications
in the evolution of modern state power.
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This chapter provides a theoretical and historical
overview of state-run identification record-keeping systems.
It begins by inquiring into how writing was made to serve
the needs of emerging modern states, and it emphasizes an
important difference in this process between record-keeping
and writing. The chapter then examines several advantages
that accrue to communication studies by approaching writing
and record-keeping as historical constructs. The remainder
of the chapter is devoted, first, to briefly reviewing the
history of identification practices in the the US and,
second, to elaborating an important concept: official
identity. The chapter closes with an outline of the rest of
the dissertation and a discussion of the sources informing
this research.

Writing, Record-keeping, and Surveillance
Although many authors have noted the importance of
writing to the evolution of modern political forms, one of
the few to provide a theoretical framework for its study is
Anthony Giddens.7 Giddens organizes his discussion of
writing through the concept, "time-space distanciation."
Time-space distanciation refers to the methods employed by
societies to "stretch" social relations across time (like
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kinship systems) and across space (like nomadic cycles)
Writing, which can act as a "storage container" for
authority and information, enables officials to stretch
their political reach further than previously possible
across both temporal and spatial dimensions.8
Broadly speaking, writing enables this expansion
because it permits officials to replace personal presence
and personal effort with written texts, at the same time
that it permits the accumulation and use of information in
entirely new ways that can bolster administrative authority.
For example, officials can rely on regular reporting to
oversee far-flung activities, rather than undertaking timeconsuming, costly travel. Instead of burdening individual or
collective memories with detailed, complex information,
officials can design logbooks, and train and hire clerks to
maintain them. By creating tables, charts, and statistical
analyses, officials can reorganize this information in novel
and revealing ways, yielding new perspectives. Thus, using
writing, officials can expand their domain over greater
temporal and spatial expanses (or, using Giddens'
terminology, increase their regime's time-space
distanciation) .9
This stretching of administrative reach that writing
provided was precisely what officials sought in applying
writing to problems of personal identity. As will be
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discussed in detail in subsequent chapters, one of the
primary engines driving innovations in centralized
identification systems was the desire on the part of
officials to invent identification methods that would allow
them to reduce reliance on personal experience or knowledge
for identifications and increase reliance on various types
of written descriptions. Such descriptions could be more
easily stored and shared and, thus, permit officials to
greatly extend their surveillance of individuals.
In these ways, writing provided to officials one of the
primary mechanisms that they used to consolidate the
administrative reach crucial to the emergence of the modern
state. Specifically, writing provided the fundamental means
for organizing surveillance activities over both persons and
objects.
The modern state relies on surveillance for extending
and consolidating both its political and economic
activities. Politically the modern state introduced methods
of social control that replaced the manifest use of violence
(such as public executions common under the absolutist or
traditional state) with the pervasive use of administrative
power. This new kind of control required the expansion of
the state's administrative reach to the extent of monitoring
citizens' daily activities. Economically, the modern state
prospered through industrial capitial's concentration of
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production which, in turn, both permitted and required that
workers' activities be carefully coordinated through close
supervision.lO Thus, the emergence of the modern state
required the stretching of time-space relations and writing
provided one of the primary mechanisms by which this was
achieved.
Giddens' notion of time-space distanciation, which he
developed as an alternative to a more static, marxist
framework for studying political development, is useful and
will be returned to here as a way of theorizing the
expansion of identification record-keeping systems. Still,
Giddens approach to explaining the relationships among state
development, writing, and surveillance, suffers a critical
shortcoming. It is not writing itself that accomplishes most
of the transformations that interest Giddens. It is writing
put to the service of record-keeping.
Giddens overlooks this distinction because he relies
on a concept of writing--writing as a storage-container-that attributes to writing a greater complexity and
permanence than it actually possesses. In itself, writing-defined briefly as the "expression of human language through
visible signs"--confers scarcely more permanence to words
than does human memory.ll Authors have mistaken its frequent
tangibility--distinct from its visibility--as permanence.
But, the fact that words scrawled in sand are "written" does
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nothing to save them from the next wave. Writing is simply
an encoding device; and alphabetic writing, a particularly
effective one.
Michael Clanchy's study on the evolution of early
government record-keeping systems in Great Britain has
contributed greatly to an understanding of this
distinction.12 As he has amply demonstrated, officials must
expend considerable effort to make writing into records
capable of sustaining surveillance or other administrative
activities. These efforts--the substance of record-keeping-include the development of methods for transcription (such
as pen and paper, or stylus and wax)

and of principles for

ordering information within and between texts

(such as

pagination and alphabetizing). Through these efforts,
officials can enhance the likelihood that the information
stored in records can be retrieved.13 It is in this
elaborated form--inscribed, protected, ordered, and stored-that writing is transformed into records and becomes a
conduit for power in the modern state. Thus, an interest in
writing's relationship to modern state power must be served
by an examination of record-keeping practices.

11
Communications Research on the Relationship Between the
Means of Communications and Political Power
Several communications researchers have engaged this
question of the relationship between the means of
communications and political power. Harold Innis, though
often maligned for his sweeping generalizations and sloppy
historiography, certainly contributed much by asserting that
a full understanding of the expansion and consolidation of
political regimes could not be achieved without an analysis
of the means of commmunication relied upon by rulers.14 His
work offers in some sense an early, rougher version of
Giddens' time-space distanciation.
himself recognizes.15)

(A heritage which Giddens

Innis however suffers from a

misplaced emphasis on the material composition of the means
of communications.

(For example, paper, being light, travels

well and improves territorial integration. Stone, being
heavy, lasts a long time and enhances the longevity of
traditions.) 16 This extreme technological determinism
stopped Innis from grasping the importance of the social
practices which shape communications. This dissertation
continues Innis' inquiry into the relationship between the
means of communication and political power, but does so from
the perspective that these relationships are historically
constructed rather than universally given.
A second line of research concerning the role played by
communications in political evolution, which produced

12

studies mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, emerged out of
concerns about the viability of a world order marked by
extreme differences in the relative wealth and stability of
nations.1? These studies took the modern state as a
universally-desired, inevitable endpoint of political
evolution and set for themselves the task of understanding
how some countries had achieved this status while others had
not, in order better to help those that had not.
Researchers found that a particular kind of
communicative style or practice played a central role in the
evolution of stable and prosperous states. This style was
marked by a certain complementarity among communicators
(citizens of the state) which fostered effective, reliable
communication. Effective communication, encouraged by
literacy and participation in the mass media, enabled the
spread of democratic governing which these researchers took
as emblematic of the modern state. These studies often
incorporated a practical note that offered advice about how
best to foster participation in these communicative
practices to encourage progress toward modern statehood.
While this dissertation shares an interest with prior
communications studies in understanding the role of
communications in the evolution of the modern state, it
diverges in basic assumptions about the modern state and
about how best to explore communication's role. It starts
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from the premise that the modern state (and, by implication,
all other pOlitical forms)

is an historical construction--

rather than a natural, pre-destined, or necessarily
desirable form--and asks how officials molded communication
practices to contribute to that construction.
This approach to studying the role of communications in
the evolution of political forms issues a useful dividend
for communications in the form of a detailed description of
the evolution of a communication system. Too often
communications researchers fail to explore how a
communications system or technology has evolved. Researchers
begin with a technology as it then currently exists, assign
it a causal status and seek its effects in the changed
behavior of people using it. In so doing, they miss the
opportunity to see how causes and effects feed in to one
another, and shape the technology, its uses, and its
implications. Here the positions are reversed. The
technology--in this case various methods for ascertaining
and assigning individual identities--is seen as the effect
or as the result, and the causes are sought in historical
events and trends.lS
This reversal recasts autonomous technology into social
practice, and directs research interest toward critical
questions such as why a particular technology was invented,
how it took its particular shape, and whose interests that
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shape serves. By opening up the possibility that a
technology is itself historical and contingent, such a repositioning acts as a useful corrective against much of the
universalist thinking in communications.
Approaching political forms as historical artifacts
leads also, although less inevitably, to one final
divergence between this work and earlier communications
studies concerning the modern state. Most prior studies have
been interested in understanding how a sense of community-and eventually nationhood--arose out of and was sustained by
certain kinds of communication, specifically, the
dissemination and exchange of information. Conforming with a
widespread bias in the field of communications, these
studies concentrated on describing and understanding the
transmission function of communication.19 An historical
study of communications' role in the evolution of the modern
state could also concentrate fruitfully on the means of
transmission, as several already have.20 But the memory
element of communications, often important and usually
overlooked, demands attention here.
The modern state derives power not just from its
control over the production and dissemination of
information, but from its control over stored information.
It maintains vast archives pertaining to multifarious
subjects including natural resources, diplomatic ties, and
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individual citizens. From these archives, the state can
create its own version of the past--in the form of files,
reports, and statistics--which defines and secures its
position in the present, at the same time that it
legitimates its actions toward the individuals and
organizations about whom it stores information. These
archives constitute the state's organizational memory.
Typically the phrase,

"communications revolution," when

used historically, refers to the transformation in
transmission capabilities resulting from the 19th century
application of electricity to communications, including the
telegraph, telephone, and radio.21 However, while the
importance of changes in memory capability may be recognized
in the computer age, it's significance has been overlooked
for previous eras. Transformations in memory practices
deserve attention no less than transformations in
transmission-related activities. Indeed, what can be
transmitted in the present depends largely on what can be
recalled from the past.22
The establishment of state-run identification systems
does represent a revolution both for the changes it embodies
in the relations between the state and the individual, and
for the innovations and expansions it inspired in the
state's organizational memory. The history of these events
could be based on any number of record types including those
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pertaining to health, social welfare, or crime. The interest
here is in criminal records because they represent the first
institutionalized individual records and because the special
concern with criminal identity (inspired initially by the
state's desire to distinguish recidivists from first-timers)
highlights attempts to reliably distinguish one individual
from another.
The history of criminal record-keeping in the US begins
in the 1790s at Philadelphia's Walnut St. Jail. Here,
officials, starting with very rudimentary record-keeping
techniques, invented basic techniques for individualizing
surveillance and uniquely distinguishing inmates. Official
interest was limited to monitoring incarcerated criminals
and thus these techniques functioned adequately only within
the confines of Walnut St. Not until the mid to late 1800s
did police and penal officials become interested in tracking
criminals as a population, both inside and outside of penal
and police institutions. This emerging interest initiated a
second wave of innovations aimed at improving both the
record-keeping's scope (to incorporate increasing numbers of
people spread over larger and larger territories) and acuity
(the ability to accurately select a particular individual in
spite of the size of the population of which he or she is a
member). The invention of statistically-based systems, such
as criminal anthropometry and, more importantly,
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fingerprinting amply served these needs. Unlike prior
systems, statistically-based systems had nearly limitless
memory capacity and they could easily and reliably
distinguish individuals without relying on personal
recollection.23 In the late l800s to the early 1900s,
various governments sought the means to extend surveillance
beyond the criminal population to the general population. To
the extent that they succeeded in applying these
requirements, they, too, relied on these statistically-based
systems.
In tracing this evolution, starting with identification

record-keeping systems capable initially only of limited
surveillance of incarcerated criminals, and moving on to
systems capable of routine and wide-ranging administrative
surveillance of large national populations, I seek first to
describe the technical side of this endeavor in some detail:
How did officials bring writing and other codes to bear in
the construction of record-keeping systems capable of
monitoring individual identities and conduct? Second,

I

describe the motivations and ideologies which inspired
proponents: What advantages did officials hope to gain by
creating these record-keeping systems?
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Historical Background of Personal Identification Practices
One of the earliest calls to implement a state-run,

national identification system came in 1885 at the first
meeting of the International Penal Congress, held in Rome.24
The system thought capable of such a large undertaking
relied on standardized anthropometric measurements. Its
inventor, Alphonse Bertillon, claimed that taken together,
these measurements would create a unique, verifiable
description of an individual. The method was
enthusiastically received and one newspaper hailed Bertillon
as the 19th century's greatest genius.25
At the conference, a talk describing the method was
followed by a brief, less technical presentation by M.
Herbette, the Director of Penitentiaries in France. Herbette
related some of the more dramatic incidents where
Bertillon's new method had aided police, but he concluded by
redirecting attention to the method's basic contribution:
that police could create a documentary version of
individuals that police could use to identify people despite
resistance on their part. Herbette pointed out that there
was nothing intrinsic to the method which confined its use
to criminals. In this vein, he exhorted his listeners to
consider the method's "extended aim," which was,
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[to] "fix the human personality ... to
give each human being an identity, a
certain individuality, lasting,
unchangeable, always recognisable, [and]
easily proved ... "26

Herbette emphasized that this "fixing" could be useful
beyond the narrow confines of penitentiaries and police. But
to whom, precisely?
Was Herbette concerned that kin recognize one another,
that neighbor always know neighbor, that a mother always
recognize her son, or that workmates not labor in anonymity?
No. As the full text of Bertillon and Herbette's speeches
clarified, their concern was neither local nor personal. It
was, instead, national and international: that the state
should be able to fix the identity of each and every person
living within or moving across its territory. Herbette
envisioned Bertillon's method as the center of a universal
identification system storing and verifying the identities
of criminal and law-abiding citizens alike. Compilers of the
conference proceedings noted that Herbette's speech received
"loud applause."27 A few years later the Bertillon system
was received warmly in the US as well, where officials
argued for its US adoption on the grounds that,

"A very

considerable portion of the crimes and wrongs which disturb
the order of human society," could be rectified if the
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government could distinguish "in every case and with
unerring certainty one individual from another. "28
The suggestion that the government should have a
written record of each citizen's identity may seem
commonsensical. It certainly reflects contemporary US
practice sustained primarily (though by no means singly) by
the federal government's requirement that all residents over
the age of five enroll in the Social Security system.
However, while this kind of direct, documentary link between
an individual and the central government may constitute
standard practice in late 20th century America, it was
unheard of in the 19th century.29
During the 1800s, the federal government interfered far
less in people's daily affairs than today and it had
established almost no identity record requirements. Few
federal laws or regulations existed, and those which were on
the books rarely affected the average farmer, tradesman, or
homemaker. Taxes were paid on production or purchases, not
directly on income, so that although federal tax collection
might bring center and periphery together, contact was far
less intimate than that engendered by contemporary tax law
requiring the reporting of all income-generating
activities.30 Short of voting for national office,

(a right

long reserved for adult, white males), the public had little
routine interaction with the federal government. Contact"
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especially that which resulted in a documentary trace,
occurred primarily in exceptional circumstances such as
military service, government employment, or federal criminal
prosecution.31 Even the diennia1 census, which did collect
individual names, reported data only in aggregate form and
the government prohibited the release of names until 70
years had elapsed following the census.32
Documentary traces were more common on the local level,
although still far less widespread than today. Through the
early to mid-1800s, in much of America, the primary unit was
the household, for both business and personal activities.33
Such a social organization generated little need for
documented interactions. However, given the religious nature
of many communities, church records were common and often
were functionally equivalent to government records. Church
rolls registered major status changes for their members such
as birth, marriage, and death. In many settlements, they may
have contained the only written records pertaining to
individuals.34 These rolls contained no physical
descriptions and were not centralized. Although occasionally
these records may have contributed information helpful to
settling disputed identity cases, they were not, in
themselves, identity records.35
The same can be said of other documentary forms
marginally pertaining to identity, more common during the
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colonial era than later. Travel passes, for example, were
required occasionally for colonists travelling in and out of
settlements, or for African-American slaves or Native
Americans travelling anywhere without a white escort.36
Sometimes a ship captain was required to submit a list of
passengers to the government of the town where he berthed
his ship. New settlers sometimes were required to provide a
certificate of good behavior from a prior residence before
obtaining permission to settle. And finally,

some

professions, notably printing and certain kinds of trading,
required licensing.37 While all these documents referred in
some way to the holder's identity, their intention was not
to prove identity. With these exceptions, to the extent that
government officials had to determine a person's identity,
they relied on information orally conveyed.
The realm of law enforcement, to which we might
predictably look for exceptions to these generalizations,
appears to contribute few. Printed descriptions occasionally
appeared in newspaper advertisements or on broadsides, but
typically officials from the prisons, courts, and police had
little or no access to documentation for establishing an
individual's identity.38 Penal and police officials did not
keep criminal records, and the courts relied on grand jury
reports, witnesses, or vouching by prominent cititzens to
settle disputes over identity.39
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Throughout the mid to late 1800s, exceptions to these
generalizations grew: the state relied more and more on
writing to track a person's identity and behavior, and
officials made a greater effort to provide themselves with
independent documentary strategies to determine whether a
person claiming or denying to be the individual designated
in a document, indeed, spoke the truth. In the early 1800s,
banks began to form national associations which tracked
counterfeiters, later Civil War soldiers carried the first
military identification tags, and in the 1870s, the Treasury
Department started what appears to have been the first
centralized federal system of identification records.40
Still, through 1900 in the US, centralized governmentrequired documentation was virtually non-existent. Even
criminal records remained rather limited through the 1920s.
It is important to underscore exactly what kind of
absences are implied here: virtually none of the standard
ways in which individuals become documented subjects today
existed before 1900. Requirements for birth and death
certificates, although on the books, were not consistently
enforced until the 1910s, or later.41 Individual federal
income tax, with its requisite documentation of personal
financial transactions, was not successfully instituted
until 1913. Driver's licenses and passports did not become
standard until after WW I, social security numbers appeared
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in the mid-1930s, and credit cards, not generally issued
until the 1950s, did not dominate financial transactions for
another 20 or 30 years.42 Thus, prior to 1900, chances were
that an individual could live his or her entire life without
becoming specifically known to state or federal governments.

Official Identity
This anonymity was what new national identification
systems, such as Bertillon's, sought to dismantle. Where
there once was an open, unstructured space, officials sought
to build a system which would create a direct, textual link
between each citizen and the central government. For
example, promoters of Bertillon's method envisioned a system
requiring citizens, upon reaching adulthood, to report to
measuring centers whereupon their relevant bodily dimensions
would be measured and recorded on a standard card. This
card, in turn, would be stored in a central location.
Officials could easily retrieve these cards for later use,
including the addition of pertinent life facts such as
change of address, marriage, or criminal sentencing. The
cards also would be available for identity verification at
critical moments, such as migration, insurance claims, tax
collections, political protests, or criminal prosecution.
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Such a system promised on a national level what once
some small communities offered: immediate, official
recognition and extensive background knowledge on the part
of the government concerning citizens.43 This recognition,
however, would be based no longer on personal interaction-on matching a face or a photo with a lived memory. From now
on, officials would "recognize"

a citizen by referring to

his or her "lasting, unchangeable" identity (Herbette's
phrase) which Bertillon's method had inscribed in written
records.
The specific system envisioned by Herbette and
Bertillon was never established in France, nor elsewhere. In
fact, after initial success Bertillon's method was rejected
completely because of a technical flaw.44 Officials quickly
replaced it, however, with a newly developed system-fingerprinting--and during the transition the impulse to
create and record official identities never faltered.
Furthermore, at this time (the late 1800s to early 1900s),
the state began to develop additional systems concerned
directly or peripherally with tracking identity. The United
States, for example, implemented several parallel systems.
Some new regulations concentrated on fingerprinting groups
defined as deviant or problematic by the government--such as
criminals, immigrants, and Native Americans--while others
concentrated on fixing the rest of the population's identity
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with military and civil service fingerprint requirements.
Still others, initiated later, concentrated less directly on
identity and focussed instead on developing systems for
tracking individual behavior over time. These included the
centralized data banks of the Internal Revenue Service and
the Social Security Administration.
These systems fell short of realizing Bertillon's
universal vision. Still they were inspired by a similar
motivation: to create and enforce a recorded, unique
identity for people, an "individual identity." But what is
this individual identity? Afterall, without such systems we
still have identities which are individual. Before or
outside of these systems we are each genotypically unique
beings, easily distinguishable by our acquaintances.45 So
why does Herbette characterize the function of these systems
as "giv[ing] to each human being an identity"?
While it is true that we each have identities
independent of these systems, Herbette was right. The
systems he extols do not simply the record identities we
have, genotypical, personal, or otherwise. They actually add
to our repertoire. What they create are our official

identities.
An official identity is not one among equals. It is the
identity we must use to bureaucratically legitimate a right
to virtually any other identity we may claim, including
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Native American, author, mother, or high school grad. They
are the identities we must use to negotiate official
discourses and the ones through which a substantial portion
of society's financial and political benefits are disbursed.

Surveillance and Official Identity
Official identity has multiple uses. My interest is in
how it was fashioned to provide the root construct for
modern state-run surveillance activities. These activities
go beyond a simple watching. They range from mundane time
cards, W-2 tax forms, centralized credit bureaus, and the
diennial census, to more controversial drug-testing, and
computerized monitoring of work output for everyone from
telephone operators to physicians. In each instance,
information is collected, analyzed, stored, and fed back
into practice in the shape of directives, admonitions,
accolades, prosecutions, or increased credit limits. This
kind of surveillance is a constitutive feature of political
life in the modern state.
As Giddens has argued, the emergence of the modern
state depended on the construction of surveillance systems
which could provide detailed, wide-ranging information to
governments about their resources

(including labor,

industrial capabilties, and natural resources) and, thus,
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enable them to administer these resources with a kind of
precision and consistency previously unattainable. According
to Giddens, it is this precision, and the administrative
reach it implies that both forms and protects the power-base
of modern states. Moreover, the kind of intimidation and
control effected by these surveillance systems is a
fundamental aspect of the internal pacification needed in
modern states to assure consistent economic and social
reproduction with a minimum of political dissent.
Surveillance, in this expanded sense, is one of the primary
means through which modern governments cultivate, deploy,
and sustain authority.46
Effective surveillance requires a means to consistently
and accurately identify the objects being watched. For
individuals, a fixed, official identity undergirds
centralized data banks by assuring that new bits of
information are consistently added to the proper file while
old bits are consistently extracted. At the same time, the
known regularity of these storage and retrieval checks
assures--or more accurately, through the threat of various
penalties, encourages--that subjects will remain faithful to
their official identities. In other words, a fixed,

identity

per~its

official

effective surveillance, while surveillance,

in turn, enforces the identity's fixity or stability.

In
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this way, these concepts--a fixed,

official identity and

surveillance--are both functionally and historically linked.
Nevertheless, the relationship between surveillance
systems and the fixity of an individual's official identity
is neither straightforward nor uni-directional. First, while
undoubtedly powerful and growing in acuity and scope every
day, surveillance systems are not nearly as inpenetrable nor
omniscient as many believe them to be. Big Brother still has
blind spots. People can change official identities, have
several such identities, or divide off one aspect of an
official identity from another. A small minority can resist
having an official identity altogether.47 Second, the
authority these systems do wield does not necessarily result
from the actual capabilities they possess. As often, it
results from what people believe to be a system's
capability. In Michel Foucault's terms, a person who thinks
he or she is being subjected to a "field of visibility" can
become the "principle of his [or her] own subjection." He or
she internalizes the constraints of power and spontaneously
applies the behavioral rules which the system seeks to
impose and monitor.48
Official identity anchors state surveillance
activities. Ostensibly and practically, it provides the
organizing unit for bureaucratic procedures. At the same
time, it functions ideologically. Its ubiquitous
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requirement, especially in situations such as births and
deaths, which are distant from more commonly recognized
state activities like tax collection, reminds us of the
contemporary state's right to know who we are, where we are,
and what we have done, notwithstanding our wish to the
contrary.

Research Interest in Official Identities
Herbette's notion that we each have a "lasting,
unchangeable" identity has taken on a commonsensical status.
Until recently, this status has deflected attention away
from analysing the history and uses of official identities.
My own interest was awakened in part by Michel Foucault's
work. In particular, Discipline and Punish (1978)

first

suggested to me the insight that official identities are a
fairly new phenomenon. Foucault makes this point indirectly
while discussing a closely related topic: the state's
relatively recent interest in the lives of common persons.49
He locates the origins of this interest in a series of
political and economic transformations in the late 1600s and
early 1700s. Prior to this time, to the extent that
officials collected personal narratives, they did so for the
exceptional subject--knight, saint, or prince--to affirm
their status. In contrast, officials did not record life
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histories of commoners as a matter of standard procedure
nor, with few exceptions, even their names.SO A nascent
interest in the individual which evolved from, and
contributed to, the rise of political liberalism and
industrial capitalism reversed this trend. The common person
became an object of inquiry, the results of which "were no
longer a monument for future memory, but a document for
possible use."S1
This interest on the part of states awakened slowly and
at first turned toward the individual only as a member of a
group. The military, for example, led the way with the need
to answer questions such as how many men in a particular
region were eligible for conscription. Later military
interest narrowed to specific individuals, with demands to
"track down deserters, avoid repeat enrollments, correct
fictitious 'information' presented by officers,
[and] ... establish with certainty the balance sheet of those
who had died or disappeared."S2
This gradual shift (from an interest in groups of
individuals to an interest in specific individuals as
members of groups) reflected not only the evolution of state
interest in the individual, but also the availability of
techniques to serve that interest. Foucault's insight--that
officials had to invent the procedures to sustain this new
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attention to the individual--is his second point of interest
here.
Foucault has been alone in emphasizing that techniques
which serve the state's interest in the individual--among
them files, tables, registers, examinations, classification
procedures, and official identities--needed inventing. He
stresses, in particular, the need to understand how
individuals are made into cases, which can in turn be judged
as conforming to, or deviating from, norms. Foucault himself
did not dedicate much time to studying these techniques.
Still, he did encourage others to examine these "ignoble
archives," because he believed that therein lay the origins
of life sciences.53 For all the scholars inspired by
Foucault, few have pursued this particular directive.54
Still, from other theoretical perspectives, there has been
some interest in current technological advances which serve
state interests in the individual.
Over the last two decades, advances in science and
computing have permitted impressive technological strides in
fixing and monitoring individual identity. DNA typing, for
example, eventually may permit individual identification
from most bodily fluids

(earlier, only blood offered the

possibility of identification), and centralized,
computerized data bases have made it possible for multiple
archives to share their resources, exponentially increasing
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the power of each record.55

With these advances,

surveillance systems have piqued the interest of journalists
and academics alike.56 Writers have contributed inquiries
into the effectiveness of new systems, studies of their use
and dissemination, and documentation of their excesses.
Communication studies often fall in the last category.
Of interest to commmunication scholars is how these
surveillance systems, especially computerized data bases,
impinge on individual privacy.57

Writing about these

issues, scholars sometimes find themselves in the position
of learning about new practices before the general public,
thus their work can often take on the critical function of
alerting readers to concealed, albeit often legal, invasions
of privacy.
Given their immediate and pressing concerns, these
studies tend not to examine the historical precedents of the
activities they are investigating. While computers did
introduce many new surveillance capabilities, they could do
so successfully only because they built on extant practices.
Computers made standarized, centralized record-keeping about
individuals more efficient than previously dreamed possible,
but they did not invent it.
For the United States, that invention (along, perhaps,
with the invention of privacy itself 58) took place more or
less over the 19th century and consisted largely of
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innovations in written record-keeping techniques, aided by
various other technologies, such as photography and
fingerprinting. During this period, officials invented and
constructed the individualized record-keeping systems needed
to sustain surveillance. They made the individual into an
object which, though mobile, could be located and monitored
and, with only passive compliance, could be accurately
described along any of several dimensions, including health,
physical appearance, education, financial status, and
criminality.
The history of this activity--in some sense a prehistory of contemporary, computerized surveillance--provides
the focal point here. It is a chapter in the history of
writing, more specifically, of how officials have made
writing into record-keeping, and hence into a state
surveillance technology.

Chapter Summaries
The substantive chapters of this dissertation focus on
tracing the means and motivations by which state officials
came to invent record-keeping systems capable of
establishing official identities. These identities were
never established as ends to themselves, but always to serve
surveillance needs in some way. Thus, a recurring theme of
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the dissertation is the examination of the relationship
between official identity and surveillance. Chapter Two
describes in some detail how individualized surveillance and
official identities emerged together in one setting--the
walnut St. Jail of the 1790s in Philadelphia--as a result of
the application of new beliefs about punishment. The Walnut
St. Jail example is particularly important to this history
because it is here that officials invented the basic methods
for establishing official identities to serve surveillance.
Reviewing these early attempts helps to underscore the
historical nature of these practices. Chapters Three and
Four emphasize how official identities are constructed, more
than how or why the surveillance they serve is conducted.
Chapter Five resumes the emphasis on surveillance by
describing efforts by the US federal government to establish
a universal, civilian identification system.
A second theme of the dissertation traces the gradual
expansion of identification systems. Official identities at
Walnut St. served distinctly local surveillance needs.
Prison reformers were interested in inmate behavior only as
it related directly to their stay at Walnut St. Walnut St.
itself closed in 1835, but a commitment to many of its
policies continued, as did a commitment to criminal
surveillance. This commitment began undergo certain changes
in the mid-l800s when penal officials and others became
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interested in being able to extend their surveillance
apparatus beyond prison walls.
Chapter Three traces this emergent interest in devising
surveillance techniques capable of reaching out, first to
other penal institutions, and then into the community at
large. This chapter describes the social and political
context that fostered an interest in expanded criminal
surveillance. It focuses on tracing changes in both penal
and police work over the mid to late 1800s, and on how these
changes helped to transform the problem of criminal identity
from one that officials believed could be handled on the
local level to one which required a national, and later an
international, response.
When officials confronted the daunting task of trying
to apply identification practices to larger and larger
populations, they turned to statistics to solve their
problems and invented systems with sophisticated storage and
retrieval capabilities (including Bertillon's criminal
anthropometry and fingerprinting)

which attenuated the need

for personal knowledge of individuals under surveillance.
Chapter Four provides a detailed description of the origins
and logic of these statistically-based systems.
Chapter Five diverges from this technical emphasis and
concentrates instead on the appearance of widespread
fingerprinting requirements in the US in the late 1920s and
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early 1930s. Drawing on the background supplied in Chapter
Four, this chapter demonstrates how the technical
innovations offered by fingerprinting were applied. It
isolates changes introduced as a result of World War I as
responsible in large part for creating an atmosphere in
which routine surveillance of individuals emerged as both
plausible and necessary.
Although the trend toward larger and more efficient
identification systems was virtually unbroken, the movement
was not without its detractors. The populations against
which identification requirements were instituted were not
entirely passive and they often had advocates in the
government who also protested expanding identification
requirements. These protests took various forms including
the beliefs that these requirements violated an individual's
privacy, or unnecessarily stimatized him or her as a
criminal. Other critics argued that new identification
systems were technically inadequate or superfluous.
Together, these dissenters constituted a weak, but enduring,
force against the expansion of state-run identification
systems and their story is integrated here along with the
broader narrative of expansion.
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Research Strategy
Most historical references to criminal identification
practices are confined to passing comments about the mid19th century invention of rogue's galleries and the early
20th century deployment of fingerprinting. These accounts
suggest that it was the invention of a new technology that
occasioned a shift in identification practices, rather than
the emergence of new social needs that led people to seek an
improved means for identifying criminals. To locate these
transformations in the evolution of state power rather than
as technological imperatives and to write a social history
of state-run identification systems, I had to pursue two
lines of research. The first aimed at establishing a
chronology of identification practices from early individual
memory devices and written descriptions, to photography and
criminal anthropometry, and culminating in fingerprinting.
The second aimed to account for these changes: What social
trends and events precipitated the invention and
dissemination of new practices?
Although these two lines of research overlapped
considerably, I concentrated initially on the first. The
lack of secondary accounts concerning identification
practices required me to dedicate considerable effort to
delineating a baseline chronology upon which the
dissertation could be constructed. There was no way to
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reliably establish the starting point and subsequent shifts
in criminal identification record-keeping systems short of
gathering the evidence myself from primary sources. I
started by conducting a wide ranging survey of archives that
might contain relevant information. Secondary sources
concerning various aspects of government history helped in
this initial phase by indicating the likely archives with
which to begin. For example, detailed histories of the
Boston and New York police departments explained that the
police did not perform the crime prevention tasks with which
we now associate them, until the mid-1800s. This insight led
me to minimize attempts to find personal identification
records created by police in the early 1800s and to
concentrate my efforts for researching this period
elsewhere, namely in prison records.
Of all the archives I visited,

I asked the same basic

question: How did officials keep track of suspects or
convicts? To answer this question, I looked for three kinds
of evidence: 1) surviving identification records of any
form, 2) accounts of how officials should or did describe
criminals, and 3) commentary concerning the utility of
identification practices or the need for their improvement.
To begin exploring these issues at the level of local
governments, I started reviewing legal material dating from
the late 1600s that described legal practices in colonial
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America. I focussed primarily on Philadelphia, although I
also looked at material from Boston and New York. These
sources consisted primarily of statute books, broadsides,
newspapers, and provincial council minutes, and were located
at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, the Biddle Law
Library of the University of Pennsylvania, and the New York
Historical Society. A visit to Harvard University's law
library, Langdell Hall, to consult a collection concerning
criminal identification practices in late 18th century
London supplemented these inquiries into early criminal
identification practices.
To extend this research into the late 1700s and the
early 1800s, I drew on collections from many of these same
archives and from the Philadelphia City Archives (PCA). Most
of these records concerned prisons and were supplemented by
an excellent collection of early 19th century published
prison-related materials held by the Van Pelt Library at the
University of Pennsylvania. Materials received through the
mail from the Bostonian Society (located in Boston, Mass).
concerning the early tracking of counterfeiters helped to
bring this inquiry into the mid-1800s. These sources were
supplemented by secondary accounts of colonial and early
republican life. with these combined materials I was able to
sketch a useful chronology for this period of local criminal
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identification practices, which consisted primarily of noncentralized written descriptions.
For establishing a chronology of criminal
identification practices at the federal level, during the
late 1700s to the early 1800s, I examined the archives of
two early offices concerned with federal law enforcement:
the Postal Inspection Service and the Department of the
Treasury (DOT) .59 Federal material for the mid-1800s was
drawn from these same archives, and was supplemented by DOT
Secret Service papers, Federal Marshal papers, and the
Pinkerton Detective Agency Collection that is housed at the
National Archives. Secondary sources for the military
confirmed what I had learned in these archives: that the
federal government at this time lacked any centralized

criminal identification records.
As the chronology that I was constructing began to
reach the 1870s and 1880s, more and more material became
available that indicated not only an increased interest in
identification, but also a marked change in identification
practices. Locally, rogues' galleries had been established.
Nationally, several organizations had started calling for
the establishment of a national identification system, and
the US government had established its first centralized
criminal identification record-keeping system.

(A small set

of logbooks maintained by the DOT's Secret Service).
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Accounts of subsequent critical events in this history, such
as the adoption of fingerprinting, are readily available in
secondary accounts. Thus, with these findings from the 1870s
and 1880s, I had established a chronology with which I could
proceed to the next phase of research.
On the basis of this chronology I selected several key
events for more detailed investigation and began a second,
more intensive round of research. As with the first phase,
this phase also focussed on primary source documentation,
guided by secondary accounts. For the chapter concerning the
Walnut St. Jail, research required a careful sorting out of
the PCA's Walnut St. collection (which is not accurately
labelled) and a close reading of the jail's records. This
reading was informed by several surviving commentaries,
essays from the 1780s and 1790s, and by several contemporary
accounts of Walnut St. and the penal reform movement in
general.
For Chapters Three and Four, this phase of the research
required identifying and locating information on early
police practices, and identifying and locating information
on organizations that were active in the drive to create a
national criminal identification system. Police-related
material was drawn from the PCA, including police manuals
and mayoral speeches. A policeman's diary located in the New
York Historical Society's collection supplemented this
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section considerably, as did several turn-of-the century
police histories. These histories, which fell somewhere
between primary and secondary sources, provided useful
descriptions of daily departmental functions and reprints
from 18th and 19th century popular writings concerning the
police. Chapter Three also benefitted from a recent group of
historical studies on urban policing and a second group of
studies on the implications of the early 19th century trend
toward industrialization in the US.
For information concerning organi2ations that were
active in the drive to establish national identification
systems, I relied on the published proceedings of these
organizations, including the New York Prison Association,
the National Prison Association, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Wardens'
Association. I also consulted the International Association
of Chiefs of Police archival collection at the National
Archives. With the exception of the Wardens' Association,
the existence of these organizations is well known to
historians of this period who have delineated the roles of
these organizations in other social movements. Still, no
history has traced their contributions to the creation of a
national identification system either as sites for the
articulation of theories of criminality that perpetuated the
importance of surveillance, nor as sources for practical
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innovations in distinguishing and tracking individual
criminals. The history of criminal anthropometry, in
particular, has been overlooked or marginalized.
In addition to continuing to trace the institutional
development of national identification systems, Chapter Four
also concentrates on examining the importance of these
systems to the history of statistics. The centrality of
statistical reasoning and evidence in the contemporary
development of social policies makes it particularly
important to locate--as this chapter has done--the moment
when the state began devising ways to apply statistics to
individuals. The establishment of this capacity represents a
key moment in the evolution of both statistical method and
personal identification practices. The movement to apply
statistical reasoning to individual identity provides a
revealing example of how the state garners and deploys its
power. While historians have delineated the implications of
these statistical innovations for the history of statistics,
they have not previously analyzed them for their
contribution to the evolution to state power. The material
for this section was drawn from a close reading of the
published writings by the principles involved: Alphonse
Bertillon, Francis Galton, William Herschel, and E.C. Henry.
Material on William Herschel was supplemented by a visit to

45

the Herschel collection held by the Bancroft Library at the
University of California at Berkeley.
Tracing the history of federal interest in the
establishment of a state-run identification system for
Chapter Five required the continued reliance on minutes of
the national organizations listed above and the gathering of
considerable additional material, as well. This material
included records of Congressional hearings and bills, the
papers of Attorney General Charles Bonaparte housed at the
National Archives, a review of 45 years worth of the New
York Times and of the Periodical Guide to Literature on
relevant topics during the period of 1880-1925 (this
material was also used in Chapter Four), a review of all
issues of Fingerprint Magazine from 1919 to 1925, and a
review of all state and federal court cases concerning
anthropometry and fingerprinting from 1900 to 1931. This
work was supplemented by several Freedom of Information Act
requests

(totaling over 1,400 pages) which sought documents

concerning the FBI's administration of its fingerprint
system. I also consulted FBI records at the National
Archives and a more limited collection at the FBI offices in
Quantico, Virginia. Secondary sources concerning the history
of WWI and the FBI guided interpretation of these materials.
A selected list of archival, primary, and secondary
sources that I consulted is appended to the dissertation.
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Chapter Two
The Walnut St. Jail:
The Emergence of Official Identities and Surveillance

Introduction
This history of official identities and individualized
surveillance begins with penal reforms introduced by the
Quakers in the late 1700s, during America's Revolutionary
War era. In the process of radically altering the structure
and function of punishment, officials established a recordkeeping system capable not only of isolating and monitoring
the conduct of individual prisoners, but also of organizing
the recorded information into a enduring form, which would
be available for ongoing consultation. Penal reformers
believed that this information would help them to humanely
rehabilitate wrongdoers and, eventually, to eradicate crime.
These reforms fell far short of their mark--crime continued
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to flourish and, arguably, the condition of prisoners
actually deteriorated under the reform program. The
identity-fixing and surveillance strategies established in
the name of reform, however, took on a life of their own and
continued to thrive, albeit often separated from their
original reform motivations. The strategies described here
constitute the first sustained, individualized surveillance
system in the United States.
This chapter begins by briefly reviewing the impulse
for early American penal reform and its various components.
It then explains how reform ideas were put into action in
one setting--the Walnut St. Jail of Philadelphia. This
account concentrates on describing how jail officials
grappled with the challenge, created by new penal theory, to
distinguish and monitor individual inmates. These strategies
are reviewed in some detail and provide, indeed, almost a
case study of the Walnut St. Jail.
This emphasis serves two purposes. First, this account
helps to correct misconceptions about the origins of
individualized surveillance in the US. This trend is usually
traced back only as far as the 1820s or 1830s, rather than
to the Revolutionary War era, as suggested here.l Second,
and more important, these events constitute a critical
starting point in the long-term and ongoing insinuation of
records into the relationship between the state and the
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individual. The Quaker commitment to penal reform led them
to initiate ground-breaking work in the adaptation of
writing into records. In fulfilling their mandate to monitor
individual conduct,

jail officials invented several basic

practices of individualized record-keeping. Subsequent state
officials, who also found themselves drawn to individualized
surveillance as a means of social control, relied on these
same practices.

British Colonial Penal Practices
The British based their penal code on the presumptions
that criminal behavior emanated from an evil soul and that
the universality of Original Sin made all people potentially
guilty.2 That some went on to commit crimes, while others
did not, was often attributed to a lack of family
discipline.3

(The equation of sin with crime and the

ubiquitous designation of small acts as sins, however, made
going through life without committing a crime unlikely.)
Punishment served two purposes--social revenge and
deterrence. To assure the full effect of deterrence,
punishments were public. Executions were held on market days
and the pillory was placed in the town square, in clear
view.4 The colonial penal code of the late 1700s specified
capital punishment for thirteen crimes, including murder,
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treason, rape, burglary, and sodomy.5 Other crimes called
for severe physical punishments including branding, ear
cropping, whipping, or nailing the victim's ears to a
pillory.6
Officials might tailor these punishments to a
particular criminal, for example by increasing the number of
lashes or adding a fine for repeat offenses. There was,
however, no formalized procedure for analyzing an individual
criminal's motives or history, and modifying the punishment
on these grounds.7 At this point, in the terms suggested by
the 19th century Italian criminologist, Raffaele Garofalo,
the law knew only two elements: the offense and punishment. 8
The third element, which so concerns contemporary society,
the criminal, had not yet emerged.
The British colonial system relied only marginally on
imprisonment as punishment. Imprisonment, a comparatively
private penalty, could not effectively advance the goal of
deterrence through terror because citizens could not witness
the convict's suffering. Prisons existed, but officials used
them primarily as holding facilities for defendants,
witnesses, debters, and political dissidents.9 Conditions in
these prisons evoked some of the most intense reactions
among reformers. Labelled "congregate" prisons by critics,
these jails housed all inmates together without regard for
age, race, gender, or reason for incarceration.
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Indiscriminate mingling between genders and races offended
the reformers on moral grounds and they believed that mixing
young innocents with hardened criminals encouraged the
innocents to take up lives of crime. The government did not
fund these prisons. The keeper supplied food, clothing, and
heat, for fees paid by the prisoner. 10

Authority was vested

in the person--the keeper, and perhaps the guard, if there
was one, and often chaos reigned. Survival depended on
negotiations: on what one could buy or barter, or on whom
one knew. Of Philadelphia's (pre-reform) Walnut St. Jail,
one commentator wrote,

"To visit the prison in those days

[1770s] required the exercise of a degree of moral courage
not ordinarily met with. "11
Early US penal reformers rejected the British-imposed,
penal code because they considered it arbitrary, cruel,
extreme, and in the end, ineffective.12 They sought to do
away with punishments which were harsh, arbitrary, and
overly punitive, and prisons where the time spent awaiting
trial often caused more suffering than an actual sentence.
The founding of a new nation provided the opportunity to
reformers to devise a new penal code which embodied these
ideas.
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Penal Reform
The Philadelphia Quakers led the calls for reform. They
had a long-standing commitment to more humane penal
practices which sprang both from their life experiences and
their beliefs. Quakers had been subjected to imprisonment
and punishment in England for their religious beliefs and
knew the horrors convicts faced. William Penn, Quaker
founder of the Pennsylvania colony, had himself been
imprisoned and upon release travelled to Holland to see
Dutch work-house alternatives as a possible model for
implementation in his colony. Quaker beliefs forbade the
death penalty except for first-degree murder and although
the Quakers did practice corporal punishment, they rejected
the more extreme British forms. Furthermore, because the
Quaker colony had once lived under its own penal code, the
rejection of British practices also signalled an opportunity
to reinstitute past Quaker traditions.13
Reformers channeled much of their energy into an
organization, the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the
Miseries of Public Prisons,

(henceforth, PSAMPP), which was

established in 1787 by a largely Quaker constituency. 14 This
organization appealed to the Pennsylvania legislature
several times to change the prevailing penal code and
finally succeeded when a PSAMPP plan was adopted virtually
in its entirety in 1790.15
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The plan presented by the PSAMPP differed dramatically
from British colonial practices. At its center was the
rejection of punishment as revenge and its replacement with
the belief that

.... . the only design of punishment is the

reformation of the criminal. "16 Punishment was still
intended to penalize offenders, but its goal now was to
change the prisoner, not to terrorize him. Ironically (or
perhaps suitably), the young Republic's leaders, dedicated
to personal freedom, chose as their primary punishment,
imprisonment: the deprivation of "personal liberty" which is
"so dear to all men."17
Reformers chose to promote imprisonment because they
believed it would permit them to create an environment
suitable for rehabilitation. Through imprisonment, the state
could isolate the convict, remove him from friends and
temptations, and have ample time to re-educate the wrongdoer.lS The prison program would combine solitude, labor,
and the careful regulation of social interactions. Solitude
would force the criminal to reflect on his misdeeds,
"[e]very thought should recoil upon himself."19

This "self-

reflexion" would cause the convict to forego his old
habits.20 Thus divested, the prisoner would be ready to
incorporate new habits--self-control, humility, and
productivity--which would be inculcated through regular,
mandatory labor.
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To end the contamination between hardened criminal and
innocents in the congregate jails, officials would classify
inmates and separate them into groups based on the nature of
their criminal behavior, gender, age, and race. Each group
would eat, sleep, work, and worship separately.21 This
arrangement not only would prevent corruption but also would
maintain and teach "proper" social boundaries (e.g., blacks
separated from whites, and men from women) .
Although there were many strictures which applied to
all prisoners, the new system also called for
individualizing punishments. In determining the sentence,
the judge was supposed to consider whether the crime was
committed because of "passion, habit, or temptation," and
adjust the sentence accordingly.22 Also the sentence was to
reflect the convict's character, "his temperment and
constitution." In these stipulations, the new penal code
departed radically from established practices.
If convicts applied themselves, proponents believed,
they could emerge from this regimen transformed, ready to
rejoin society, this time as disciplined, trustworthy
citizens. If convicts could demonstrate personal growth,
prison inspectors could grant a pardon and early release.
In the words of Caleb Lownes, a prominent PSAMPP member,
treatment at the new prison "would depend on [the
prisoners'] conduct." Those who evidenced a "disposition"
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that favorly impressed the prison inspectors "should be
recommended ... for a pardon. "23 With this final stipulation-reform leading to early release--the PSAMPP plan introduced
a new kind of individualization into the penal code and with
it the need for creating official identities and
surveillance.

Individualizing Punishment
PSAMPP officials believed that successful reform
required knowing each prisoner, and tailoring or
individualizing the punishment to suit his or her particular
character. Wrong-doers became objects of scrutiny: What had
led these hapless men and women astray? How did they
understand their responsibility to God and the community?
What could officials do to show them the way back into the
fold? And, finally, how would officials know when this
transition had been accomplished?
To answer questions posed by the new emphasis on
individualizing punishment, officials had to erect a system
of observation, examination, and recording. They had to
devise procedures which, in Michel de Certeau's words, could
"isolate" the individual in the same sense as isolating an
element in chemistry.24 Having located the individual,
officials had to invent the means for holding him steady for
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regular and repeated observations, and the means to store
and use these observations. In sum, they had to invent the
means to create official identities and monitor individual
conduct.
Prior to Quaker reforms, punishment had been
individualized on a limited scale and had generated equally
limited individualized record-keeping. Referred to as

judicial individualization, and restricted to the final
pronouncement when a judge exercised his right to soften or
augment a punishment (for example, ten lashes versus a fine
and ten lashes), records reflected this kind of
individualization only in the brief notation which described
the penalty. In contrast, Quaker reforms extended
individualization of punishment from the ruling into the
sentence itself. This change dramatically increased the need
for individualizing records pertaining to convicts and led
to administrative individualization.25
Penal reformers who introduced administrative
individualization of punishment were largely unaware of its
implications. They were struggling to create a new penal
code: one befitting an idealistic young republic--a

code

"less sanguinary," as one commentator described it, but
nonetheless effective in its control of deviance.26 They did
not use the term individualization nor apparently did they

63

recognize the new, vital role their reform theories would
create for record--keeping and surveillance.
It is important to point out that Quaker penal reforms
cannot take sole responsibility for the emergence of
individualized record-keeping systems in early US history.
In the long-term perspective, Quaker reforms represent the
fruition of a several centuries-long process involving farreaching economic and social change that fostered the
emergence of the modern notions of the individual and of
individual responsibility.27

Quaker reforms simply

crystalized these trends into a new penal code and a related
surveillance system. Furthermore, Quaker reforms were not
alone in expressing these transformations in the young
united States. Other efforts to create official identities
and deploy surveillance strategies also emerged in medicine
and social welfare, although their development was slower
and more sporadic.28

The New Jail at Walnut St.
To assure the prisoners' isolation from temptation and
friends, the original penal reform plan called for building
a jail in a remote part of Pennsylvania. However, for
economy and convenience, officials settled on using an old
Philadelphia facility, the Walnut St. Jail. To make this old

64

congregate jail into a place where imprisonment would "reform" its subjects, rather than endanger them, required a
complete administrative transformation.29 To oversee this
process, the Pennsylvania Assembly chartered a Board of
Inspectors that drew its membership from among
Philadelphia's leading citizens, largely PSAMPP devotees.
The Inspectors, in turn, hired a new warden who was
sympathetic with the reform regime's goals, and new clerks
and guards to help the warden implement the program day by
day. The Inspectors designated two of their ranks to be
Visiting Inspectors and directed them to visit the prison at
least twice weekly to monitor events.30 Together, this
prison staff labored to create a system which deployed
surveillance over the entire institution, although prisoners
were of greatest concern.31
The first part of this Walnut St. account concentrates
on its "halcyon days," the period of 1790-1798 when
reformers dedicated considerable energy to this new
experiment and when they believed they were succeeding.32
The changes described below were not all in place when the
regime began. Rather they took place over the whole of this
early period. These were heady days for the reformers. They
spent many hours debating the right way to proceed, received
praise from the state's governor, and welcomed many local
and foreign visitors who came to see for themselves yet
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another tangible result of America's revolutionary politics.
This account begins by detailing the surveillance strategies
devised by officials. Although prison officials also needed
to devise a means for distinguishing one prisoner from
another and assigning to each of them an official identity,
at least during Walnut St.'s first decade, this challenge
remained a minor concern due to the small size the inmate
population. The greater challenge lay in designing a
surveillance system that would produce individually-based
information.

Surveillance

Strat~gies

The Inspectors devised five kinds of surveillance
strategies to sustain their new regime. These strategies
included rules, prisoner classification and spatial
organization, observations, logbooks, and reports. The first
two, rules and classification/spatial organization,
generated information and guided the third, observations.
The final two, logbooks and reports, provided the formats to
store and use these observations.
This account of the Walnut St. surveillance apparatus
is based both on descriptions of activities

(including

commentaries and minutes of Inspector's meetings) and on
actual records of activities

(for example, sentencing
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records as records of record-keeping) .33 Commentaries and,
to a lesser degree, minutes present idealized versions of
the prison that cannot be automatically trusted to reflect
actual practice. However, in many instances, such as the
mandate to submit daily reports of nightly disturbances,
this distinction is not terribly important. For questions
pursued here, it is important to know simply that Inspectors
demanded such daily reports and that they contended to
visitors that the reports had been made, whether or not they
actually had been.
Because this account concentrates on exploring how
Walnut St. officials devised new methods of record-keeping
to serve their reform agenda, it may present a slightly
imbalanced picture of the relationship between oral and
textual practices at the prison. Record-keeping's centrality
in this account is an artifact of the theoretical interests
it serves, rather than an accurate depiction of the relative
importance of orality and textuality at the prison. While
Walnut St. officials pioneered the use of individualized
records, the prison environment remained one where personal
or oral authority continued to prevail. As oral authority
remained dominant at the prison in spite of the new role
created for texts, so it often does today even in the face
of the wide dissemination and valorization of multifarious
textual practices. The intent here is not to contribute to
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that valorization, but to explore something about its
origins.

Rules
In one of the more telling departures from congregate
prison practices, Inspectors composed a list of twenty-five
rules regulating both guard and prisoner behavior.34 For
prisoners, the rules delineated acceptable practices for
dress, bathing, and religious and work habits; and for
guards, the rules described their duties and forbade them
from accepting bribes. The rules also set forth rewards and
punishments for upholding or breaking the rules.
These rules formed the kernal of reform efforts. They
both represented and engendered the orderliness which was
supposed to inculcate discipline in the prison's population.
Their form was important: printed, numbered, declarative.
They seemed to announce that the promised retreat from chaos
had been accomplished. Hung in "six conspicuous places in
said gaol," the rules provided a standard to which both
prisoners and guards could refer in their efforts to comply
with the new regime.35 By reducing (in the sense of
concentrating rather then diminishing) the reform effort to
a programatic statement, the rules affirmed that the reform
process was systematic, knowable, and feasible.
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These rules formed a fundamental part of the
surveillance apparatus. They did not provide a means for
watching individuals; instead, they set forth something
logically prior to watching: the framework for creating the
distinction between proper versus improper behavior in the
individual being watched. In so doing the rules provided a
way to generate information about individuals.
First the rules indicated where to look: at speech,
hair length, or cleanliness. They then indicated what to
look at: level, length, or

shade. For example, with the

rule that inmates should be shaved twice weekly, beard
length turned into information. An unshaven face indicated a
recalcitrant inmate or a lazy guard, or both. A clean shaven
face indicated conformity. In the same way, a rule to wash
daily directed the supervisory gaze toward hands and face,
and dirt became information. A rule against yelling isolated
that act, too, from the behaviorial stream. Rules channelled
parts of behavior out from that stream and into the guards'
view. They generated the information that other strategies
monitored and recorded.
In a basic way, these rules differed little from rules
which govern orally-based interactions. They outlined
mandates for proper behavior and in so doing enabled the
monitoring of behavior. Still, the writteness of these rules
was a deliberate and meaningful choice that distinguished
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them from oral admonitions. First, their written form
associated these rules

(and thus the prison's

administration) directly and immediately with the new
democratic order: the US Constitution, its statutes, and its
commitment to rule by (written) law rather than by men
(sic). The posting of rules allowed officials to share in
the new regime's legitimacy and indicated that the new
approach to punishment, which was mandated by the
revolutionary regime, shared that regime's commitment to a
regulated, explicit mode of governing.
Second, reliance on written rules distinguished the
reform prison from the congregate prison, where authority
was lodged almost completely in the person. In the
carnivalesque congregate prison, authority and hierarchy
were open to wide-ranging and frequent negotiation. In
contrast, the reform prison sought to project an image of an
orderly and ordering institution (even if, in reality,
prison life remained somewhat chaotic). The prison rules
were critical to this new way of ordering.
By devising, printing, and mounting a set of rules,
Inspectors and the warden distanced themselves from the
fray.

They were not demanding personally that a particular

prisoner behave in a particular way. The demand was located
in the rule. Although in some sense, an appeal to nonwritten tradition can achieve the same displacement, written
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rules can do it more efficiently. The rules appeared
throughout the institution (at least, in "six conspicuous
places"), thus attenuating demands for personal reiterations or re-affirmations by those in charge. This does
not necessarily mean that these rules were obeyed more often
than unwritten ones, only that their imposition may have
required less direct or continual intervention by
administrators. This posting also may have helped to protect
the rules from threats of re-negotiation, against which oral
traditions must defend constantly.
Thus, printed rules, at Walnut St. and in general, by
constituting an impersonal authority, protect the actual
people in power, at the same time that they expand
authority beyond any particular official. These functions
can be attributed to the other written forms that made up
the surveillance apparatus at Walnut St. Just like rules,
logbooks and reports create alternate sites for authority to
inhabit, which strengthens and extends official interests.

Classification/spatial organization
The congregate prison recalls in its name one of the
greatest complaints about it: that regardless of race,
gender, age, class, or crime, inmates were housed together.
This practice offended reformers on several grounds
including the possibility of "illicit" sexual relations and
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"indiscriminate" racial mixing. But their greatest complaint
was that this uncontrolled contact made prisons into schools
for crime. They believed that new criminals were created out
of the contact between innocents

(such as debtors, first-

time offenders, and witnesses), and hardened criminals who
were housed together. As one early commenter lamented,
debtors or first offenders, "by mixing with the criminals,
have formed connexions which ultimately led to their being
convicts themselves." Importantly, indiscriminate mixing
also mitigated against effective, individualized
surveillance. 36
Toward alleviating this problem, reformers insisted
that the inmates be divided into groups based initially on
their criminal history, apparently drawn from sentencing
reports, and later based, as well, on their behavior while
in the prison.37

Those who "evince a disposition to demean

[meaning here, to conduct) themselves in an orderly and
exemplary manner," for example, were part of

the "select

class." Those who "have nothing to recommend them either by
their past life ... and have not evinced any remarkable
disposition since their confinement" were part of the
"probationary class." And those "who are ... men of depraved
morals, dangerous Characters, unruly dispositions or
disorderly conduct," belonged to the "Dangerous Class."38

72

Using these classifications, the Inspectors assigned
prisoners to various locations in the prison. The "select
class," for example, was permitted "whilst orderly" to
occupy two rooms formerly used by the carpenters and
weavers, and female convicts could use the first floor in
the west wing and the court-yard, while the "dangerous
characters" were confined at all times to separate rooms.39
This deployment produced information in a way similar
to the prison rules. Assignment to one room implied
exclusion from others. By designating where inmates were
supposed to be at designated times, this practice generated
a grid of temporal and spatial relations. With this grid as
background, individual deviant behavior could be detected.
Eating, sleeping, and religious worship schedules
contributed to surveillance in the same way.
Together rules and classifications provided the
fundamental means of generating information about inmates.
By specifying criteria for normalcy and deviance, they
distinguished figure and ground which was necessary for
productive observations focussed on individuals.

Observations
Observation, perhaps the activity most commonly
associated with surveillance, was pervasive and wellorganized at Walnut St. The Inspectors devised a system of
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multiple gazes arranged concentrically with prisoners
inhabiting the innermost spot as the objects of the most
intense gaze, but with all members of the prison being the
object of someone's scrutiny.
The daily charge of observing the prisoners fell to the
guards. They watched for misbehavior while "constantly
parading in the passages, in the courts, and among the
prisoners."40 During the day they kept a look out for
"sluggardly" or "loquacious" workers. At night they were
alert to signs of attempted escape or unauthorized mixing
among classified groups. Transgressions were reported to
supervisors every morning and recorded.41 These reports were
conveyed to the Visiting Inspectors who visited the prison
twice weekly, if not more often.42 While there, the
Inspectors walked the grounds "with the jailbook in one hand
and a pencil in the other" talking to staff and prisoners,
and recording their observations.43 The Inspectors held the
power of pardon and reached their opinions about a
prisoner's progress, in part, during these conversations.
The guards and Inspectors were not alone however in
their daily vigilance. According to two observers who
visited the prison in the mid-1790s, there was "little or no
necessity" for punishment because the prisoners behaved as
they should "under the mutual inspection of each other."44
Moreover, prisoners not only watched other prisoners, but--
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officials believed--theyalso watched themselves. According
to one 1796 visitor, because prisoners believed that a
transgression was never overlooked, they contrived "to
adjust their conduct accordingly. "45 In this last sense, we
can see how the prison rules foster Foucault's inspecting
gaze, "which each individual under its weight will end by
interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer, each
individual thus excercising this surveillance over, and
against, himself."46

Logbooks
Logbooks are records in which information about the
same class of events is repeatedly entered in pre-determined
categories. The Walnut St. logbooks were huge volumes, some
weighing as much as 10 or 15 pounds. Inspectors initiated
logbooks to monitor everything from expenses to illneses.
Two in particular were dedicated to prisoner affairs.
The Sentence Docket recorded an inmate's arrival and
his departure. Upon arrival, a clerk entered the following
information for each inmate: name, age, crime, court at
which tried, prosecutor, sentence, and sentencing date. Upon
departure, the clerk added a physical description, and noted
"when and how".the prisoner was discharged.47 This docket
oversaw the flow of prisoners in and out of Walnut St.
During the early years, it contained the only written

7S

description of prisoners.

(The "description" category will

be discussed in greater detail below in the section devoted
to official identities.)
A second logbook relating to prisoners tracked their
work activities. The Inspectors ordered the warden to
monitor all expenses related to each convict including the
bargain that the convict reached about the kind of work
assigned to him or her. According to two accounts, each
convict had a separate book in which this information and
the prisoner's daily work output was entered. As a way to
assure that both the prison warden and the prisoners kept
their bargains, this book was "audited every three months in
the presence of the Inspectors."48
Accounts and statutes mention two additional logbooks,
dedicated to monitoring unusual events. The first recorded
illnesses experienced by inmates, and the second tracked
disturbances in the prison routine.49 In describing the
justification for the latter, one commentator explained that
the law required night guards to report " ... on the morning
of the succeeding day any remarkable occurrence of the night
to the clerk who commits the same to writing, and lays it
before the inspectors at their next meeting."SO
Together these logbooks provided prison Inspectors with
a detailed picture of both routine and aberrant events in a
prisoner's daily life and an overview of the jail previously
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unavailable. Although information was recorded by single
events associated with a specific person (illness, release
date, and so on), the logbook, by virtue of its organization
could generate summative information. Through its
requirement to categorize and store similar information
consistently in the same place and manner, the logbook also
encouraged standardization. This permitted comparison and
facilitated the compilation and novel organization of
information. For example, every quarter the warden used
these entries to write a report describing the total prison
population by various characteristics including occupation,
gender, and crime committed.51
These logbooks also provided information for decisions
concerning adjustments in an inmate's sentence, such as a
stint in solitary confinement or, most importantly, a
pardon. For example, the Board of Inspectors stipulated that
prisoners should not be recommended for pardon unless they
had earned their keep, and Inspectors referred to these
books in making that determination.52 The labor logbooks, by
revealing a prisoner's work habits, demonstrated whether
convicts had taken on the "disposition" of a reformed,
because productive, person. The pardon decision, based in
part on work records, exemplifies administrative
individualization of punishment. Adjusting the length of
punishment based on willingness to work embodies the
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reformers' idea that "punishments should always be varied in
degree"

(e.g. abbreviated or continued), according to "the

progress of their [the prisoner's] reformation."S3

Reports
Reports provided a final common destination for much of
the information generated by rule infractions and the
logbooks: reports from the doctor to the keeper, from the
guard to the clerk, from the keeper to the Inspectors, and
so on.

Wherever found, these reports performed the pivotal

function of transferring information from one group of
officials to another, whether up the hierarchy, laterally,
or down. Some were mandated to be delivered in writing,
others orally, but for the most their form was unspecified.
They differ from logbooks in that they cover one time
period, rather than compiling information about a series of
events, and in that they seem to have been more portable,
thus allowing them to deploy information differently than
logbooks. Instead of requiring that users come to the
source, as with logbooks, the portability of reports allowed
officials to bring information in from the outside or to
transfer it out, from the inside. The report sent along with
the convict for his or her arrival at the prison
illustrates this feature of reports.
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Escorted by officers from the sentencing court, the
convicts were presented first to prison personnel while the
court officer gave a brief report of the convict's crime,
emphasizing any mitigating circumstances. The officer also
described the defendant's behavior at his trial and his
"general conduct" before and after sentencing. 54

A clerk

then, apparently, recorded the sentencing court's reports in
a single volume purchased for just that purpose.55
These reports contributed directly to the
individualization of punishment. Extenuating circumstances,
once relevant only to sentencing, now became relevant to the
convict's treatment while undergoing punishment. They helped
construct the punishment itself. As a 1796 commentator
described the applications of these reports,

"This knowledge

of the prisoner's character and disposition ... affords them
[the Inspectors] an opportunity of ascertaining the degree
of care which may be requisite for the annihilation of his
former bad habits. "56

The introductory report provided the

vehicle through which Inspectors extended surveillance from
the courtroom into the prison. It brought a particular
version of the past forward into the present, shaping the
future; a critical function discernible to all of the
surveillance strategies thus far discussed.
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Surveillance: Then and Now
The approach to punishment that 18th century penal
reformers advocated required gathering intimate details of
inmates' lives. To meet this need, Inspectors had to create
a flow of information from the convict to themselves. To
initiate this process, they devised a set of rules and
classifications (which also acted as rules) that served as a
back-drop grid which revealed and measured behavior, as it
unfolded. In so doing, they transformed undifferentiated
behavior into appropriable artifacts, or information. To
preserve these information-producing performances beyond the
moment, prison officials employed various record forms such
as logbooks and reports. Entered here, performances became
notations ordered chronologically, and by name. In turn,
these notations, taken together, came. to constitute an
inmate's past. In written form, this version of the past
joined Walnut St.'s organizational memory, and was available
for an Inspector's use at any time, as for example when
evaluating the chance of pardon or the need for solitary
confinement.
The Walnut St. surveillance system incorporated the
basic elements of all subsequent surveillance systems. Today
state officia·ls use the same set of procedures to monitor
everything from financial status, to child health, to work
output. A set of rules

(such as a credit card account's
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charge limit, or a toddler's progress learning to pile one
block atop another, or the number of keystrokes a secretary
completes per minute) provides the standards for regularly
made judgments (such as credit checks, semi-annual
pediatrician visits, or hourly keystroke totals) that are
recorded in designated locations

(such as credit reports,

health records, or personnel files), for use by officials
when deciding access to resources

(such as mortagages,

insurance or welfare benefits, or promotion) .
In modern identification systems the desire to properly
attribute the right behavior to the right person, and to be
able to accurately retrieve that information is strong.
Hospitals hand out bar-code sensor bracelets to new-borns,
and some employers routinely fingerprint their employees.57
In the 1790s, Walnut St. Jail officials, worried far less
about creating procedures which would assure that they
attributed the right record to the right person. During the
first decade at Walnut St., the convict population never
rose above 146 and averaged just over 100.58 For day to day
affairs, prison personnel could rely on name and sight
recognition to identify inmates and could probably retrieve
pertinent information, stored by name, with little
difficulty. Still, during this period,

Inspectors did begin

devising strategies to augment, or circumvent, personal
recognition in determining a criminal's identity.
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Strategies for Establishing Official Identities
The Inspectors seem to have concentrated their
describing efforts into one volume, the Convict Sentence
Docket, briefly described above.59 A large, leather-bound
tome measuring one and half by two and half feet, the docket
contained blank pages which clerks ruled by hand. Successive
clerks laid out the pages in a fairly consistent manner.
They drew one column along the left-hand margin for the
convict's name, and several more columns extending across a
two-page spread for entering information pertaining to the
convict's sentence, such as

the sentence itself, the

sentencing date, and the prosecutor. The third to last of
ten categories was "description,"

which was the only

category not directly related to sentencing.
The hand-ruled lay-out changed slightly from page to
page, but the categories remained the same. The box
designated for "description" usually measured an inch high
by two and half to three inches across. Depending on the
clerk's handwriting and interest, it might contain only a
single phrase such as "born in England,"

which the clerk

used to describe Martha Jeffries, felon.60 Of another woman,
the clerk wrote, "a negress Born in the State of Maryland-had a young child when in jail called Sarah."61 Alternately
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the clerk might enter a paragraph more typically associated
with descriptions today, such as the one entered for 22 year
old John Barlow, alias David Lyon, who was discharged
November 26, 1794, after serving two years at hard labor for
stealing a mare:
Born in Sussex County New Jersey. Sft 7 in
high. pitted with the small pox. long dark brown
hair. Grey eyes, marked on his forehead just at
the edge of his hair.62

This lack of standardization in detail and type of
information is explained partially by the record's
improvisational prose form. Unlike later records which
specified more than 20 descriptive categories from shoe size
to parents' sobriety, this original docket had no set
categories and demanded instead that the clerk himself
decide what constituted a description.63
The novelty of these descriptions lies neither in their
existence (descriptions of thieves or runaway slaves had
appeared in newspapers and on broadsides for a long time),
nor in their content. They were rather imprecise compared to
other descriptions made in the same time period, or even
earlier.64 Instead, what is important here is their form and
their institutional link. Prior descriptions referred to
one-time events: an escape or a theft. In contrast, these
descriptions were part of an ongoing logbook series which

83

served institutional interests. For example, Walnut St.
officials recorded these descriptions, at least in part, to
provide themselves with a means for identifying recidivists.
Although the law had long treated repeat offenders more
harshly than first-timers,

recidivism's significance changed

with reform. Under the pre-reform British system, for
example, recidivism signalled a particularly intractable or
evil criminal, and called for banishment or the death
penalty. The pre-reform system held out no particular
promise for changing wrongdoers, only for terrorizing them.
Recidivism, while unfortunate, was more damning of a
particular criminal than of the penal code. Under the reform
regime, however, punishment was supposed to lead to reform
and hence to crime's eradication. Thus, recidivism cast a
shadow on the system, rather than on the individual, and
demanded attention.
As Walnut St. officials apparently planned to use these
descriptions primarily to distinguish recidivists, they made
them when the prisoner was about to be released. 65 After
prisoners had been pardoned and were ready to leave Walnut
St., they passed before a clerk for review. The clerk
entered a description which would be in place as a record
against which newcomers to Walnut St. could be compared.
Officials may have used this parting ritual as an
opportunity to warn the newly reformed convict not to go
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astray and to resist committing another crime which would
return him or her to Walnut St. Elsewhere in discussing
recidivism, the Inspectors promised that "mercy abused will
never be repeated," and if returned to Walnut St. as repeat
offenders, once-pardoned prisoners would face a term of
solitary confinement, which was "a real terror to them
all. "66
Inspectors believed that they could enforce this threat
of stiffer punishment for recidivists because "neither
change of name or disguise, will enable [prisoners] to
escape the vigilant attention" with which new arrivals would
be examined.67 Unfortunately, there is little information
available about actual recidivism rates.

(Those commentators

who mention recidivism rates cite rather low ones. Lownes,
for example, states that of 200 prisoners pardoned, only 4
had returned. 68 However, he cites no source for his
figures.) This lack makes evaluation of the utility of these
descriptions difficult. Still, as a fundamental component of
the "vigilant attention," given to new inmates, the
descriptions recorded in the Sentence Docket deserve close
attention. To what extent could they have helped clerks
counter a recidivist's subterfuge of a changed name or
facial disguise?
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Sentence Docket Descriptions
A randomly-selected sample of fifty descriptions
recorded from 1794-95 shows that clerks might have included
any of the following features in their descriptions of
convicts about to be released: birthplace, scars, height,
complexion (whether "sallow" or "fresh"), residence (before
sentencing or after release), hair or eye color, occupation,
and speech (for example, whether "thick" or "quick"}.69

The

descriptions usually included only 2 or 3 of these features.
(The mean number of features was 3.3 and the mode was 3).
Clerks most often listed the criminal's birthplace (84%),
followed by age (66%), height

(49%), and then hair or eye

color (32%) .70 (See Table One on page 95 for a summary of
these figures.)
It is unlikely that these descriptions could have
permitted identifications independent of a clerk's
recollection. They included too few unalterable features,
such as height, and concentrated instead on features subject
to fabrication,

such as birthplace and age. The descriptions

could aid a clerk's recognition by reminding him of a
particular feature. Final confirmation, however, would have
to rest not on the description's adequacy, but on the
clerk's own sense of certainty, perhaps aided by the
recollections of other prison staff.
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An equally serious problem undercutting the utility of
these desciptions surfaces when considering how a clerk
might go about locating an already recorded description to
match against a newcomer, who was a suspected recidivist.
Clerks recorded these descriptions in the Sentence Docket,
which was the primary volume for noting information about a
prisoner when he or she arrived at Walnut St. Sentence
Docket entries were ordered by sentencing date. To enter
departing information, "how and when released" and
"description," the clerk had to turn back the Sentence
Docket pages to the original sentencing entry and record the
now-pardoned inmate's release and description information.
The earlier Sentence Docket volumes contained no index, no
convict numbers, and no cross-referencing.71 Beyond
chronology and names, the records provided no ordering
priniciple to aid retrieval of desired information. If
confronted with a new admission, who was somehow familiar-possibly a former inmate and thus a recidivist--a clerk
would have had to thumb through the entire tome, and glance
across names and descriptions, hoping to find something to
substantiate the match he suspected.72
Of course, the clerk could call on his own memory, or
on those of other prison staff, for recollecting sentencing
dates. This might narrow the search to entries from a few
months or years. Still, and this is the same point which
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emerged above in the discussion of the descriptions'
adequacy, these entries might be of some use, but only in
the context of the collective memory operative at the
prison.
Walnut St. logbooks and reports contain no information
which would help now in determining the actual extent to
which clerks referred to these descriptions. Although
several entries characterize inmates as recidivists, the
clerk made no note of how he knew this, nor any indication
whether the prisoner was first incarcerated at Walnut St.,
or elsewhere. Still, whether or not they were used much,
these descriptions signal an important step in the
development of surveillance systems. Even in this nascent
form, they represent a desire on the part of the state to
stake out new territory in its control over individuals.

The Utility of Records to the State
Records are well suited to helping officials collect
the kind of information required to establish official
identities and deploy surveillance, such as, heights,
birthplaces, and sentencing dates. The required facts are
repetitive, decontextualized, and constantly accumulating.
This information is not the kind easily assimilated by
individual or collective memories. Records permit officials
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to overcome the time-space barriers implicit in individual
and collective memories. In the years after Walnut St., when
surveillance interests expanded beyond organizational walls,
this advantage became even more critical.
Records help officials overcome time-space barriers by
permitting a rupture between experiencing and remembering.
Individual or collective memory demand that those who want
access to memories, must cultivate them. In contrast,
through records, people with no personal experience of an
event can have access to it, or at least claim to. Prison
Inspectors, for example, could consult records and stay in
touch with prison affairs, while at the same time being
released from the burden of having to watch, and of having
to remember what they watched.

In this way, record-keeping

introduced a new division of labor at Walnut St.: Guards
observed, clerks recorded, and wardens and Inspectors read
and evaluated.
This division of labor conforms to the social hierarchy
implied by surveillance in the first place: a knowing elite
watching, correcting, and reforming the ignorant. The
maintenance of written memories requires labor, as does the
maintenance of any memory, but the burden shifts. Assuming
that clerks performed their duties, several kinds of
information, including identity descriptions and work
reports were available for Inspectors to consult.
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Created within a specific social hierarchy and
sustained by a particular division of labor, records can
extend the sight of officials over vast populations,
faciliate appropriation of information by concentrating and
organizing that information, and assure survival of the
authorized version of past events, all with a minimum of
labor contributed by officials.
Walnut St. records, of course, fulfilled this potential
only imperfectly. Clerks may have entered descriptions
fairly consistently, but these descriptions could have been
helpful only occasionally. In varying degrees, this kind of
imperfection is evident in all of the subsequent recordkeeping systems to be discussed here. While these failures
at achieving a sufficiently penetrating gaze do not negate
the project of trying to mount individualized surveillance,
they do indicate that there may be another implicit function
to these systems.
Why did Walnut St. clerks record descriptions which
offered little hope of aiding later identification?

In

part, they continued to write inadequate descriptions
because they were the only kind they knew how to write.
Indeed, they were inventing the art of description as they
described. But also, perhaps they persisted regardless of
poor quality because the descriptions had more than
instrumental significance. Indeed, these descriptions'
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utility lay not only in detecting recidivism, but also in
expressing and emphasizing the prison's political hierarchy.
As the pardoned prisoner--supposedly rehabilitated--prepared
to depart, the descriptive session permitted officials to
enact their authority one last time. The description is a
ritual which communicates who has the right to describe
whom, and thus, who rules whom.

Walnut St. 's Decline
For the first three or four years of Walnut St. 's
experiment, public opinion supported its new approach to
punishment. The remarks of Inspectors and of various
commentators (usually foreign visitors to the prison)
suggested that the prison routine was firmly established.
Convicts seemed to be responding well to the new demands
placed on them and many pardons had been granted.73
Citizens at large agreed that Walnut St. was having "good
effects," at least to the extent that there seemed to be
less crime in the city.74 Yet in a few short years, by 179899, conditions at Walnut St. began to deteriorate rapidly.
Prisoners set fire to a new wing of workshops, several
escaped, and an epidemic of yellow fever plaguing the city,
spread to the prison. Visitors to Walnut St. in 1799
reported seeing "idleness, sickness, filth,

and
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disrepair."75 Although the prison stayed open until 1835,
reformers had long since despaired of its capacity to enact
the new approach to punishment that once had held such great
promise.
In trying to explain this precipitous fall from order,
one of Walnut St. 's chroniclers pointed to several factors,
all related in some way to diminished administrative
invol vement. Caleb Lownes--one. of the most dedicated
Inspectors--departed, at the same time that political strife
among members of the Board of Inspectors prohibited other
Board members from filling the vacuum his departure had
created. This lapse in administrative attention coincided
with an increase in prison admissions, which in any case
would have caused problems for Walnut St.'s novel program.
But in the absence of strong leadership, overcrowding led to
compromising some of Walnut St. 's most sacred procedures:
classification and solitary labor.76 Once these reforms were
forsaken, many of the other basic disciplinary underpinnings
of the place gave way. While many of the past practices that
had distinguished Walnut St. from the congregate jails fell
away, one remained: record-keeping.77 Some logbooks and
report series did lapse, but records concerning personal
identification continued and actually became more elaborate.
The continuation of personal identity records in the
face of a general deterioration deserves some explantion.
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Unfortunately the Inspectors' Minutes reflect the waning
interest in the prison project and make little or no
reference to the need to continue or elaborate recordkeeping practices as a response to various problems. Prison
visitors, also once given to lengthy commentary when Walnut
St. represented something novel and radical, lost interest,
as well. In the absence of direct data (except, of course,
for the records themselves), however, two possible factors
influencing the continuation of personal identity records
still can be suggested. First, the law requiring harsher
punishments for recidivists remained on the books, even if
the reform efforts once aimed at helping first-time
offenders had gone by the way side. Thus, officials still
needed to be able to identify pardoned or released men and
women who were returning for a second stint of imprisonment.
Furthermore, prison escapes continued to occur with
disturbing frequency and the rate of crime in the city of
Philadelphia and its environs did not appear to abate. Based
on these factors, there was good reason for clerks to assume
that some of the new arrivals at Walnut St., indeed, were
recidivists.
Second, by the 1820s, the prison population regularly
topped 300 inmates, making personal recognition by clerks
less and less likely.78 An important trend in the US
population in general mirrored this decreasing ability to
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rely on recognition for prisoner identifications, and
perhaps contributed to the prison's commitment to
establishing official identities. Starting in 1820, the US
witnessed an astonishing growth in its urban population,
which by 1860 had increased 797%.

(During the same period

the national population rose only 226%.)79

For the first

time, many cities, including Philadelphia, crossed over the
invisible line that divided to.wns--where most people were
known to one another--from cities (such as those as we live
in today)--where most people were strangers to one another.
This population shift, caused by rapid and socially
disruptive industrialization, created uneasy times in
cities. As strangers established their quantitative edge
over acquaintances, a new set of narratives about outsiders
as potentially dangerous people emerged.80

This concern

about a growing, anonymous population may have encouraged
Walnut St. officials to improve their identification
strategies.
For these reasons and perhaps for others, clerks at
Walnut St. worked to improve the prison's identification
records. Reviewing the evolution of these records reveals
changes in several basic record-keeping practices, including
those which guided storage and retrieval procedures, and the
standardization and independent verifiability of recorded
information. These changes were critical to the creation of
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official identity records which could function independently
of individual or collective memory, and thus were also
critical to the later extension of identification recordkeeping systems beyond a single organizational setting.

Record-Keeping Improvements in the Post-Halcyon Days of
Walnut St.
Changes in Walnut St. records, over a thirty-year
period from the late 1790s until the mid-1820s, imply an
emergent desire to enhance the utility of recorded
information by expanding its content, improving its
standardization, and facilitating its retrieval. The
Sentence Docket's format and content illustrate these
trends. The following analysis of descriptions entered into
the Sentence Docket is based on a randomly-selected sample
of descriptions drawn at approximate ten-year intervals from
1795 to 1823.81 Table One on page 95 summarizes these
findings.
During the thirty-year period under consideration, both
the mean and modal number of features which clerks recorded
increased. The increased mean indicates that clerks were
recording a greater number of features for the prisoners
they evaluated. The parallel increases in the mode (from 3
to 5 to 10) indicates that this increase was not due to a
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TABLE ONE
Characteristics Recorded in Sentence Docket Descriptions
at the walnut St. Jail, 1795-98; 1808-1810; 1821-1823

==============================7============================1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1795-1798
1 1808-1810
1 1821-1823
1
1
1
n=53
1
n=81
1
n=83
1
----------1---------------1---------------1----------------1
Age
1
35 ( 66% )
1
59 ( 72 %)
1
72 ( 87% )
1
----------1---------------1---------------1----------------1
Birthplacej
45 (84%)
1
65 (79%)
1
66 (79%)
1
----------1---------------1--------------- ----------------1
Complexion 1
10 (19%)
1
47 (57%)
33 (40%)
1
----------1---------------1--------------- ----------------1
Gender
1
5 (9%)
1
14 (17%)
68 (81%)
1
----------1---------------1--------------- ----------------1
Hair/eye
1
17 (32%)
1
48 (58%)
42 (51%)
1
----------1---------------1--------------- ----------------1
Height
I
26 (49%)
1
71 (86%)
66 (79%)
1
----------1---------------1--------------- ----------------1
Occupation 1
12 (22%)
1
20 (24%)
49 (59%)
1
----------1---------------1--------------- ----------------1
Race
I
9 (17%)
1
19 (23%)
75 (90%)
1
----------1---------------1--------------- ----------------1
Residence 1
3 (5%)
1
0
63 (76%)
1
----------1---------------1--------------- ----------------1
Scars
1
2 (3%)
1
19 (23%)
27 (32%)
1
===========================================================1
===========================================================1
Mode
1
3
1
5
1
10
1
----------1---------------1---------------1----------------1
Average
1
3.3
1
4.5
1
7. 6
1
===========================================================1
Source: See Endnote no.81.
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few densely detailed descriptions, but to a consistently
higher number of features being recorded for each entry.
Importantly, this increased number of features did not
derive from the clerks adding new features to their
descriptions.

(All the features ever listed in any of the

sample of subsequent volumes appeared somewhere in the first
volume, which covered 1794-1804.) Rather, the increased
number of features is due to clerks consistently reporting
more of the same features already designated as relevant.
Thus, the increased number of features not only indicates
that clerks were routinely writing increasingly complete
descriptions of prisoners, but also that contents of those
descriptions were increasingly standardized.
These changes are made even more notable by the
additional observation that they occurred in the absence of
changes in record format. As described earlier, clerks wrote
discharge descriptions in prose form. In the absence of
separate categories, this increased attention to detail and
consistency would have required notable effort on the
clerk's part to remember each feature he was supposed to
examine. Possibly, the clerks referred to some sort of
memorandum specifying what information they were to record,
but given the rather rudimentary form bureaucracy took at
this time, such a possibility seems unlikely.
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Over the period studied, the clerks also enhanced the
independent verifiability of these descriptions. To the
extent that clerks were trying to make descriptions which
better served the demand to detect recidivists, independent
verifiability was critical. A recidivist might be returned
to Walnut St. years after his or her initial incarceration,
long after the clerk who wrote the original description had
left. For the description to provide any aid at all to the
clerk trying to make an identification, it had to include
features which remained relatively stable over time and
which could be re-evaluated by the current clerk. Such
features included items like eye color or scars, which the
clerk could observe himself, as opposed to features like
birthplace or occupation which were reported by the prisoner
and subject to fabrication (albeit within certain
credibility limits).
Nevertheless, while concentrating on independently
verifiable features will enhance a description's utility, in
no way will it guarantee that the description will
accurately identify a recidivist. This is true for several
reasons, not the least being the continuing difficulty of
locating an already entered description, no matter how great
its accuracy. But more to the point here, the fact that
certain features can be gleaned by the clerk's own
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observation, does not mean that that observation will be
accurate, nor that it will match those made at another time.
Certain mistakes can be made through a clerk's
inattention, but even great care does not eliminate them
all. None of the examined features was absolute. Even those
which seem clear-cut, such as race or eye color, are open to
interpretation. What one clerk describes as "brown" eyes,
another can describe as "hazel." What one clerk recorded as
"mulatto" another could record as "dark-complexion," or
"white." Much of the ensuing effort in identification work
can be interpreted as an attempt to reconcile this problem
of creating descriptions that are useful across different
settings.

(See Chapter Three for a fuller discussion of this

issue). Still, there is a fundamental difference between
those features which the clerk can observe and record on his
own, versus those he must ask the prisoner to report, such
as birthplace. Clerks and prisoners work at cross-purposes
over descriptions: an accurate description helps a clerk
detect a recidivist, while an inaccurate one helps a
recidivist escape. Thus, features that can be collected
independent of the prisoner are more likely to consistently
aid in the detection of recidivism, even if they are not as
straight forward as they first might appear.
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Analysis of Logbooks
Between the first sample of descriptions from the
Sentence Docket (1795-1798) and the last one (1821-1823),
the frequency with which clerks recorded independently
verifiable characteristics increased several-fold. In the
early sample, for example, clerks recorded race for 17.9% of
the inmates passing under their gaze, scars for 3%, and
height for 49%. The most frequently recorded features were
birthplace (84%) and age (66%), both features which are
subject to falsification. Thirty years later, clerks
continued to collect information about the same set of
features, but while still interested in items like
birthplace, they also dramatically increased their attention
to features that they could evaluate independently, such as
scars and height. Based on the 1821-1823 sample, clerk's
interest in race increased more than four-fold, their
interest in scars increased ten-fold, and they recorded
height half again as many times as they had in the late
1700s.
Taken together, the recorded features created
descriptions of much greater complexity and potential
utility than those written thirty years earlier. Again,
while it is impossible to know precisely how, or even if,
these description were used, this trend in the type of
features recorded does seem to indicate a growing awareness
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and sophistication on the part of clerks--or perhaps on the
part of officials directing clerks--about how to create a
description of greater utility in detecting recidivisits.
During this same thirty-year period, perhaps because
descriptions had become more useful, clerks also made
headway in improving retrieval methods. In 1808, they
integrated the first alphabetic index into the Sentence
Docket.82 The index, inserted at the beginning of the
volume, allotted several pages to each of the letters of the
alphabet and provided a space for clerks to record convict
names--first name, last--alongside the page number on which
the full sentencing entry for that person appeared. Assuming
the clerk could link, in his memory, the face of a newcomer
with a name, this alphabetic index could expedite the
clerk's search for the original entry. Once adopted,
alphabetic indexes were used in several other logbooks.
However, as late as 1826 when an alphabetic index prefaced a
new docket series, clerks felt compelled to append an
explanation telling prospective users how to employ it.83
A final, concentrated push toward consistency occurred
in the mid-1820s when officials introduced two new dockets
which pertained to prisoner identity. Into the first, the
Receiving Docket, clerks entered--in prose form--a
description of the prisoner including physical features, the
trial court, sentencing date and much later, a statement
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evaluating literacy skills and sobriety. Clerks treated this
docket as a primary source book from which they transferred
information into other dockets, such as the new Convict
Description Docket.84 Using information recorded in prose in
the Receiving Docket, clerks created, in the Convict
Description Docket, the first tabular display of criminal
identity information.
The Convict Description Docket fOllowed the same basic
grid pattern of the other dockets. One column ran down the
the left side of the page for the prisoners' names. Across
the top of the two-page spread, left to right, ran a string
of categories including birthplace, age, occupation,
complexion (often race was entered here), hair and eye
color, and stature, which clerks filled-in with information
for each convict. Clerks left a blank line running under the
boxes for these categories which spanned nearly the entire
two-page spread. Here they entered what became increasingly
detailed descriptions of scars and other permanent marks
such as, tatoos or physical disfigurements.
Eventually this tabular form came to replace prose
entries entirely. The Convict Description Docket represents
a transitional form still requiring a clerk to write out a
prose description before entering the information into a
table. The tabular format offers severa·l advantages over
prose descriptions, especially when fully implemented.
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First, it speeds description by minimizing the effort
required by the clerk. Forms demand that the clerks simply
check boxes or enter single words, rather than write out
full phrases. Second, the tabular format improves
consistency by reminding clerks which items require
reporting. They no longer have to rely on their own memory.
And third, it greatly enhances access to information by
clarifying its presentation.

~nstead

of having to search an

entire docket by reading through each description, the new
Convict Description Docket permitted clerks to find relevant
information by simply glancing down a column. For example,
if faced with a possible recidivist of a known height, say
5ft. 7 in., instead of having to read through hundreds of
prose descriptions, clerks could search for the individual's
possible prior entry simply by glancing down the height
column and looking for all entries, say between 5 ft.
and 5 ft.

6 in.

8 in. This method would leave the clerk with a

small pool of entries which he could read through more
carefully.
One final record-keeping innovation was introduced
during this period. Officials shifted the description's
timing. As the Receiving Docket's name indicates, officials
moved the description session from departure to arrival.
(Actually, they may have added this new arrival session
while continuing the one held just prior to departure.) The
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reasons for this switch go un remarked in the Inspector's
minutes for this period. Most likely they were related to an
increased desire on the part of officials to enhance their
control over prisoners during their incarceration. The
growing prison population (by 1825, there were 358
prisoners) would have attentuated the sway of personal
authority once held by Inspectors, a trend exacerbated by
the Inspectors' own waning interest. 85 Also frequent escapes
finally could have driven home to officials that they needed
descriptions on hand to aid in the recapture of fugitives.
No doubt, also, as the discharge description had functioned
to assert--one last time--the social hierarchy which
initially brought the wrongdoer to prison; the new arrival
description functioned to declare--from the start--the
jailer's right to watch, to measure, and to know the jailed.

Utility of Record-keeping Improvements
Overall, by the mid 1820s, Walnut St. clerks would have
had access to several useful facts which, while not capable
of proving an incoming prisoner's identity as a recidivist,
certainly could have contributed to verifying a guess.
Clerks would have known the race, gender, height, and hair
and eye color of most of the possible returnees. For another
third of this group, they would have known about scars or

.

"
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other marks. The added information of occupation and
residence, for 76% and 59% of the prisoners respectively,
also would have facilitated an identification. And because
clerks would have known all this information soon after
commitment, it could have been equally useful in
apprehending and re-committing escapees.
By consistently adding independently verifiable
features and by making the means to retrieve information
both more efficient and more easily used, officials were
moving the work of identification from memory to written
record, and thus from individual clerk to administrative
regime. Less and less often could recidivists count on time
to erase their past by dimming the jailer's memory. Now
prisoners' pasts were recorded, organized, and (somewhat)
retrievable, regardless of the number of years elapsed
between incarcerations, and regardless of who happened to
preside over each admission or release.
Although individual and collective memories can display
impressive persistence over time, these identity records
permitted prison officials to time-travel in a new style.
Having shifted the burden of memory away from personal and
collective memories and toward a clerk's obligations to tend
the organizational memory, officials began to assure that
the past could be brought forward into the present with
minimal effort by themselves. This substitution of a record
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for a person exemplifies what Giddens refers to in his
assertion that writing permits officials to "stretch" social
relations.86 As subsequent chapters will also demonstrate,
this is a goal toward which many record-keeping innovations
are directed.

Conclusion
This chapter has shown how surveillance and identity
came to be linked through an interest in monitoring
prisoners' conduct. Sustaining this interest necessitated
the development of a capacity to distinguish one wrongdoer
from another. As subsequent chapters will show, this linkage
of surveillance and official identities through a penal
reform agenda remains an important motivation for their
continued evolution throughout the 1800s. At the same time,
new motivations, which were tied more directly to crime
prevention, also began to emerge. Although these newer
applications of surveillance and official identities
differed in important respects from Walnut St. Jail
applications, they still found legitimacy in a fundamental
principle that Walnut St. officials successfully promoted:
that it is the state's right and obligation to single out
and monitor individuals defined as deviant.
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As this chapter also has demonstrated, officials
exercised this right and fulfilled this obligation in no
small part by adapting writing to serve record-keeping.
Records allowed officials to store official identities and
accumulate surveillance-generated information in tangible
forms that could resist the distorting effects of travelling
over time and space. In this endeavor to fix information in
an accessible form, officials had to invent procedures for
the standardization, ordering, storage and retrieval of
information. So fashioned, prison records became a resource
on which officials could rely at critical moments to sustain
and deploy their authority over the subordinate prison
population. These records directly exemplify how writing as
records can be made to serve state interests.
At Walnut St. the critical moments when officials
relied on records included, most prominently, the clerk's
initial evaluation of the prisoner as a first-time offender
or as a recidivist, and the final decisions about a
prisoner's pardon. As the 19th century unfolded, similar
moments when officials relied on surveillance and official
identities multiplied. Paralleling (and enabling) the
state's expansion of its administrative reach, these moments
ceased being confined to clearly delineated institutional
settings and began appearing in daily life, although they
were still confined to penal and police affairs. The
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immediate cause for this expansion was an increased concern
about recidivists. Officials often expressed this concern in
the shape of the belief that all criminal acts could be
traced back to an unconfined, although identifiable,
criminal population. This concern inspired a new set of
record-keeping innovations: The challenge before officials
of the mid to late 1800s was to recreate Walnut St. 's
"unceasing watchfulness" in the community at large.87
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a more general term, "officials", when describing changes
that might have been undertaken by either the warden or
Inspectors, as available sources make only inconsistent
distinctions between the two.
78 Teeters, The Cradle of the Penitentiary, p. 135.
79 Karen Halttunen, Confidence Men and Painted Women, (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), p.35.
80 On the changing concept of the stranger see, Haltunnen,
Confidence Men and Painted Women, Chapter Two, pp.33-55.
81 In order to collect a minimum of fifty entries, based on
discharge dates, I had to extend my collection of Sentence
Docket discharge descriptions over several years for each
sample. For example, the first sample consists of 50
descriptions randomly selected from those entered over 17951798, drawn from the 1792-1804 volume. The next sample
consists of 83 descriptions written from 1808 to 1811 and
entered in 1805-1811 [?] volume. The final sample of 84 was
drawn from descriptions entered into the 1819-1824 volume
between 1821-1823. (All dockets are drawn from RG 38.36,
PCA. )
82 An alphabetic index does appear in an earlier logbook,
the 1792 volume of the "Prisoners for Trial" docket (RG
38.38, PCA), but it is not linked to prisoner descriptions.
83 The new Prisoner Description Docket (RG 38.41, PCA)
started in 1826, was prefaced by the following statement,

114
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In the alphabet list commencing with the book are
arranged the names of all the convicts in the prison on the
13th day of January 1826 so that to find the description of
any particular prisoner you have but to take the initial of
his or her last name and follow the order of arrangement.
For those received subsequently to the 13th day of
January 1826, find the name on the docket marked [ ... J the
year and date of the sentence will point out where the
description is entered, to facilitate which they are in same
order as the docket.
84 Receiving Description Docket, RG 38.40, PCA; Convict
Description Docket, 38.41, PCA.
85 Teeters, The Cradle of the Penitentiary, p. 135.
86 Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical
Materialism (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1983), pp.90-94.
87 LaRochefoucau1d, On the Prisons of Philadelphia, p.29.
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Chapter Three
Extending Surveillance Beyond the Organization: Centralizing
and Nationalizing US Criminal Identification Practices

Introduction
The insularity of early 19th century US penal
organizations exemplified a localism which marked economic,
religious, and political relations generally in the young
nation. States, and even cities within the same state, had
few relations with one another. As the 1800s unfolded,
however, this separateness started to give way. New modes of
communication and transportation forged links where none had
been, and the idea of nationhood became more palatable, and
more concrete. By the end of the 1800s, these changes
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resulted in a nation which perceived itself as a united
whole, linked effectively by an extensive infrastructure.
The 1800s also generated new ideas about crime and
punishment. For the first time, local city governments
chartered police forces with the mandate to prevent crime,
rather than to locate stolen goods and house lost children,
and penal reformers advanced even further in their campaign
to individualize punishment. By the late 1800s, police and
penal reformers alike had come to believe that
distinguishing habitual and occasional offenders was
critical to their respective tasks. Combined, the new
nationalism and the new commitment to contain crime by
controlling habitual criminals resulted in the first calls
for the establishment of a national criminal identification
system. The initial systems advocated were never
implemented, but the idea, once spoken, only grew in
popularity.

Recidivism and Record-keeping
Although Alexis de Tocqueville's 1829 visit to the
United States is best known for his subsequent volume,
Democracy in America, Tocquevi11e's official commission from
the French government was to undertake a study of US prison
practices.1 Spurred on by an active penal reform movement,
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several US states had built new prisons or, as they had come
to be known, penitentiaries--places to do penance.
Continuing the work begun by the planners of the Walnut St.
Jail, these penitentiaries staked the claim that wrongdoers
could, and should, be reformed rather than physically
tortured or humiliated. This belief, and the novel
disciplinary techniques deployed to enact it, attracted
attention throughout Europe but particularly in France,
where powerful factions in the government were urging prison
reform. 2
Although generally united, the US penal reform movement
did involve various factions. Two are of interest here:
supporters of the Philadelphia system, represented by
practices followed at the Eastern State Penitentiary of
Philadelphia, and supporters of the Auburn system,
represented by the system in place at the Auburn Prison in
New York. Both Auburn and Eastern State incorporated many of
the elements espoused by Walnut St. 's early proponents:
prisoner classification, solitary labor, and discipline.
However, the Philadephia system advocated total isolation-accomodated by housing inmates in separate rooms. While
Auburn permitted prisoners each other's company--in silence-during the work day, but not otherwise.3
Among other projects, Tocqueville wanted to evaluate
the effectiveness of the Auburn and Philadelphia approaches
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to reform relative to each other, relative to other US
practices, and relative to punishment in France. He
theorized that comparative recidivism rates might be a
useful measure. Thus, Tocqueville's discovery that available
records provided no way to calculate the rates at which
prisoners, released as reformed, might have relapsed,
seriously disappointed him. As with the records at Walnut
St., so too with the newer penitentiaries: officials had no
way of knowing about previous incarcerations at other
institutions. As Tocqueville pointed out, officials could
calculate only the recommitals "which bring the prisoner
back to the prison where he has been detained the first
time. His return to the same prison, is in fact the only
means of proving his relapse." Tocqueville believed that exconvicts knew about this loophole and took advantage of it
regularly. As he wrote,

"Nothing is easier than to pass from

one state to another, and it is the criminal's interest to
do so ... [Almong a hundred criminals convicted in one state,
thirty, upon average, belong to some neighboring state."4
To Tocqueville, this shortcoming in the penitentiaries'
surveillance capabilities fit in with what he perceived to
be the US government's general lack of concern about the
surveillance of identity. In contrast, France, according to
Tocqueville, was "obsessed" with surveillance.5

The central

government had a coordinated system of internal passports,

•
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residential registration, and centralized reporting of
criminal convictions. Combined, these practices resulted in
what was probably the most extensive state-run surveillance
system of the time. In Tocqueville's France, legal officials
had a "thousand ways" to assure a criminal's detection. In
the united States, in contrast, the criminal had a "thousand
means to avoid detection. "6
The striking difference for Tocqueville was not the
abundance or lack of organizationally-based records. Both
Auburn and Eastern State had well-kept, relatively
sophisticated records describing their criminal populations.
Instead, what concerned Tocqueville was the lack of

centralization among those records. There was "no central
power" to which officials "might refer to obtain information
respecting the previous life of an indicted person ... " Given
this situation, Tocqueville hazarded,

"the courts condemn,

almost always, without knowing the true name of the
criminal, and still less his previous life." While this
probably was not the case--established methods of vouching
likely supplied information about many defendants--it is
true that the United States lacked centralized recordkeeping facilities, not only in penitentiaries, but also for
most legal affairs. Tocqueville's description of criminal
record-keeping practices remained accurate for another forty
years. Not until the early 1870s did police and penal
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authorities voice the need for a national, centralized
identification system and not until the mid-1880s did they
make any appreciable progress toward fulfilling that need.

Centralizing and Nationalizing Records
Centralization constitutes a critical step in recordkeeping evolution. As with certain other record-keeping
procedures, it permits officials to overcome time-space
barriers. Specifically, centralization allows officials to
have access to information from widely dispersed locations
without having to travel. By replacing personal presence
with record-keeping, officials can greatly extend their
sphere of influence. Furthermore, centralization permits
officials to multiply access to information exponentially
and to reconfigure information in innovative, useful ways.7
Officials can centralize record-keeping in varying
degrees. Most basically, centralization occurs when
peripheral or branch entities submit information to a
central location where it is stored, and perhaps compiled
and consulted. Compilation alone can create new information.
Linking one event to another occurring elsewhere, to still
another occurring somewhere else again, adds up not simply
to three events, but to a trend. Information can remain
compiled in a central location, unused, or used only by
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central authorities. Alternatively, the compiled information
can be made available to all the outlying contributors. This
dramatically increases access to information which otherwise
would have been available only to its original collectors.
Nationalization of record-keeping systems refers here
to records centralized on a national level. All subordinate
jurisdictions such as states or provinces contribute records
to a central bureau which stores, collates, and possibly
redistributes the information. The system is national when
it incorportates all

(or most) of the jurisdictions over

which the state claims authority. Such systems signal the
growing magnitude of state authority in that they represent
the state's ability to impose its standards and laws on
outlying settlements. Once established, nationalized recordkeeping systems--pertaining to criminals, public health, or
any other venue claimed by the state--contribute directly to
the reproduction of the state power apparatus by providing
vital information for administration and by exemplifying the
reach of the state.
In the case of criminal records, their centralization
and eventual nationalization underwrote several important
advances. First, it allowed officials to construct
increasingly complete criminal histories of offenders. In
the French model that Tocqueville had in mind when he
criticized American practices, officials sent information
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regarding a wrongdoer's local criminal actions to a central
office where all the submissions pertaining to that person
were drawn together and, in this compiled form, made
available to participating communities.8 Such information
was crucial to officials who wanted to distinguish between
habitual and occasional offenders, but there were other
advantages to centralization, as well.
For example, taken together, these records permitted
officials to define a criminal population and to discern
trends within that population. Although less important when
criminal records were first centralized, this feature later
provided much of the justification for the continued
expansion of the US criminal record-keeping system.9
Centralization, more than other record-keeping
procedures, is linked to political development. Minimally,
it presumes a center, or some designated location to which
information is sent, and affiliates, or branches which
recognize a set of shared interests. The center may have
been created by the mutual consent of the affiliates, or it
may have imposed itself over the affiliates using some
measure of force. In either case, before such an effort is
undertaken, officials somewhere must recognize the
advantages of territorial integration afforded by
centralization. Tocqueville believed it was the lack of this
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recognition which stalled the introduction of centralization
into US criminal record-keeping practices.

The Emergence of National-Level Relations
Tocqueville attributed the absence of centralized
criminal record-keeping to a lack of cohesiveness among the
states. He described relations between the states, as
"strictly political," by which he meant that, although the
states were legally, socially, and economYcally federated,
they operated independently. Elsewhere he described America
as a country "in which every village forms a sort of
republic, accustomed to govern itself."10
In this, the Frenchman was right. The US of
Tocqueville's visit consisted of dispersed communities,
isolated from one another by poor roads--"hardly more than
broad paths through the forest," and served by a slow and
irregular, albeit improving, postal service.11 Markets were
highly localized and inter-state exchanges, economic or
social, undeveloped. Cities within states and states within
the union shared few concerns and expressed only rare
interest in overcoming these separations.
Nevertheless, during the mid-1800s, both the local
orientation of communities and the insularity of legal
institutions began to attenuate. Private entrepreneurs and
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the government joined together in a building spree which
resulted in a vastly improved transportation and
communication network--consisting of turnpikes, canals,
railroads, and the telegraph--which greatly facilitated
inter-state and inter-city activities. Regional economic
interdependence both fed and benefitted from this expansion,
with southern agriculture supplying northern manufacture,
and western expansion demanding eastern supplies. By the
1850s, the extreme localism of the market had given way to a
viable, national market.12

During the 1860s, the Civil War

and its aftermath reinforced this trend and produced,
finally,

states united more in fact than ideal for the first

time in US history.13
Translated locally by various groups and institutions,
these changes resulted in a broad-based trend toward
national organizing.14 Legal institutions, specifically the
prisons and the police, were no exception. They held their
first national conferences in 1870 and 1871, respectively.
At these conferences, each group, for the first time, voiced
the need for a national system for criminal identification,
similar to the one described by Tocqueville in 1829.
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The Emergence of Police Interest in Criminal Identity
Participants in the 1871 National Police Conference put
a national criminal identification system on the top of
their agenda. They believed that without a capacity to track
criminals between cities and across state lines, the battle
against crime would be lost. The police characterized this
need, in part, as a result of the phenomenon discussed
earlier: now that a sophisticated communications and
transportation network criss-crossed the US, which criminals
could exploit, it was necessary for the police to begin
acting nationally, as well.15 Police urgency in this matter,
however, went beyond a response to improved transportation.
It also related directly to profound changes in the
organization and function of municipal police departments
themselves.
During the 1850s and l860s, urban police underwent
massive changes, becoming what recent historians have
labelled "preventive police."

The label refers to their

newly assigned task of preventing crime, something we take
as definitional of police duties, but which was quite novel
at its inception. Until this change, the police, or their
constabulary predecessors, were not organized into a
distinct professional grouping. They rarely reflected on the
means necessary to improve their crime fighting measures,
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nor had they much interest in tracking criminals nationally,
or, for that matter, locally.
Police interest in criminal identity grew out of this
mandate to prevent crime. Closely monitoring criminals,
which required knowing their names, descriptions, and life
histories, seemed a first and essential step to stopping
criminal acts. Police initiated this linkage between
prevention and identity on a local level, and it is
important to review its onset there before proceeding with
an analysis of the nationalization of identity issues. This
review requires background on how police related to
criminals before police embraced a crime-prevention mandate.

Early Policing Functions
In urban America, throughout the early to mid-1800s,
practices which today are concentrated under the auspices of
the police were distributed over two distinct groups: the
night watch and constables. 16 In colonial days, the night
watch was a mandatory duty of most adult males, although
later it became a paid position. Members of the night watch
took responsibility for watching over the town from sundown
to sunrise.17 They alternately walked an established route
or sat (often, fast asleep)

in watch bo·xes. They reported

fires, questioned suspicious persons, maintained the street
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lamps, and raised the hue and cry, if they detected criminal
activity.18 They did not have the police power of arrest.
Constables, in contrast, were directly linked to the
court system and had a variety of powers including serving
warrants and arresting individuals. Although they performed
no patrol duties, they did have "responsibility for order
broadly defined. "19 As was also true for the night watch,
constables wore no uniform and carried no weapon, but often
were provided with some symbol of their authority such as a
staff, or badge.20 Constables' duties included containing
riots, bringing in defendants for trial, detaining vagrants,
raising the hue and cry, and keeping track of activities at
taverns and gaming houses. They also acted as health
officers, overseeing problems associated with epidemics or
stray animals.21 Instead of regular salaries, they earned
money through a fee-for-service system based on a schedule
set by the city or the state. Together these two groups
helped to maintain social order in urban areas. Relative to
today's police, or even those of the late 1800s, they were
rather unobtrusive and circumspect, and their role relative
to criminals was limited.
Neither the night watchmen nor the constables were
directly responsible for capturing criminals, except in the
pressing instance of actually witnessing a crime or being
alerted to one in progress. Then, their duty was to yell for
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help and give chase. Constables might be directed to locate
a particular perpetrator to serve an arrest warrant, once
his or her identity was known. But it was not the
constable's duty to discover the identity of wrongdoers.
That was the victims's responsibility. Informally, burglary
victims could rely on men known as "thief-catchers" for
help. These thief-catchers (a misnomer) acted as go-betweens
to negotiate the return of stolen goods in exchange for a
fee. Although often helpful, they also were often targets of
complaints that they acted in concert with thieves.
Regularly-convened grand juries investigated other crimes
such as arson or assault, and coroners' inquests looked into
unsolved murders. As with robberies, so too with these other
crimes; the role of the constable was limited to serving
papers or rounding up recalcitrant witnesses. Members of the
night watch, unless they happened to witness a crime, played
no role at all.
Moreover, these early 19th century peacekeepers had no
responsibility for preventing crimes. Reviewing constable
and night watchmen duties, only an obligation to act after
the fact manifests itself. Both the night watch and
constables raised the hue and cry, if they saw a crime, or
were told of one in progress. Constables sought out an
accused, if they had a warrant to serve, and brought someone
in under force,

if, already accused, he or she resisted
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arrest. In sum, these peacekeepers could act against
criminals, but only based on specific requests from
magistrates, witnesses, or victims. Their preventive stance,
to the extent that they took one, pertained only to issues
which affected the "public health and welfare as a whole,"
such as controlling stray animals.22
Apparently, this reactive approach to crime sufficed
thoughout the colonial and early Republican periods.
Complaints were registered about unsafe streets or unruly
crowds, but they did not result in demands for a new form of
policing. Urban dwellers generally did not expect the
constable-night watch system to prevent crime nor catch
criminals, and did not criticize its lack of initiative in
this direction.

Preventive Policing
Sometime in the mid-1800s, however, satisfaction with
this arrangement began to erode, and various factions within
cities began to push for a new kind of police--police who
would wear uniforms, patrol the streets, and stop criminals
before they acted. Philadelphia Mayor Conrad's 1856 annual
address illustrates the shift toward a preventive police.
Conrad started out by criticizing the "miserable" constablewatch as a system where
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... the officers waited patiently until crime was
committed, and then set upon the pursuit of the
offender ...

He believed that this system
... constituted at best, an authorized warfare
between the police and the criminals, and if it
did not encourage crime, did not prevent it.
Conrad concluded that
Under the most favorable views, it [the constablewatch system] was an ineffective system of
subsequent vengeance; and in every moral and
practical point of view was an absurdity.

Instead he argued that preventive policing was a worthy
investment,
... such a police should be a system overspreading
and guarding the whole community, rendering it
either impossible, or most dangerous, to attempt
the commission of crime, and leaving no moment of
time, and no place, without its guardian (emphasis
added) .23

The new mandate to prevent crime transformed the nature
of police work. Over the mid to late 1800s, as
municipalities embraced this notion, they restructured their
peacekeeping force from the informal constable-night watch
system into a quasi-military organization. Officers became
trained, salaried, and uniformed. They walked assigned
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beats, developed expertise in understanding criminal
behavior, and eventually began carrying weapons.24 No longer
simply acting as adjuncts to community-based social control,
municipal police became a primary repository for statesanctioned authority and violence.
Historians have sought to understand the precipitants
to this transformation and have provided a variety of
explanations. Some have concluded that the changeover to a
preventive police resulted from an increase in property
crime, or perhaps more accurately, from perceptions of
increasing property crime, which led officials to implement
new protective services for the cities' growing middle-class
population. Other explanations have focussed,

instead, on

the increasingly uncontrolled nature of urban riots, the
growth of certain ethnic groups, or the increase of
vagrancy, as justifications for implementing a new approach
to social control.25
A recent study by Eric Monkkonen claims to undercut
previous preventive police studies with the finding that a
city's adoption of a preventive police force can be
accurately predicted by its relative position in the size
hierarchy of cities: As cities grew in population over the
last third of the 1800s, regardless of crime rate, ethnic
composition, or civil disorder, they switched over to
preventive po1icing.26
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Monkkonen's study provides a useful comparative
perspective on this question which has traditionally been
approached only through the case study method.27 However,
while the diffusion of innovation model which he uses does
predict the order of adoption of preventive policing, it
does not explain the substantive issue of why officials
believed a preventive police force was an appropriate
solution to their problems in the first place. Size alone
cannot be held responsible for such a specific, novel
response. The move to preventive policing might be
explained, instead--following Anthony Giddens' analysis of
the genesis of modern state power--by seeing it as an
attempt to fulfill part of the need for a new surveillance
capacity, which was engendered by industrialization's
concentration of laborers.28
For here, the important point is that by the end of the
1880s, every major city in the United States, and many of
the smaller ones, had decided that preventing crime was the
primary responsibilty of the police force. Since that time,
the public and the government alike have come to equate
crime prevention with policing. Yet it is important to
consider for a moment some of what this concept implies, for
therein lies a critical justification for the deployment of
surveillance, hence for establishing official identities, in
contemporary society.
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Preventing Crime
When police were called on only to respond to crime,
they counted on victims and witnesses--members of the
community--to report crimes to them. This arrangement
required the establishment of a communications link between
the community and police, a routine procedure for reporting,
but little else. As a reactive force, constables and night
watchmen had no reason to mount, in the Philadelphia police
chief's words, an "overspreading" surveillance system. With
the obligation to report being upheld by the community, the
obligation to watch was fulfilled there, as well.
Communities satistified their obligation to watch with
varying degrees of success. Generally informal, though still
effective, community vigilance assured that at least some
behavioral breaches would be noted and dealt with by
established mechanisms, which occasionally meant calling the
constable. The mandate to prevent crime radically altered
these practices.
The basic idea that crime should be prevented was not
itself new. But until this time, it had been served
primarily by projects like the Walnut St. Jail which, after
the fact--that is, after a crime's commission--tried to
reform criminals, thus indirectly preventing crime by
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encouraging these convicts not to commit future crimes. The
police-based version of prevention, in contrast, sought to
stop all crimes before they were committed by direct, ongoing, community-based intervention.
A word about prevention generally: Stopping something
before it happens requires a certain kind of knowledge about
the class of events to be stopped--from crop blights, to
traffic accidents, to crimes. The knowledge must be intimate
and grounded, yet generalizable enough to sustain accurate
predictions. This information is difficult enough to gather
for phenomena amenable to experimentation, such as blights
and accidents. But as the continued rise in crime--despite
more than a century of preventive policing--indicates,
consistently predicting crime, which is notoriously variable
in incident and character, poses an insurmountable
challenge.
Nevertheless, to the extent that prevention of even a
portion of targeted events is to be accomplished, it must be
grounded, at least in part, in surveillance. Only with
careful, regular, organized watching can officials both
collect the information they need to predict an undesirable
event and be in position to orchestrate its prevention.
Thus, in the name of preventing crime, cities had to deploy
police so that they knew where to watch and so that they
would be watching at the right moment. In Mayor Conrad's
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words, preventive police should leave "no moment of time,
and no place, without its guardian"

(emphasis added). Surely

an impossible goal anywhere, especially in large urban
areas, but one nonetheless vigorously espoused.

Approaches to Surveillance
Recognizing (though rarely explicitly) that they could
not watch all places at all times, officials found ways to
concentrate and extend their gaze. A primary extension took
place through the uniforming of police. Previously dressed
no differently than other citizens, police presence often
went unnoticed. Officials believed, with good reason, that
uniforming police would make them more visible and increase
their deterrent effect. Counting on people to turn away from
crime when in view of police, police used this strategy to
increase their surveillant range by extending it to all
people who could see them, rather than vice versa.29
Additionally, police departments created a new category of
officer: the detective, whose primary job was tracking
criminals. Reversing the strategy deployed by uniforming
most police, these men were to go un-uniformed, thus
allowing them to roam the streets exploring taverns and
other lowlife locales, without detection.
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Even with these new tactics, the area over which police
were supposed to extend their presence was greater than
their numbers would allow. Interestingly, although
complaints about the low number of police appeared
frequently in newspapers and city council minutes, rarely
did commentators note the clear impossibility of the
constant, complete coverage to which officials aspired.30
The impossibility went unnoticed because, in spite of what
officials said and possibly believed, they were not really
demanding that all people in all places be watched at all
times, but only some people, in some places, some of the
time.
During the same period that demands for a preventive
police force were first being voiced, concerns about
increased property crimes and the population supposedly
responsible for them were also emerging. In major urban
centers, the 1840s and the 1850s witnessed the first
articulation of the notion of "dangerous individuals."31
Officials used this label--early on interchangeable with
vagrants and tramps--to refer (with misplaced concreteness)
to a group of individuals who they thought committed crimes
habitually, easily, and with little remorse.
The immediate history of this term, unfortunately,
remains obscure.32 Sometimes its use was extended to
perpetrators of violent crimes, however, during its the mid
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to late 1800s' zenith as a popular catch-all phrase,
"dangerous individuals" referred most often to various
stripes of thieves. Although some commentators believed that
the qualities creating a "dangerous individual" were inborn, the phrase precedes by several decades the highly
elaborated idea of the "born-criminal" conceived of by
criminal anthropologists, and so its history stands
separate.33 To the extent that commentators reflected on
what led certain people to become "dangerous individuals,"
they most often attributed it to bad upbringings in unsavory
(economically impoverished) environments. Typical targets
for this labelling included anyone thought likely to commit
a crime because of poverty--such as prostitutes or the
unemployed--or anyone who shared certain attributes with
others who had committed crimes, such as a particular
ethnicity.34
Crime statistics are notoriously difficult to
interpret, still one study based on mid-19th century crime
reports from Detroit has offered some useful insights about
the spuriousness of the "dangerous individual" concept.
Analyzing the birth places of people found guilty of the
most common forms of thievery in Detroit of the mid-1850s,
John Schneider found that persons designated as "dangerous"
by Detroit officials--Irish immigrants--in fact were less
likely to commit property crimes than members of those
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ethnic groups from which the city's elite was drawn, Germans
or native-born Americans.35 Still, the notion of "dangerous
individual,"

performed a useful function.

It told police

whom to watch.
Thus, municipal governments put preventive policing
into action, not by casting a surveillant net across the
whole city, but by concentrating their efforts over small
sub-populations whose actual constituency shifted with
public opinion but whose labelling as "dangerous" remained
constant. Officials believed that by keeping a "dangerous"
population under surveillance, they would be able to prevent
crimes from happening.
Even within this sub-population of people so
designated, the police had to further narrow their gaze.
Certainly individuals who had been convicted or tried of a
crime were subjected to monitoring, as were those who
associated with them. Add to this people in suspicious
professions such as pawn shop or tavern owners and those
with particularly pressing motivations to commit crimes,
such as the unemployed, and the police had a lengthy list to
watch over.
Fixing the identities of these individuals posed
several challenges to the police---some shared with Walnut
St. officials of a half century earlier, and some entirely
new. Walnut St. officials required the means to watch
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constantly and minutely, but narrowly: their gaze extended
only as far as as Walnut St. 's walls.

Police, in contrast,

faced the challenge of extending surveillance over unbounded
territory: the city. In reality, the spatial concentration
of the populations deemed dangerous did limit the area
police had to cover. Still, the task posed a challenge.36
Some of the techniques employed, such as walking a
beat, have already been described in the discussion of the
formation of preventive police forces. Putting this concept
into action required dividing a city into regions and
creating a spatial grid similar to the one created by rules
at Walnut St.37 This tactic organized and regularized
monitoring, while also assuring that the range of coverage
deemed necessary indeed was achieved. Still, while walking
beats, or watching crowds gather, the police--detectives and
regular officers alike--needed specific techniques to help
them distinguish known criminals, suspicious arrivals, and
innocent passers-by.
Police of this era began to train their memory
capabilities for distinguishing and storing faces and body
types. Referred to once as "human encyclopedias," policemen
with particularly adept memories were assigned to train
stations and harbors where criminals might be using the
concealment of crowds to mask a getaway.38 Alternatively,
some members of the force kept diaries where they noted
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detailed descriptions of the individuals assigned to them
for monitoring. One detective, William Bell, a member of the
the New York police department in the early 1850s,
concentrated on pawn shop owners, pickpockets, and petty
thieves.39 Bell apparently spent his days paying occasional
visits to the police station and walking a circuit in an
area where pawn shops concentrated. During his walks, if he
recognized a known criminal, or saw someone who looked
suspicious, he made a diary entry, which recounted the
person's description, location, and activity. During visits
to the police station, Bell both "gave"

and "took" "spots,"

a practice whereby police officers brought suspects into the
station to be "shown up," so that other officers could get a
good look at them and record descriptions of their own.40
These spottings also fed a collective memory among police
officers which could be called upon later for identifying
suspects.41
Bells' descriptions usually included height, hair
color, visible markings such as tatoos, and a statement
about clothing.42 They were often rather brief, but,
importantly, in contrast to Walnut St. discharge
descriptions, these accounts were not expected to function
independently of individual memory. At least in the case of
Bell, his recorded descriptions of people that he
encountered in his daily peringrinations, and descriptions
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of suspects that other policemen "showed up" to him, were
created for his own use.
Based on Bell's diary entries, the detective seems to
have experienced moderate success relying on his written
descriptions, aided by personal memory, to identify
wrongdoers. In two cases, his ability to identify potential
pickpockets exemplified the preventive approach to crime.
One day, for example, on crowd duty during a New York visit
by US President Fillmore, Bell spied two men he knew to be
pickpockets--people whom he had previously described--and
removed them from the crowd.43
Some cities went a bit further in organinzing the kind
of descriptions that Bell recorded. Philadelphia and Boston
mandated that police submit lists of the dangerous
individuals that they had encountered to the police precinct
office.44 If this regulation was followed, these lists may
have been organized into something like a centralized
identification system. Unfortunately, from this period, the
only surviving evidence of this practice are the regulations
mandating it.
Another practice that did centralize criminal
identification information, was the rogues' gallery.
Introduced in France in the early 1840s, US police
departments did not begin establishing these photographic
collections featuring criminals until the late 1850s and
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early 1860s. Their introduction coincided neatly with the
decision of various municipalities to embrace preventive
policing.45 Early rogues' gallery photographs resembled the
work of protraiture studios, rather than the standard
criminal format which emerged later. Often police
departments arranged the photographs in elaborate display
cases that far exceeded basic requirements for
accessibility. In some cities, the rogues' galleries were
open to the public, for viewing by "anyone who wished to
satisfy idle curiosity."46
Although police were enthusiastic about how helpful
these galleries might be, few anecdotes about their early
use have survived, so an evaluation of how they were
integrated into police routine remains elusive. Photographs
can provide immediate, emphatic evidence of identity, but
they are not always as helpful as they may seem.
Photographic collections are useful because they require
little particular expertise for interpretation. Still, they
are difficult to arrange in an accessible manner. Should the
pictures be arranged by crime committed? Hair color? Ear
shape? Such ambiguities in classification make consistent
retrieval of photographs difficult and thus their use in
identifying criminals unreliable.47
Bell and others cite cases of using spotting,
photographs, and written descriptions to track criminals
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moving from city to city. Bell reports having travelled to
Philadelphia to "give a spot" on a criminal known to him,
and other sources refer to the exchange of photographs and
descriptions between distant police departments.48 Still,
for the most part, police in the mid-1800s did not extend
their surveillance beyond municipal boundaries.49

Preventive policing, and its associated demand for the
surveillance of "dangerous individuals," underwrote police
interest in criminal identity. Police met the challenges
posed by preventive policing's surveillance requirements
with several strategies. Most importantly, they limited the
space which needed coverage by concentrating their
monitoring efforts over particular populations and the
regions of the city they inhabited or visited. Over these
regions, the police imposed grids to delineate beats, which
assured regular and comprehensive coverage, and they
expanded the range of their presence by wearing uniforms. To
fix identity, they apparently relied primarily on their own
memories. In addition, they began to devise practices which
would permit them to make identity information openly
accessible: rogues' galleries and spotting.
As with the first Walnut St. clerks, the records which
police kept, although useful, remained secondary to personal
experience and collective memory in making criminal
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identifications. Rather than relying primarily on records,
the new preventive police--by making trips back and forth to
the police station, strolling through crowds, and visiting
pawn shops--made themselves into agents of surveillance.

The 1871 Police Convention
The first national meeting of police officers took
place in 1871 in St. Louis. Representatives of nearly 100
cities attended and debated enthusiatically over the
necessity and methods of national police cooperation. For
police the impulse to organize at the national level clearly
reflected other national-level trends occurring at the same
time. Police had come to see that since criminals had
already begun to take advantage of rapid rail transporation
by fleeing far from the crime scene, so too must police
begin to operate across local boundaries.50

They believed

that the US was under attack by criminals and that a
nationally-based attack on the populace required a
nationally-based defense. Toward this end, conference
participants resolved "not to remain isolated" and made
"perfecting the cooperation of police" their "primary
objective."51 As Chief McDonough of St. Louis (the
conference organizer) said, the adoption of uniform,
national rules and regulations would permit the "whole
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detective force of the country" to "act in union for the
prevention and detection of crime."52 Conference
participants vowed to foster cooperation and to facilitate
the exchange of information among local police departments.
Indeed, half of the conference agenda items directly
addressed the need to improve communications among police
departments on matters related to crime. 53
When it came to dealing with the question of how to
track criminals nationally, there seemed to be little debate
that photography was the most efficient way to share
criminal identification information across great distances.
Still, participants did disagree over how to best organize
such a system. Most apparently favored establishing a system
which combined written descriptions and photographs.54
The "Committee on Photography and Exchange of Same"
took up the system's planning and proposed the following
plan: Each police department would take photographs of "all
noted criminals arrested in their respective departments,"
make multiple copies, add any other important descriptive
information to the back of the photograph, and send one of
these photographs to the "police office of every city in the
country. "55
The implementation problems were referred to committee,
however, and the police never actually established such a
system. Still, the proposal does constitute the first
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statement by any group in government--1oca1, state, or
federa1--in support of a plan for a national, criminal
identification system.56
Strictly speaking the plan did not constitute
centralization. It envisioned a network of information, not
a clearinghouse. It is a significant organizational
distinction, although not one which police recognized at
this point. If enacted as described, the plan would quickly
have become prohibitively cumbersome. Calling for each
department to send every other department a photograph of
every known criminal, would have required police departments
to be mailing off scores of photographs a day--a difficult
organizational task in itself--to say nothing of handling
the hundreds they would be receiving in return. Furthermore,
photographs offer no self-evident means of classification
which would have allowed officers to easily tame the
incoming deluge. Although in theory this system would have
given each department access to information collected by
each other department--a primary advantage of
centralization--in practice, the informations' utility would
have been severely hampered by the plan's organizational
flaws.
The police did not meet again nationally until 1884,
and did not seriously consider the need for an
identification system until several years after that. Still,
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these proceedings do demonstrate that the police had come to
embrace criminal identification as a central concern which
cbu1d no longer be served by separate local systems, but
instead required, the establishment of a national system.
The next step in the realization of such a system was taken
by the penal reformers.

Penal Reform Interest in National Criminal Identification
Systems
The post-Civil War decade witnessed newly intensified
interest in penal affairs.57 Spurred on by highly publicized
studies of deteriorating prison conditions and a growing
awareness that a rising crime rate demonstrated the failure
of extant penal practices, penal reformers of the late 1860s
began organizing with a zeal unmatched since the early days
of Eastern State and Auburn Penitentiaries. 58 They lobbied
legislatures to pass new penal codes, held conferences,
published leaflets, and devised new theories and methods for
reform. While continued crime and continued recidivism might
have suggested that reformative incarceration--the practice
of discipline and punishment first initiated at Walnut St-had failed, penal reformers did not jettison the concept.
Instead, they continued to support imprisonment and
discipline as the paths to reform, but concluded that
treatment needed to be more individualized.
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Best exemplified by a program put in place by a
midwestern reformer, Zebulon Brockway, at the Elmira
Reformatory in Elmira, New York, the new approach to
prisoner reform carried the adminstrative individualization
introduced at Walnut St. to unprecedented levels.59 The plan
at Elmira was to construct a tightly calibrated system of
gradual correction enabled by the prisoner's co-operation,
which was assured through

"indeterminate sentencing"

(release was not automatic, but earned), and facilitated by
a thorough knowledge of the prisoner's background. Brockway
personally interviewed each newly arrived convict before
assigning them to one of several hierarchically-ranged
grades of prisoners. He believed that, as with physical
disease, criminal diagnosis had to be made based on
knowledge of the subject's history.60 In this spirit,
Brockway's initial interview delved into prisoners'
"ancestral history, their constitutional tendencies and
propensities, their early social condition and its probable
influence in forming their character ... ," and "their
physical, mental and moral condition."61
The treatment plan based on the intervievl generally
included disciplined labor, education, and participation in
the prison community during which guards kept close watch on
convict behavior. Good behavior, determined by a system of
marks entered daily in separate books maintained for each
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convict, provided the basis for moving the convict on to
higher grades--each one permitting greater freedom.
Eventually the prisoner was permitted occasional
"conditional liberations," furloughs from the prison, which
prefigured the modern practice of probation. 62
This new approach to prisoner reform increased penal
reformers' interest in criminal identification in two ways.
First, reformers and many government officials believed that
only first-time convicts should be eligible for this kind of
intensive, re-education, thus prison officials needed a way
to distinguish first-time offenders from habitual
crimina1s.63 Second, adherents to this brand of penal reform
believed even more fervently than their predecessors that
they needed to know about a prisoner's past to properly
tailor an individual reform program. According to E.C.
wines, a proponent of this approach and an eminent penal
reformer, of all the "elements" informing a "judgment as to
the moral curability of an offender the most reliable" was a
"knowledge of his past."64
While these factors account for this generation's
interest in criminal identity, they do not explain a
critical aspect of that interest: For the first time,
reformers supported, albeit only weakly at first, the idea
that a system tracking criminal identity should be a

national system. Logically, to track a criminal population
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which travelled regionally if not nationally, the system
would have to be national and centralized, but this had been
the case for decades without actually inspiring any penal
reformers to make such a suggestion. Indeed, while the need
for information about a criminal's background or identity
may have been more urgent under the reform plans suggested
in the 1870s, it was not new.
From the earliest reforms embodied by Walnut St.,
through the penitentiary movement and through this most
recent reinforcement of interest in the individual, the
plans promulgated by reformers would have benefitted from a
national identification system. Until now, however,
reformers made no such suggestions. This oversight,
explained in part by Tocqueville's remarks about America's
extreme parochialness, might also be explained by a more or
less conscious desire on the part of reformers to make an
accurate calculation of recidivism difficult, as a way of
concealing what were impressive failures on their parts.
It was not until the first national conference of penal
reformers, the National Penal Association in 1870, that a
plea for a national criminal identity system was put to a
national audience.65 Reformers attending the conference
regarded the suggestions for a national identification
system as "worthy of earnest inquiry and study," believing
that if it could be incorporated into

us

practices, "its
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utility will be great and manifold."66 They feared, however,
that its implemenation would be obstructed by another
problem they were trying to overcome, the lack of accord
among states on legal matters.
That penal reformers finally entertained the idea that
criminal identification systems should be nationally instead
of organizationally-based, is traceable to two factors.
First, as discussed earlier, the heightened sense of
importance attached to national organizing prevailing in the
1870s undoubtedly encouraged reformers to look favorably on
the idea of establishing a national-level system. In this
climate, reformers believed that only a national body would
have what conference organizers called the "moral power"

to

enact the sweeping changes required to adequately improve
prison conditions.67
Second, when conference participants first heard about
a plan to track criminals, it was in the form of a
presentation about an existing system in France, a welldeveloped, nationalized, centralized system. France, a
country long-practiced in centralized political
organizations and criminal surveillance had been using the
system for decades.
The paper describing the system, written by Arnould
Bonneville de Marsangy, a French lawyer, iegislator, penal
reformer and the system's architect, was entitled, "Criminal
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Registers Considered as a Means of Knowing the Antecedents
(Criminal Biography) of Persons Charged with Crime or
Trespass." In this paper and in his earlier descriptions of
the system, Marsangy emphasized the logical necessity of
constructing a system to track criminals which was both
national
wrote,

(if not international) and centralized. As he

" .. . in these times of incessant locomotion, which

lead to a wandering life," criminals have been "arrested and
punished in various places" and they thus "seek in that very
vagrancy the occasion or impunity of [their] misdeeds." The
courts cannot count on the criminal to reveal his past.
"'Have you ever been previously arrested, '" the sentencing
court judge asks. The criminal "invariably" answers, "'No,

never.' "68
In the absence of an overarching record-keeping system,
short of sending off an inquiry to every possible
jurisdiction, the judge had no way of determining whether a
criminal who asserted his status as a first-time offender
was telling the truth. The only way to assure that past
misdeeds were revealed was to create a system which gathered
together records from all the convictions around the country
and organized them in a readily accessible fashion. Marsangy
believed that the system had to be national and
international, so that it would incorporate all the possible
jurisdictions where a criminal might have been convicted,

153

and it had to be centralized so that officials would be
required to appeal to only one location (at most two
locations, in Marsangy's plan) to obtain the information
they sought.69
Marsangy's plan received several hearings in the United
States to apparently lukewarm reception. Importantly,
however, the idea captured the imagination of E.C. Wines,
who was the corresponding secretary of the National Prison
Association, and most likely the person responsible for
introducing Marsangy's work into the United States in the
first place.70 Wines appears to have passed his enthusiasm
on to a younger colleague, R.W. McClaughry, then a recently
appointed warden of Joliet Penitentiary.71

It was

McClaughry who first actively pursued the construction of a
national, centralized criminal identification system in the
United States.

A National Criminal Identification System
It took McClaughry many years to get other penal
officials interested in a criminal identity system.
In 1887, after several preliminary meetings, McClaughry,
along with several other wardens, formed the Wardens'
Association for the Registration of CriminalS, later simply,
the Wardens' Association. At the first meeting, the
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organizers presented participants with articles of
association which described the organization's purpose as
securing "the registration in a central office, of the
criminal records of prisoners ... and the mutual interchange,
between prisons, of such information, with a view to
distinguishing between habitual and occasional offenders,
and as an aid to reformatory work in prisons."72
Toward this end, the association voted to establish an
identification system which required each warden to submit
to a central office a monthly list which described the
physical appearance and life history of recent arrivals.
Wardens were also directed to send enough photographs so
that one could be forwarded to each member prison. The
Warden Association membership decided that McClaughry's
Joliet Prison would be the central location for the first
year and assigned to him the task of working out the details
needed to make the system work. Although the details are
vague, it appears that members expected McClaughry to issue
regular reports describing the criminal population and to
act as a clearinghouse for information requests about
particular convicts.
In motivating others to support their system, the
wardens emphasized that their system was no "ordinary"
rogues' gallery, but an "aid to reform."73 In this they
referred to their need for information to distinguish first-
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time from habitual offenders and the need to have specific
background information on each criminal to inform the reform
process. They specifically distinguished themselves from the
police who wanted to learn a criminal's identity to speed
his or her capture. In contrast, these penal reformers
claimed that they wanted to know a criminal's identity only
to help accomplish his or her reform.
In any case, the system as planned was never
established. Less than a month later, McClaughry issued a
circular to members alerting them that he had learned of
another identification system, one he thought superior to
what they had planned. 74 He suggested that the association
delay implementation of the photograph-exchange system until
the members could hear about the new system at their next
meeting five months later. McClaughry believed that the
"delay would result in a gain rather than a loss," because
the new system would be cheaper, simpler to implement, and
more effective.75
The new system was Bertillon's criminal anthropometry.
In the summer of 1887 McClaughry became the first US
official to adopt anthropmetry as an identification method
when he began measuring inmates at Joliet State Prison.76
Soon after the Wardens' Association adopted anthropometry as
the centerpiece of its new identification system.77 In so
doing, they established the first centralized identification
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system in the US which, while not fully national at its
inception, was national in intent. Anthropometry seemed to
hold great promise for this endeavor. Unlike any prior
system, officials could make identifications by matching
records with records rather than relying on personal memory
to match a name or face with a history. As the range over
which surveillance was supposed to extend grew, this
capability of replacing name and sight recognition with
records became increasingly critical.

Summary
Over the last third of the 1800s, police and penal
officials came to decide that the fight against crime
required a national response. This decision reflected both
the emergence of a greater sense of nationhood in the
country as a whole, and shifts within each group's perceived
mandate. For different reasons, police and penal officials
felt compelled to redouble their crime prevention efforts by
intensifying their control over individual criminals. But,
at the same time that they became increasingly eager to
learn more and more about a criminal's past, they also
started to feel the pressure to venture beyond local
boundaries and to recognize the criminal population's
national character. Faced with conflicting demands--the need
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for increasingly detailed information and

th~

need to

collect it about a growing and widely dispersed population-both police and penal officials realized that they had to
band together and develop procedures for sharing
information.
Their first attempts in this direction concentrated on
developing the means for exchanging and later centralizing
information. Through centralization, officials overcame the
barrier of distance which they felt as they took on the
mandate to monitor the criminal population nationally.
Centralization permitted officials to substitute themselves
with record-keeping procedures that assured that information
collected in one site would be available to officials at
another site. This maneuver assured that they would have
access to relevant information without themselves having
been present at an event, such as an arrest. The first
attempts at such systems relied on photographs and written
descriptions which could be cumbersome and inexact and did
not always successfully circumvent the need for personal
knowledge of the criminal. Criminal anthropometry, which was
embraced as a solution to these problems, turned out not to
work as well as its proponents had believed. Still for some
time, it underwrote the rapid expansion of national
identification practices.
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Chapter Four

Applying Statistics to Identity

Introduction

In the late 1890s, when US and European police and
penal officials began pushing for national and international
identification systems, they faced serious obstacles. All
prior identification methods had relied to some extent on
personal knowledge or recognition, including even Marsangy's
innovative system which required knowing a suspect's name
and birthplace. The demand to create systems that could
incorporate hundreds of thousands, eventually millions, of
people, made unworkable methods that depended to even the
slightest degree on personal knowledge. Thus, officials
interested in criminal identity sought new identification
methods. The ones they chose were based on statistical
insights that permitted the evolution of identification
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systems with greater acuity and scope. These procedures-criminal anthropometry and fingerprinting--permitted
officials to accurately describe and classify virtually
unlimited numbers of people. This chapter will review the
statistical basis and institutional history of these
methods.
The statistical concepts crucial to this endeavor, such
as normal distributions and probability theory, were for the
most part well-established even a hundred years ago when
researchers first began seeking new identification methods.
Still identification research did help to advance
statistical thinking. For example, work accomplished in the
process of contrasting anthropometry and fingerprinting, led
to crucial insights about statistical correlation theory.
Equally important, these efforts represent some of the
earliest attempts to fashion statistical concepts useful for
studying individuals rather than groups. Only with these new
statistical procedures could scientists develop systems
which the state could use both to track large populations
and to isolate individual members within those populations.
Although many officials immediately recognized the
value of criminal anthropometry and fingerprinting, the
dissemination and acceptance of these methods took several
decades. Certain factions among police and penal
organizations found them either unnecessary or unworkable,
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and the competition among various methods occasionally
became acrimonious. Still these new approaches to personal
identification spoke to pressing needs including the
detection of recidivists, crime prevention, and the
professional development of police and penal officials.
Anthropometry preceded fingerprinting by 15 to 20 years and
was for that period considered the most sophisticated,
useful criminal identification method. However,
fingerprinting was clearly superior, technically,
theoretically, and practically. Eventually it prevailed and
rapidly replaced anthropometry as the single most useful,
and most used,

identification method in national, criminal

identification systems. This chapter starts with a detailed
description of Bertillon's invention and then moves onto
fingerprinting.

Alphonse Bertillon
The inventor of criminal anthropometry, Alphonse
Bertillon, grew up in a 19th century scholarly Parisian
home. His grandfather, Jean-Claude Achille Guil1ard, is
considered among the originators of the science of
demography (he coined the term). His father, Louis-Adolphe
Bertillon, made many contributions both to demographic
theory and, by way of enabling demographic research, also to

167

statistics. His brother Jacques continued the tradition in
Alphonse's generation.1 Grandfather, father, and brother
were all interested in the human species' natural and social
history, which they believed could be investigated through a
mathematical knowledge of populations. They devised
statistical procedures to flesh out fundamental demographic
concepts such as fecundity,

and birth and death rates, which

were essential to the analysis of population growth and
fluctuation.
Anthropometry, the measurement of human physical
dimensions, was marginal to the Bertillons' direct concerns,
but was still a topic that interested them. In turn-of-thecentury social science, anthropometry played a central role.
Adolphe Quetelet, the Belgian astronomer, had brought
anthropometry to center stage earlier in the century when he
declared it a primary tool in the search for "l'homme
moyen." Quetelet believed that the mean of numerous
anthropometric measurements would reveal an essential human
type, a type which he cast as a distillation or an ideal,
rather than as an arithmetical average. This ideal type,
once delineated by research, was to become a genetic goal to
strive toward. The notion of "l'homme moyen" was eventually
discredited,

in large part by the work of Louis-Adolphe

Bertillon, who pointed out--among other more carefullyargued criticisms--that such a calculation would represent
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not the ideal man but "type de la vulgarite."2 Still, the
belief that anthropometric measurements could reveal hidden
truths thrived in other circles, notably among
anthropologists and eugenicists, who hoped to find in them
the indicators of normalcy and deviancy. Alphonse Bertillon
inherited his father's scepticism of anthropometry's more
extended uses, yet he praised its utility in other spheres.
Alphonse Bertillon was slow to follow in the footsteps
of his illustrious family. Although not an avid reader--he
was a grudging student at best--Pascal was reportedly a
favorite,

and he surprised his father by getting through

Quetelet's Physique Sociale at age 13.3 He passed his
baccalaureat, though late and without distinction. He
floated through various jobs as a bank clerk and tutor, and
completed a trouble-ridden tour in the military. At 26 he
found himself jobless and with no particular training. He
presented himself to his father and asked for help. His
father, disinclined to extend himself very far for this
difficult off-spring, found Alphonse a job as a clerk with
the police department.
Part of Bertillon's new job required him to copy over
physical descriptions of suspects recorded by inspectors.
These descriptions often included terms such as "small" or
"tall" for stature, or "ordinary"

for facial description.

Bertillon, with his scientific background, and in
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particular, his knowledge of anthropometry, had an
appreciation of the diversity of human physique, and knew
these descriptions to be useless. The terms could easily
apply to thousands of people. "Brown hair, brown eyes, and
medium height," while possibly accurate, would fail to
distinguish one brown-haired, brown-eyed, medium-height
person from the next. Moreover, a person described by one
inspector as "medium" in stature

might appear to another as

"tall." Without a standardized way to assign these labels,
they could not be reliably replicated. These descriptions
were alphabetically stored by the subject's last name.
Confronted with a suspected recidivist, police had no
routine mechanism for locating an earlier description filed
under a different name.
Bertillon resolved to correct matters and at the same
time to make a career for himself by developing a method for
standardizing criminal description. Bertillon's goal was to
develop a system that w.ould permit police to record uniquely
distinguishing descriptions of suspects that could also
could be reliably replicated, routinely stored, and thus
readily available for reference. Bertillon relied on
insights evident in his father's work, but he applied them
in quite the opposite fashion. Instead of collecting
anthropometric information from individuals in order better
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to describe groups, the young Bertillon would collect it
from groups to better describe individuals.
The system that Bertillon designed suceeded in
correcting many of the faults he had detected in the French
system. The French police and the police of several other
European nations adopted it immediately and the US soon
followed suit. However, while its acceptance was widespread,
it was also short-lived.
Research conducted later by the British scientist
Francis Galton revealed a critical flaw in the reasoning
Bertillon had used in trying to develop unique descriptions.
(This problem will be described in detail later.) Although
this flaw did not negate all of Bertillon's accomplishments,
it did contribute significantly to anthropometry's decline.
While most of the identifications achieved through the
method were likely to have been accurate, the assumptions
pertaining to the ultimate size of the population to which
this method could reliably be extended, were not.
In spite of its later demise, Bertillon's method
remains an important chapter in the history of human
identification systems. Many of Bertillon's insights
survived scrutiny and influenced later identification
systems.4 Furthermore, the story of Bertillon's method
reflects an important part of the history of statistical
thinking--specifically that involving concepts for the
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individualized management of large populations. Tracing this
history can contribute to an understanding of how
individualized administrative methods evolved which
permitted the modern state to effectively deploy its
authority through surveillance.

Bertillon's Project
Bertillon began his project by inventing a way to
standardize descriptive terms. Knowing that certain skeletal
parts of the human body remain unchanged after an individual
reaches adulthood, Bertillon began collecting anthropometric
measurements of adults: police suspects, his father's
friends--indeed,

anyone willing to submit.S From each he

took measurements of height, head-width and length, finger
length, and arm and leg length, as well as several other
dimensions. Based on these measurements, Bertillon developed
three categories for each dimension: small, medium, and
large. A subsequent step in Bertillon's procedure required
that these small, medium, and large categories divide the
population equally into thirds.
Earlier attempts to describe suspects with such labels-small, medium, large--had been found to be inadequate by
Bertillon, as just described. That is, they were purely
subjective on the part of the examiner and failed to
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incorporate any criteria that could be objectively described
or evaluated. But Bertillon's knowledge of normal
distributions allowed him to understand these failures in a
particular way. Based on Quetelet's assertions, Bertillon
believed that anthropometric measurements conformed to a
normal distribution. By definition, this meant that the
majority of measurements would cluster about their mean.6
For example, although the possible range of heights among
French males may have been 1 meter 40 centimeters (1m 40cm)
to 1m 85cm, the majority of actual heights fell roughly
between 1m 59cm and 1m 70cm Many observers may have sensed
this fact intuitively. But Bertillon's statistical
background validated and explained this observation to him
and guided him in the calculations needed to establish
useful measurement categories.
If heights tend to cluster around the mean, simply
dividing the range of measurements into three equal parts
would not have resulted in categories of equal membership.
Rather, such a procedure would have created an overpopulated, and thus non-discriminating and useless "medium"
category. For the categories to be equal in membership, the
"medium" category had cover a narrower range relative to the
the "small" and "large" categories.
For example, Bertillon determined that the mean height
of French men was 1m 65cm and established the following
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categories: "Small" would refer to anyone less than 1m 619mm
(millimeters) in height; "Medium" to anyone 1m 620mm to 1m
679mm; and "Large" would refer to anyone over 1m 680mm.7
Using the same procedure, Bertillon calculated small,
medium, and large categories for other dimensions, such as
head width and length, arm and leg length, and so on. These
categories covered intentionally unequal ranges. The medium
category for height spanned less than 6 centimeters, while
the other two categories extended considerably further,
ending only with the upper and lower physical limitations on
height. However, they served Bertillon's purpose because
they divided the French adult male population into three
roughly-equal groups.
Knowing where to establish the limits of the middle
category--which otherwise would have referred to a
disproportionately large group and been incapable of
usefully distinguishing members of a large population--was
the key advantage Bertillon gained by relying on the his
knowledge of normal distributions to create standardized,
descriptive categories. Taken together, these categories
created a framework that usefully described the range of
body types found among the adult French population. 8
Of course, while Bertillon's system solved some
measurement problems by establishing standardized
categories, his system did little to ameliorate other
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pressing problems with measurement. Since he was working
with continuous rather than discrete variables, Bertillon's
method faced serious obstacles with accuracy and
consistency. He eventually implemented a rigorous training
program for clerks in charge of measuring that helped to
eliminate some errors. Still he faced the same problems that
users of anthropometric measurements had faced before him
(and since): anthropometric measurements are notoriously
difficult to replicate consistently, especially within the
degrees of tolerances required by Bertillon's system. To
some extent he handled this problem by carefully delineating
the procedures for recording a measurement that fell at the
limits of a particular category, but there was little he
could do to eliminate the problem entirely. 9
Still, the Bertillon system greatly advanced police
identification practices by introducing the ideals of
standardization and replicability. In contrast to their old
tradition of intuitive, informal descriptions, police now
followed precise procedures that resulted in far greater
descriptive uniformity. Each suspect passing through police
custody was assigned to an array of standardized categories
and people with similar measurements were consistently
assigned to the same categories. With these innovations,
Bertillon ameliorated many of the problems he had found so

•

175

problematic earlier at police headquarters, but he did not
stop there.
The next step, which called on probability theory,
provided the key to extending Bertillon's method. Building
upon Pascal's theory of combinations, Bertillon reasoned
that combining these anthropometric measures in a kind of
nesting arrangement would result in descriptions that could
distinguish one individual from among hundreds of thousands.
Combination theory explains how certain probabilites
should be calculated, such as those of serial events like
repeated dice rolling. The probability from each roll must
be brought forward into the next roll by multiplying the
next probability by the preceding one. For example, the
likelihood of rolling the same number twice in a row is
calculated by multiplying 1/6 (the probability of getting a
particular number on the first roll) by 1/6 (the probability
of getting a particular number on the second roll). The
resulting probability for rolling the same number twice in a
row is 1/36. Through multiplication, the probability of each
successive roll is conditioned (narrowed) by the probability
from the previous roll. The predictability of the narrowing
of probabilities rests on the assumption that other relevant
conditions remain constant. For example, the die must always
be six-sided and can be rolled only once for each try.
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Bertillon's understanding of how probabilites could be
sucessively narrowed provided a critical insight for
extending his identification method. It allowed him to
devise a procedure for combining one measurement with
another, and another, and yet another still, to achieve
increasingly distinctive and powerful descriptions. The more
likely that a descriptive category was unique, the more
powerful it would be in terms of absolute identification.
Bertillon arbitrarily chose head-length as his first
measurement, dividing the population by thirds, into small,
medium, and large head-lengths.10 According to Bertillon's
system, the chance of falling into anyone of these
categories was one in three. Next, using head-width
measurements, Bertillon divided each of the small, medium,
and large head-length categories into three sub-groups--once
again small, medium, and large--resulting in nine total
groups, with roughly equal membership. The probability of
membership in anyone of these categories was 1/9. He
repeated this operation with yet another measurement, median
finger length, which resulted in 27 categories and a 1 in 27
chance of any particular description applying to a
particular individual. Bertillon repeated this operation
with several more measurements. Each additional measurement
decreased the chance of membership in a group by a factor of
three. Continuing in this fashion, by the time 13
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measurements had been incorporated, the classificatory
framework,

in theory, could have distinguished nearly 1.6

million people.11 Thus, while anyone of these measurements
could distinguish only one in three people, their successive
combination geometrically increased their descriptive
acuity, resulting eventually in very specific, narrowly
applicable portraits. 12
The idea of applying this kind of logic to identity
questions was not entirely new. For example, the increase in
the number of features listed by walnut St. Jail officials
could be interpreted as evidence of the same insight that
guided Bertillon: by listing additional descriptive
criteria, the range of people to whom the description
applied was thereby narrowed. There is no evidence that
Walnut St. Jail officials understood the utility of nesting
descriptive criteria, though certainly this technique was
well established at the time in various plant and animal
classificatory schemes.
Edgar Allen Poe's 1842 short story, "The Mystery of
Marie Roget" contains perhaps the first published
description of the method's application to identifying human
beings. In it, Poe described the process employed by a man
as he tried to identify a bloated corpse as that of a
friend. Each physical feature known to have characterized
the dead woman and each piece of clothing known to have
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belonged to her, although in itself incapable of providing
the complete evidence needed to prove identity, contributed
one more degree of certainty toward a final, positive
judgment.13 Bertillon's contribution was to standardize and
extend this intuitive awareness of probability.
Bertillon's prior, careful calculation of the small,
medium, and large categories for these measurements was
pivotal to a more formalized application of combination
theory to human identification. For each new measurement to
increase the description's discriminatory power threefold,
Bertillon had to assure that subjects always experienced a
one in three likelihood of falling into each category. He
believed that he had fulfilled this condition in the
procedures he used to create his tripartate categories.
However, this is where Bertillon erred. In point of fact,
each person did not have an equal chance of falling into
each category. This was not because Bertillon had
incorrectly drawn the categories, but because he had failed
to assure that the dimensions he selected varied
independently of one another. For example, people with long
arms, who fell into the "large" category for arm length,
stood a far greater chance--rather than an equal chance--o f
falling into the "large" category for leg length. In other
words, arm length and leg length (and many other
anthropometric measurements) are correlated.
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This problem was first publicly revealed in an 1888
study by Francis Ga1ton.14 Galton, a sophisticated
statistical thinker, had been asked by the British Royal
Institution to examine new criminal identification
practices. In releasing his findings regarding Bertillon's
error, Galton published the first account of statistical
correlation theory. In so doing, according to one author, he
"created a revolution" in social science methodology.1S In
addition, he initiated work he would complete later when
proving the uniqueness of fingerprints.
Initially, Galton's critique had no impact on the
popularity of Bertillon's method. The system continued to
spread in France and several other countries, including the
US, which actually embraced it most heartily following the
publication of Galton's piece. It is important that Galton
did not entirely reject Bertillon's system. He felt that in
spite of its faults,

the system was "most ingenious" and

should be used to standardize descriptions. Still, he
emphasized its limitations in making unique
identifications.16 It is possible that officials in the US
and elsewhere were unaware of Galton's critique. But equally
important, they may have continued to use Bertillon's
system, because,

in spite of this flaw, the system worked,

or seemed to work, at least for the time being.
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According to Bertillon, within the first four years of
his system's implementation in Paris, officials had measured
over 60,000 subjects and detected over 1,500 recidivists.17
By 1892, the number measured had risen to well over 100,000
and the recidivists detected to nearly 5,000.18 By
Bertillon's own account, all the charges of recidivism were
later independently confirmed. Indeed, of the thousands of
identifications of recidivists made by Paris police using
anthropometry, Bertillon asserted,

"not one had given rise

to any confusion. "19 Bertillon also claimed that operators
had not erred in the opposite direction by categorizing
someone as a first-time offender who was in fact a
recidivist.20 A thorough search of case record material from
US courts tells basically the same story: only one instance
of an assertion of false identification by criminal
anthropometry appears in these pages.21
Neither this finding nor Bertillon's figures confirm
that there were no mistaken identifications made under the
Bertillon system. Still, it is unlikely that the system
produced rampant errors without leaving some record
attesting to this. Given the mistake in the systems' logic,
this performance deserves some explanation.
Bertillon's system could have produced two types of
errors. First, false identifications: instances where
measurements incorrectly indicated that a person was a
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recidivist when in fact he or she was not. Second: failures
to identify: instances where measurments did not reveal as a
recidivist someone who actually had passed twice or more
times through the system. Several factors worked against
either type of error occurring at a rate one might have
expected.
First, although the anthropometric measurement system
was Bertillon's primary innovation, it was not his only one.
He also developed a sophisticated method for analyzing
photographs and standardizing written descriptions of facial
and other bodily features,

such as scars and marks. Although

anthropometry was designed as the primary mechanism for
ordering identification records, the other two kinds of
description could be relied on to verify anthropometric
findings, especially photographs. Thus, perhaps there were
errors of both types, but clerks caught these errors by
referring to information collected by these other methods.
Second, to assure reliance on these alternate systems
and to encourage careful measuring and filing, Bertillon
offered a financial incentive to officers. Every time a
police officer or prison-keeper could point out someone as a
recidivist whom anthropometry clerks had missed, ten frances
[approximately $2) was deducted from the anthropometry
clerk's salary.22
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Third, Bertillon devised special procedures for
handling measurements which fell right at a category's
limit. These measurements were a potential source of
frequent failure-to-identify errors. A minor measuring
error, which normally made little difference, took on great
significance at the boundaries of categories because it
determined the person's classification as either small or
medium, or medium or large. For example, the difference
between 1m 619 and 1m 620 is only 1 mm, but it made the
difference between classifying an individual as small or as
medium and thus influenced the likelihood that the original
card would be found in the event of a subsequent visit. In
brief, the procedures required clerks to check cards stored
in both adjoining categories (small and medium, or medium
and large) when filing the cards of individuals who fell
within a certain range surrounding the category cut-off
points.23
One final factor mitigated against the first type of
error, false identifications. Prior to the addition of
fingerprints into Parisian criminal record-keeping in the
late 1890s--a move that ameliorated the problem with
Bertillon's system--it is unlikely that the anthropometric
card collection ever included more than 200,000 individuals.
At this time, anthropometric clerks were taking and
recording 12 measurements for each subject.24 Had all twelve
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of these measurements represented truly independent
variables, the system could have distinguished over 500,000
individuals.25 In fact some of the variables did vary
independently,

for example finger length and head breadth.

Thus, the 200,000 people who were actually in the files may
have been insufficient to have produced more than a few of
the replications that would have been expected, given the
other variables' covariance.26
Thus, Bertillon's system succeeded, if only briefly, in
part due to corrective measures--such as rewards and special
procedures to encourage careful measuring--and in part
because it was applied to a relatively small population.
Importantly, much of Bertillon's basic logic actually was
correct. Indeed, not only did fingerprinting's uniqueness
proof rest on nearly identical assumptions,

Bertillon's

method also fostered long-lasting advances in storage and
retrieval methods for identification records. These advances
were pivotal in the successful application of statisticallybased identification systems to national populations.

Advancing Organizational Memory: Storage and Retrieval
Methods
To meet the requirement.s of a national identification
system, Bertillon had to devise a method that permitted
officials not only to produce replicable, unique
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descriptions, but one that also permitted them to find these
descriptions. A national system, by definition incorporating
a large population, could not rely on personal or collective
memory for keeping track of identity records. Bertillon's
anthropometric measurement cards were remarkably easy to
file and find,

and with this last feature, Bertillon's

system radically altered identification practices. The ease
of locating stored anthropometric measurements resulted from
the logical relationship between the procedures for
classifying and storing anthropometric cards, the procedures
for retrieving them, and their content. This feature is
critical to understanding anthropometry's place in the
evolution of identification procedures.
It is important to note that the advantages accruing
from Bertillon's system depended on the accuracy and care
taken by clerks. Only if cards were filled-out and filed
correctly, were they easy to find.

In practice, clerks made

errors and lost cards. Here the discussion focusses on the
system's theoretical organization, rather than on its
practical application. Later a brief discussion addresses
the problems of clerical errors.

A personal identity description, no matter how
carefully or scientifically executed, provides no help
whatever to officials if they can't find it when they need
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it. At Walnut St., detailed descriptions, untraceable
through any means save the clerk's recollection, probably
often remained buried among Sentence Docket pages, allowing
many a recidivist to pass undetected. The procedure used to
store a Walnut St. description--chronology by sentencing
date--bore no logical relationship to the means used to
retrieve it--name or face recognition. There was no
procedure for assuring that clerks would find what they or
their predecessors had recorded.
This mismatch between storage and retrieval procedures
surfaces in many record-keeping systems. For example, the
commonly-used alphabetic system rarely has any intrinsic
relationship between itself and the material it is used to
order. Its retrieval efficiency relies instead on the
filer's memory of how he or she chose to distribute
information into letter-based categories.

An electric bill,

for example, has no intrinsic relationship to the letter
chosen to represent it.

"B" for bills, "E" for electric, or

"H" for household are all equally plausible locations. While
the alphabet orders the information, its retrieval depends
not on any intrinsic property of the alphabet, but on the
user's memory of how he or she applied the alphabet.
Bertillon's classificatory scheme for anthropometric
cards eradicated this gap between storage and retrieval, and
in so doing eliminated reliance on individual or collective
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memory in personal identification. The anthropometric cards
contained measurements, and the measurements delineated the
path for both storage and retrieval. By making storage and
retrieval principles isometric with content, the scheme
virtually assured that material (properly) stored could be
readily retrieved.
Each suspect's anthropometric measurements were
recorded on a single, standardized, printed card. After
recording a suspect's measurements on one of these cards,
clerks filed it in a specially-built cabinet.27 One source
suggests that the first cabinet that Bertillon had built, in
late 1882 in Paris, had nine columns of drawers across the
top and nine rows down the side, resulting in places for 81
card-classifications (3 to the 4th power) .28 (He was working
with fewer measurements at this time because initially he
was permitted only to try the system experimentally with a
few hundred suspects.) To determine the card's placement,
clerks referred first to the head length measurement, then
head width, then median finger length, and so on. The
drawers in the center of the cabinet housed cards whose
first measurement placed them in the medium category, those
falling in the small category were stored to the left, and
those designated large were stored to the cabinet's righthand side. Within these columns, the drawers were similarly
organized to mirror the remaining measurement categories.
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Each measurement directed clerks to narrow their drawer
choice, until they eventually located one which housed a
handful of cards with very similar measurements. Additional
measurements were used to order the cards within each
drawer. Logically, the system could have extended the
categorizations until each card found its way into a
separate drawer housing a single card. But the challenge of
fashioning such an elaborate cabinet led Bertillon to settle
for final groupings of 10 or 12 cards, which then were
examined by hand.
Once stored, a given card, theoretically, should not be
retrieved until the same person (then a potential
recidivist) passed again through police inspection. In that
case, the card would be retrieved as an artifact of the
process of storing the second card and a match would be
noted. Any other entries of the same person into the system
would, in theory, always lead to this sort of match
occurring. As part of routine procedure, all suspects--those
believed to be recidivists as well as all others--were
measured and their cards classified and stored. If a person
had ever been measured before, then, when the clerk filed
that person's card--that is, when the clerk located the
final storage spot for the second card--he would find a card
already there. A card which may have featured a different
name, but which proved the suspect's identity through its
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identical

(or nearly identical within the degrees of

tolerance of the method) measurements. Indeed, the process
of storing or filing anthropometric cards was actually
Bertillon's way of checking on a suspect's past.
It is important to point out a limitation of
anthropometry, one that all existing identification systems
share. Bertillon's anthropometry could identify a person
only if that person had already been measured. The person in
question had to have passed though police hands once, and
have a card on file,

for the second measuring session to

result in an identification. A first pass only established
the person in the record-keeping system. It would reveal
only that the person had never been there before, often a
critical fact in itself. This aspect of identification
systems will be considered in more detail later in
discussions concerning the campaign for "universal
identification," which proposed requiring that all citizens
automatically have on file a copy of their measurements or
fingerprints.
Thus, anthropometric card storage and anthropometric
card retrieval occurred by the same mechanism--a
measurement-delineated path--that was determined directly by
the card's content. The procedure required the clerk to
understand the classification procedure but, while clerks
may have chosen to memorize the limits of categories so they
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would automatically know which measurements fell into which
categories, the system made no intrinsic demand on the
clerk's individual memory. Storage and retrieval could be
accomplished as successfully by referring to a printed
reference guide. Assuming that clerks took accurate
measurements and stored the cards properly (assumptions
which actually could not be counted on), Bertillon's
anthropometry seemed to assure that descriptions taken would
be available at a later date to any interested official,
regardless of his or her personal knowledge of the
individual whose identity was in question.
This novel quality of Bertillon's system made it
suitable for centralization on a national level. Under
Bertillon's direction, local police departments in France's
provinces began taking anthropometric measurements of
suspects and convicts and sending them (by telegraph or
mail) to a central office in Paris.

(Smaller towns and

villages were exempt). Upon filing the card, if the Parisian
clerk discovered a match he alerted local police. The local
police also kept their own files so they could quickly
uncover local recidivists, while centralization through
Paris assured the discovery of the recidivist who had first
plied his or her trade elsewhere in France.29
These practices created a surveillance network that
extended over much of France. While not strictly national,
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because some jurisdictions did not contribute, its intent
and often its accomplishments, indeed were national.
Officials from both the center and the outlying districts
contributed information to a central clearinghouse. All
could draw then on this comprehensive collection of
information. Furthermore, the criminal biographies that such
a system produced were national in character, incorporating
misdeeds committed from border to border. In theory, and
sometimes in practice, a change of venue no longer provided
a wrongdoer with a clean slate. Through anthropometric
records, the state made its first real attempt to extend its
gaze over the entire nation.
Furthermore, not only did this new system overcome
traditional spatial boundaries, allowing identifications at
a distance that previously would have required personal
presence or prior acquaintance, it also greatly enhanced
officials' depth of memory. Bertillon's system helped to
circumvent reliance on specific individual or collective
memories, and shifted some of the burden of recollection to
an organizational memory. Rather than being limited by the
lifespan of individual policemen or court officials,
Bertillon's system now extended official memory to the
lifespan of the record-keeping system.
This discussion of anthropometry's suitability for
national application should help to clarify assertions in
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Chapter Three about photography's deficiencies as a primary
tool in national identification systems. Although
photographs often provide easily recognized, readily
acceptable identity evidence, they cannot be easily relied
upon for a large-scale, national system. Once taken and
stored, they provide no obvious, logical means of retrieval.
There is no standardized procedure through which photographs
can be reliably linked with criminal records at a
distance.30 In Bertillon's 1885 Paris, police had already
accumulated over 100,000 photographs in their rogue's
gallery.31 As one proponent of anthropometry inquired
rhetorically,

"Does anyone suppose ... [that the] police are

at the trouble of searching through a collection of one or
two hundred thousand photographs every time they make an
arrest?"

" [A]nthropometry, " this author concludes, "shelves

the camera."32 By eliminating the reliance on personal
knowledge or recognition, anthropometry opened the door for
a dependable national system, which was considerably freed
from traditional time-space constraints.
To Bertillon and a handful of other officials,
anthropometry's advantages were startlingly clear. The
system demanded immediate adoption. As Paul Richard Brown, a
major and surgeon in the US army and an official delegate to
the Fifth International Prison Congress in Paris, commented
in his report on criminal anthropometry to the US Senate,
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When I think of the vast results of which it
[criminal anthropometry] is capable in the
prevention and repression of crime, I believe I do
not exagerate when I say that Quetelet and
Bertillon are two of the greatest benefactors of
the human race which this century has brought
forth, and that the jurist and criminologists of
the twentieth century will be amazed when they
read of the stupidity and ignorance of those
nations that did not adopt this wonderful system
of anthropometric identifications as soon as it
was made known to them.33

Such support extended beyond the police community, as
evidenced by a New York Times "Topic of the Times" piece
that states that anyone who denied the value of Bertillon's
method "simply proved his inability" to keep up with the
"march of progress," and "revealed an ignorance" that
"deserved to be called amusing, disgraceful, or criminal,
according to his position in the body politic."34 Some
officials, however, were reluctant to adopt criminal
anthropometry. As Bertillon himself, complained, "It was
less difficult to discover it than to get it accepted and
used correctly. "35

The Dissemination of Criminal Anthropometry
Senior officials at Paris police headquarters initially
rejected Bertillon's plan. The statistical reasoning that
justified its claims fell beyond these men's expertise.
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Although they understood the need for an improved
identification system, Bertillon's system was
incomprehensible to them. One account contends that the
Prefect of Police first took Bertillon's plan as a practical
joke.36 Only with the intervention of his father, LouisAdolphe Bertillon and the appointment of a new police
prefect, did the police finally concede to an experimental
trial of criminal anthropometry. Officials gave Bertillon
two clerks and three months to catch a recidivist, using
only his method. Two months into the experiment, Bertillon
caught his man, a M. Dupont, who, until the measurements
proved otherwise, had vociferously claimed his status as a
first-time offender.37 The police administrators were
immediately convinced of the efficacy of Bertillon's system
and moved quickly to adopt it throughout the city.
Bertillon's system enjoyed rapid success in France
because it served several pressing needs there. The police,
for example, were still trying to recover from an 1871 fire
that had destroyed their extensive criminal files. Although
they had begun to rebuild their collection--indeed,
Bertillon owed his 1879 employment with them to the
initiation of a massive criminal record reorganization
effort--the French police were still seeking ways to improve
on established methods. Bertillon's system answered this
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need, as well as providing a solution to official concern
that recidivism was on the rise.
Studies in the late 1870s and early 1880s claimed to
show that in Paris recidivists committed 53% of crimes
generally and 71% of all vagrancy crimes.38 Based on these
findings, several prominent legislators began pushing for
new laws that distinguished between first-time and repeat
offenders and that meted out more serious punishments for
the latter. After the 1885 "Relegation Law" passed, habitual
criminals faced exile to overseas French penal colonies,
even for a misdemeanor. A second new law, the Parole Law,
also passed in 1885, fostered further interest in a
criminal's life history by introducing new sentencing
criteria based more on a criminal's potential for reform
than on the crime committed.39
By providing a way to implement these laws, Bertillon's
system was assured popularity in France. A deputy in the
French government wrote,
The services rendered by scientific
identification and the anthropometry which is its
basis, and those which it is calculated to render
(when its organization has been completed) not
only to the police but also to PURE SCIENCE demand
its official recognition as a service of the
state.40

Headlines that greeted the invention described the
"ingenious" Bertillon as having "revolutionize[d] the
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identification of criminals" and as having provided to the
French police the

means for "them to once again lead the

way in the wor1d."41

Criminal Anthropometry in the United States
Word of Bertillon's success in France quickly spread to
other countries.42 Two eminent Italian criminologists
learned of it and invited Bertillon to give his invention
its international debut at the International Prison Congress
being held in Rome in 1885. His talk was well-received and
in preparation for this event

Bertillon wrote his first

book, Signaletic Instructions.43
The story of Bertillon's Rome appearance was printed in
a US newspaper. Gallus Muller, the clerk at Joliet State
Penitentiary, read the article and told his superior, Robert
W. McClaughry, the warden at Joliet, about what he had read.

McClaughry immediately began corresponding with Bertillon.44
As explained earlier, the news of Bertillon's system reached
McClaughry at an opportune time. McClaughry was in the midst
of planning a national identification system for the US
Wardens' Association, and although they had already chosen a
procedure relying on photography for this new system,
McClaughry was open to new ideas. Upon receiving a detailed
letter from Bertillon describing how his system worked,
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McC1aughry contacted the members of his organization and
suggested that they delay implementation of the system they
had designed until they could see a demonstration of the
Bertillon system at their next meeting, only a few months
away.45
The wardens saw a demonstration of Bertillon's
anthropometry at their meeting in Toronto in September 1887
and adopted the method by an enthusiastic majority, although
not without dissent.46 One of the system's most ardent
proponents later described his reasons for supporting the
systems as follows,
It is a self-evident fact that the avenues
through which those criminally inclined find
freedom for movement, must be closed or the
growing increase in the numbers of criminals and
crimes will not be checked. No broader avenue or
one more free from restraint exists than the one
made by the inability to identify criminals after
the first offense ... The adoption of the
"Bertillon" system of identification would close
this avenue successfully ... 47

In February 1888,

McClaughry organized a conference at

the Joliet Penitentiary to instruct Wardens' Association
members from several prisons in anthropometry's application
and 10 or 12 large prisons joined with McClaughry to
establish the first working national criminal identification
system in the US.48 Unfortunately, apparently, no detailed
description of this system has survived. A brief plan set
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forth in 1887 suggested that all contributing prisons send
Bertillon cards to the Joliet prison monthly, whereupon
contributing institutions would be notified if any of the
subjects on their lists were recidivists.49
By 1889 the Wardens' Association Identification Bureau
had 14 member institutions, and two states, Pennsylvania and
Illinois, had passed statutes requiring anthropometric
measurements be taken of convicts.50 The federal government
chose the Wardens' Association 1889 meeting to voice, for
the first time, public support for the establishment of a
national, centralized, anthropometry-based identification
bureau, located in Washington DC.51 Still, despite this
promising start, the Wardens' Association never really
fulfilled its commitment to anthropometry. After an initial
fascination with the method's potential, many members began
to have serious concerns about its efficacy and necessity.
Some of these doubts reflect a fundamental disagreement
over the Wardens' Association mission, which in turn spoke
to a basic disagreement over the function of prisons and the
role of the warden. Several members, among them the founders
of the organization, who were also active members of the
National Prison Association (NPA) , believed that the
function of a prison was prisoner reform.52 Toward this end
they formed the Wardens' Association in order to establish
an identification bureau upon which prison wardens could

198

rely to inform them about the "truth" of a prisoner's
background, information that they considered essential to
the reform process.53 These wardens saw themselves not as
"mere prison-keepers" but as "men ... engaged in one of the
grandest works on earth."54
Other members, however, did not mind being thought of
as "mere prison-keepers," and they found the debates over
reform and the causes of crime that marked the NPA meetings
too theoretical. They joined the Wardens' Association (a
sub-section of the NPA) because they thought they would find
there a place to discuss practical issues of prison
adminstration, such as the relative merits of different
sorts of prison uniforms, recreational activities, and labor
contracts. They did not necessarily believe that criminals
could be reformed, and in any case, they rejected the idea
that overseeing reform was the warden's primary mandate. For
these Wardens' Association members, Bertillon's
anthropometry was a diversion from the pressing business of
running a secure, economically-sound prison.
A small but vocal minority voiced yet a third position
relative to anthropometry. These men concurred with the
first group in the belief that prisons were in the business
of reform, but they seriously questioned the utility of
anthropmetry in achieving that goal. Put simply, they saw
anthropometry not as an aid to reform, but as a tool of
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police surveillance. They saw this sort of record-keeping as
a violation of privacy and as an "indignity."SS
Specifically, they feared that the criminal history
information recorded on the anthropometry cards would be
released to the police or to the press and would follow exconvicts wherever they went, thus jeopardizing their chances
of starting over in a new life. Serving a prison term was
penalty enough and the practices associated with
anthropometry were "unjust."S6 As Warden Cassidy of
pennsylvania commented, "r will not persecute a man for his
naturallife."S7
This question of whether information collected for
anthropometric cards--measurements and criminal histories-in one setting could be released for use elsewhere surfaced
repeatedly in debates that accompanied the spread of
anthropometry and, later, of fingerprinting. At the Wardens'
Association meetings, however, this objection eventually
fell by the wayside, although other complaints surfaced to
replace it.S8
Even officials who supported anthropometry began to
register dissatisfaction about the system's complicated
implementation. Although based on elegantly simple
reasoning, anthropometry, in practice, was rather cumbersome
and subject to error. A competent clerk took at least ten
minutes to measure a compliant subject, and these two
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conditions--competence and compliance--could not always be
counted on. For the system to work, measurements had to be
consistent and precise, qualities that apparently Bertillon
had less trouble enforcing in Paris, perhaps because he
personally trained many of the clerks--but which were harder
to come by in the United States. The difficulty of taking
precise measurements of sometimes resisting suspects was
exacerbated in the United States by Bertillon's requirement
that all measurements be taken in the metric system.
Bertillon demanded this in anticipation of the day when the
united States and Europe would join together and establish
an international system, which would require that all
measurements be in the same units. But the US clerks saw it
only as an unnecessary complication of an already burdensome
process.
The Wardens' Association continued to meet and
continued its official support of anthropometry, and prisons
continued to join the system throughout the 1890s.
Nevertheless, the program remained controversial and
divisiveness over it threatened on at least one occasion to
wreck the organization. 59 Instead of disbanding, however,
the organization referred all discussions to a committee
constituted expressly for handling anthropometry-related
business. In 1900, believing, erroneously, that the federal
government was on the verge of establishing its own national
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anthropometry identification bureau, the Wardens'
Association suspended its anthropometry activities and
decided to "move on to other things."60

The International Association of Chiefs of Police
Meanwhile, R. W. McClaughry had not given up. He had
left his position as the warden at Joliet in late 1888 for a
brief job at a Pennsylvania prison and, in 1891, left that
job when called by the mayor of Chicago to take over as
police chief of that city. The mayor purportedly hired
McClaughry in anticipation of the crime and crowd control
problems he feared would accompany the World's Columbian
Exposition planned for 1893 in Chicago. Police Chief
McClaughry lost no time introducing criminal anthropometry
to the Chicago police department and used it with some
success as part of crime-fighting efforts at the 1893
Exposition. 61
In the same year, the nation's police chiefs decided to
meet nationally for the first time since their 1871 meeting
in St. Louis. Initially called the National Chiefs of Police
Union, this organization eventually became known as the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). They
chose Chicago as the site for their first meeting.62
McClaughry, who probably had a role in getting the police
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back together and bringing them to Chicago, attended and
took this opportunity to introduce the nation's police
chiefs to Bertillon's anthropometry.
The IACP enthusiastically received McClaughry's
presentation. The Pittsburgh police chief, in introducing a
resolution praising anthropometry's utility, explained that
anthropometry would allow the police to overcome "the most
embarrassing deterrent to the successful administration of
criminal jurisprudence:" not knowing the identities and life
histories of criminals.63 Another police chief later went
further, asserting that no police department should be
without Bertillon's anthropometry method, as it was a "great
lever" in the suppression of crime.64
At the 1893 meeting McClaughry demonstrated the
Bertillon system, and the police chiefs voted unanimously to
establish their own anthropometry-based identification
bureau. Early on, they apparently planned to rely on the
Chicago police department for the new bureau's local
administration. The chiefs planned to build their
anthropometry collection by agreeing to submit to the
Chicago office one copy of each anthropometry card they made
of local wrongdoers. Although, they did not specify the
details, presumably the chiefs expected to hear in return
whether the card submittted was that of a recidivist.65
Soon, the IACP established an independant office, hired a
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superintendent, and named their organization the National
Bureau for Criminal Identification (NBCI) .66
The first burst of enthusiasm, however, was not quite
sufficient to sustain the immediate establishment of a
functional national identification system on the scale that
IACP members had envisioned. Some early supporters soon
quit, contending that the identification bureau had not
provided the kind of the service it had promised. Others
complained that the system was too difficult to learn and
implement. Still others opposed the system because they
feared that reliance on it would destroy the finely-honed
and still much-needed memory faculty of individual
policemen. Chief Tukey from Boston opposed Bertillon's
anthropometry because he thought that the "old system" of
"taking a spot" worked just fine. Furthermore, he questioned
whether the courts would accept an identification based on
anthropometric evidence.67 The New York Times quoted Police
Chief O'Brien of New York as describing the system as
"absolutely useless." 68
Still, in the long run, despite all these complaints,
IACP proponents fared far better in overcoming
anthropometric naysayers than had their Wardens' Association
counterparts. Within a decade, the IACP had moved its NBCI
to Washington DC, was collecting 2,000 to 3,000 new
anthropometric cards yearly, and was making hundreds of
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identifications. This number of cards was far lower than
that collected by the Paris police. But, it must be
remembered that, in contrast to the French system, the NBCI
was not sponsored by the government and police contributions
to it were voluntary.
Anthropometry experienced greater success among police
than among prison wardens, because police believed more
firmly than prison officials in the advantages accruing from
knowing a wrongdoer's identity. Furthermore, anthropometry
served two other items on the agenda of this late 19th
century police organization: national affiliation and
professionalization. Combined, these advantages provided
sufficient motivation for IACP members to become leaders in
the movement to establish a national, anthropometricallybased identification system in the US.
Other players in this game deserve brief mention here.
During the 1890s, both the Pinkerton Detective Agency and
several large metropolitan police departments (notably,
Chicago, New York, and Washington DC) established their own
criminal anthropometry bureaus. Some of these collections
grew more rapidly than the NBCI's and garnered

more

support. Still, while relevant to a complete history of
criminal anthropometry, these organizations were not
committed to building a national system, which is the focus
here. Many of them shared their criminal identity
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information with other police departments and, later,
several donated major portions of their collections to the
federally-sponsored bureau, once it was established in the
early 1920s. Still, their focus was local, in contrast to
the IACP, which always saw its mandate as establishing a
national network.
The IACP's strong commitment to anthropometry grew
directly out of the earlier shift by police from crime
response to crime prevention, as well as out of the
accompanying interest in habitual criminals or "dangerous
individuals." This new direction in police work led police
to embrace the belief that to perform their job properly
they needed to know the identity of all criminals and
potential criminals. First emerging in the mid-l800s, the
committment to keeping records of criminal life histories
had only grown in the intervening decades. At the 1898 IACP.
convention, one participant commented, "It has come to be
recognized that ... the purpose of the police is, above all
else, to prevent crimes .... "69 And, as another claimed,
"Establishing their [criminals'] identity ... is the first and
most important question for crime prevention. "70
By building an anthropometric identification system,
police believed they could prevent crime, first, because it
would act as a deterrent for those contemplating crime. The
police reasoned that if criminals who were planning crimes
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heard about the new police capability to identify
wrongdoers, they would fear the certain detection
anthropometry seemed to promise, and would re-consider their
plans. Second, the police believed that knowing a criminal's
identity would permit the police to rid their city of
wrongdoers, or potential wrongdoers, even before they had
the opportunity to contemplate acting. Using the then much
wider police powers to "sweep" a neighborhood, police
planned to corral "dangerous-looking" individuals, take
their measurements, imprison fugitives or suspects, and
banish anyone found to have a record.71
This desire to know the identities of individual
criminals seems to have grown more acute with the addition
of new categories of wrongdoers. Turn-of-the-century police
faced not only the common criminal, but also anarchists
(President McKinley was assassinated by a self-proclaimed
anarchist in 1901 and the US anarchist movement was at its
peak during the early years of the 1900s), labor agitators
(frequent incidents throughout the 1880s and 1890s, such as
the Haymarket Massacre of 1886, had seriously heightened
tensions between police and union organizers), and--worst of
all to the police--parolees, products of a new penal theory
(rejected by police) that held that criminals might be
helped in their reform process if they believed they could
work toward an early, but monitored, release.72 Each of
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these groups, especially the anarchists, triggered a
particular anxiety among police because these criminals
seemed to blend in with the rest of the population too
easily. Unlike old-fashioned criminals, these wrongdoers
were hard to pick out of a crowd.73 Even bank robbers joined
this trend by rejecting the ostentatious and attentiondrawing outfits that, early on, had been their emblem. The
new breed dressed like laborers to fool the police.
Another factor that contributed to police interest in
an anthropometry-based identification system was the growing
belief that crime was a national phenomenon. Even more than
their 1871 predecessors,

IACP members believed that

criminals were part of national and international networks.
The wrongdoers who police were supposed to be looking out
for were not local felons and vagrants--men and women who,
over the years, police would come to recognize. They were
interlopers--anarchists from Europe, labor organizers from
New York, and thieves from neighboring states. Furthermore,
improved railroads and telegraphs aided the criminal element
by speeding their escape and permitting easy communication
with far-flung compatriots. As one police chief explained,
Thieves, especially are nomadic. They are
here to-day, and in the East, West or South
tomorrow--ready at any moment to commit crime. A
registry [of criminals) would not only furnish
information to each detective of a city, but it
might form a connecting link as evidence as to
crime committed elsewhere.74
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Police felt that they could no longer rely on locallybased systems to track wrongdoers. They needed a
"systematic" and "complete system" for the "exchange of
information" about criminals.75 Many felt that only a system
such as criminal anthropometry could establish adequate
surveillance over the roving criminal population they were
supposed to control.
Interest in a national system developed from another
trend, as well: the growing sentiment among police that
they each had a responsibility to help brother officers in
other towns. While local conflicts still remained intense,
police had come to see themselves more and more as part of
an inter-city, inter-state, and inter-regional network.76 At
the IACP meetings during the 1890s and early 1900s members
spoke glowingly of the good turns done one another when an
officer from one city captured a fugitive reported by
officials from another city. Indeed, this practice did
represent a new trend, departing radically from the days
when police would do nothing to catch a criminal if they
thought the reward money would go to another town's police
officer or when banishment from a city's limits (implicitly
sanctioning a criminal to move to another city and set up
operations) was considered an appropriate punishment.
Anthropometry .las alone among identification methods that
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could dependably make identifications at a distance, thus
facilitating this new cooperative spirit.
Support for anthropometry came from yet another quarter
in the IACP--those officers who supported the
professionalization of the police. In the 1890s municipal
police departments provided a frequent target for political
reformers, especially those from the Progressive party who
favored an efficient, bureaucratic approach to governance.
Up until this time, the police often functioned overtly as a
political arm of local politicians rather than as a nonpartisan municipal service, as the Progressives
envisioned.77 Powerful, local political parties could rely
on the police force to carry out dirty deeds at election
time and to lend support as needed throughout the year to
bolster the regime. Officers received little training, were
notoriously undisciplined, and were easy to bribe.
Reformers within the IACP saw a program of
professionalization as a way to eradicate these unacceptable
practices and to bring to the police a new respect and
influence. Several police chiefs among the IACP's leadership
called for police professionalization, including, the
depoliticization of the police, increased discipline and
training of officers, and the establishment of a quasimilitary system of ranks. Supporters of the
professionalization movement were also strong supporters of
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the identification bureau. They believed that an
identification bureau would provide a scientific basis to
police work and would help to underscore the difference
between them and the old-fashioned partisan cop who relied
on hearsay or his own fallible memory for making arrests.78
To some hopefuls, participation in the NBCI even provided
the opportunity for police to contribute to an emerging
academic discipline, criminology.79
Furthermore, IACP leaders were also attracted to the
NBCI as a way of furthering professional aims because they
believed that bureau participation would promote harmony
among local departments and help foster a national identity.
This they considered critical to their overall project
because national presence was an essential quality of a
profession. They reasoned that local departments wishing to
join would have to forsake local idiosyncracies and abide by
standardized procedures. Standardization would help spread
professional values of impartiality and science. At the same
time, it would fulfill the IACP leadership's quest for
national status by providing a local arena for practices
that affirmed national connections.
Philip Deitsch--police chief of Cincinnati, NBCI board
member, and later IACP officer--expressed this sentiment in
an 1897 address to the IACP convention concerning the
necessity of adopting the anthropometric system:
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... there can be no question but that our
object is a common one. There should be but one
uniform system of organizing and transacting
police business. This in itself is not only the
most practicable, but also the most beneficial to
our professions. There can be no question, [the
anthropometric] system of identification ... should
be used in every police department.80

Still, efforts to build this national network, even if
desired by several factions in the IACP, met many obstacles.
Some members opposed it directly, believing that it was
unnecessary or unreliable. And certainly for a long while,
the latter was accurate. One of the most difficult
challenges the NBCI faced was enforcing standardized
procedures that would assure accurate identifications.
George Porteus, who was the NBCI superintendent for
several years early on in the organization's history, often
lamented the lack of accuracy and adherence to prescribed
procedures.81 Local contributors failed to write clearly on
the anthropometric cards he supplied, or they altogether
refused to use the standardized cards that Porteus had
distributed.82 Even "first-class· operators made mistakes in
taking and reporting measurements, work which Porteus
described as needing "continuous care."83
During the early years, officials also debated
different formats and procedures such as whether the US
should adopt a new code or use the one invented in France,
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and whether local police should be required to submit cards
in duplicate.84 Furthermore, at various times when the NBCI
moved operations (from Chicago to Washington in 1902, and to
St. Louis in 1904 for a lengthy visit to the World
Exposition being held there) identification work was
suspended entirely. Complaints multiplied. IACP leadership
placed much of the blame on Porteus who, although a great
spokesman for the NBCI, was apparently a drinking man who
loved the horses as much as his work.85 It is unclear
whether the responsibility for the system's early
difficulties lay with Porteus or with the simple fact that
establishing such a system required considerable effort and
practice. Nevertheless, Porteus was replaced, and
eventually, NBCI operations began to run more smoothly,
although complaints never ceased entirely.
Over the years, the NBCI's reputation improved and its
membership grew. By 1904, the NBCI was established in a
well-appointed Washington DC office, with custom-built
cabinetry, newly printed stationery, a salaried
superintendent, and a part-time clerk, who helped to process
the various incoming identification cards and requests for
record checks. During 1904, the office received 2,128
Bertillon cards, bringing their total collection to over
15,500.86 They sent out 3,559 Bertillon cards and
photographs to help local departments make identifications,
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and from their own records made 282 identifications for
their 64 members

(all but a handful were police departments

of fairly large US cities) .87 They also published regular
bulletins containing the photographs and measurements of
several dozen of the nation's worst criminals.88 To
celebrate their accomplishments, the IACP voted to
appropriate the money (with some help from the Washington DC
police department) to send an NBCI contingent to the 1904
St. Louis World's Fair where they would mount an exhibition
that showcased NBCI accomplishments. In the same 1904
convention report that described the successes of the
exhibit, another entry appeared: it was the first lengthy
IACP discussion of a new identification technology-fingerprinting.
The president's address discussed a report submitted by
an IACP member who had returned recently from a trip to
London to inspect the fingerprint system in use there.
President Sylvester concurred with the author's positive
evaluation of the new identification system and suggested
that the IACP adopt fingerprinting, although initially only
as an adjunct to anthropometry.89 Fingerprinting rapidly
gained popularity among IACP members and the US police
community at large. Although criminal anthropometry
continued to be used by the NBCI and many local
jurisdictions for another 15 to 20 years, by 1911 the IACP
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officially endorsed fingerprinting as the superior method
and encouraged members to begin learning the science of
dactyloscopy. 90
Eventually, fingerprinting so completely eclipsed
anthropometry that many police histories do not even mention
anthropometry. Several authors, knowing that Bertillon
contributed something to identification practices,
apparently credit him with the invention of
fingerprinting.9l Fingerprinting rapidly surpassed
anthropometry because it offered several incontestable
advantages. These included uniqueness, life-long
persistence, and dependable and easy classification. Each,
however, had to be discovered or created, and then tested
and implemented. From the first collection of fingerprints
by a Western government official to their first organized
deployment by

police, over 40 years elapsed.

Fingerprinting History
A small community of fingerprint historians debated
fingerprinting's paternity for some time after its late
1890s' introduction into police use. Most writers on the
topic concentrated on exploring and substantiating the
conflicting claims to discovery made by several European and
Latin American researchers.92 One article pointed out,
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however, that no Westerner could legitimately take credit
for recognizing the value of fingerprinting. As this
Smithsonian-sponsored review demonstrated, Chinese and
Japanese government officials and traders had used the
bodily traces to authenticate documents for hundreds, or
perhaps thousands of years before Westerners understood
fingerprinting's utility.93

While several authors had

previously conceded these Asian antecedents, they had always
glossed these uses as ceremonial or superstitious.94 One
review, however, cited several examples that clearly warrant
description as bureaucratic. For example, a requirement in
China to fingerprint all foundlings.95 This law suggests
that officials understood that fingerprints were permanent
or unique, or both.96 Nevertheless, research has turned up
no evidence of a centralized registry of fingerprints
associated with these applications. Such centralized
collections of fingerprints apparently did not emerge until
the beginning of the 20th century.
The history of fingerprinting as the means for
establishing a centralized, state-run surveillance system
begins with William Herschel's India records, Francis
Galton's statistical work, and E.R. Henry's classification
system. The contributions of these men, combined, laid the
foundations for the first national fingerprint system. Of
the three men, Galton's contributions were the most critical
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both for his theoretical work in applying statistical theory
to the proof of fingerprints' uniqueness, and for the
campaigning he undertook to hasten fingerprinting's public
acceptance.

Galton's Interest in Fingerprinting
During his long career, Francis Galton, an eminent
British scientist and statistician of the late 1800s,
conducted extensive research that focussed on uncovering the
mechanisms that guided heredity. Once uncovered, Galton
hoped to manipulate these mechanisms to produce a "more
intelligent," "more productive" human species. Overtly
racist, sexist, and anti-Semitic (beliefs which
distinguished him little from most of his colleagues),
Galton claimed that his hope was not to eradicate lesser
strains, but to work out ways of "improving" them.97
Galton believed that a wide variety of traits were
heritable, such as obesity, piety, beauty, genius, idiocy,
and criminality. Yet, upon collecting vast geneologies,
Galton realized that these traits did not always express
themselves equally from generation to generation: geniuses
rarely begatgeniuses. In trying to explain this
observation--that parents with exceptional characteristics,
physical or intellectual, usually produced children of only
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average abilities or appearance--Galton eventually
elaborated statistical regression theory. But before he came
to understand transmission of exceptional traits
statistically, Galton hypothesized that the traits that
interested him, indeed, were present in successive
generations, but were somehow masked or made invisible by
competing traits.98 Thus, at this stage in his thinking,
Galton focussed on trying to locate some kind of marker or
external sign of heritable traits that would help him to
trace the paths by which genetic material travelled. It was
in this vein that Galton's initial interest in
fingerprinting began.
Galton began investigating fingerprints in 1888 when,
at the behest of the Royal Institution of Great Britain, he
inquired into the utility of Bertillon's criminal
anthropometry.

(This was the investigation that revealed the

correlation problem in Bertillon's method.) Asked to examine
Bertillon's method, Galton decided instead to use the
request as an opportunity to mount a broad exploration of
all current identification methods. In conducting the
survey, he sought to improve upon methods for describing
"hereditary resemblances and types of features. "99 He hoped
to find an external marker of heredity: the "undeniable
evidence" carried "visibly about [a person's] body" of his
or her "parentage and near kinships."100 If located, this
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evidence would greatly facilitate his heredity research.
Galton's only interest in identifying criminals at this time
was to improve his ability to discern the criminal type,
which he was certain existed as a natural, biological
phenomenon. He had yet to perceive fingerprinting's
potential for tracking particular, individual criminals.

Herschel's Collection
Galton began his work with a fingerprint collection
donated by William P. Herschel, a British civil servant
previously stationed in Bengal, India. Herschel, in charge
of several building projects, had begun using fingerprints
as a way of encouraging stricter compliance from the workers
he employed. He claims to have gotten the idea from a
repressed childhood memory of seeing Thomas Bewick's
fingerprint colophon in the preface of several books
published in the early 1800s.101 According to Herschel's
story, he first started taking handprints
limit his collection to fingerprints)

(only later did he

one day while

negotiating a contract for road-building materials with a
supplier, Rajyadhar Konai. Herschel speculated that the
appearance of Konai's handprint on the contract would
"frighten him out of all thought of repudiating his
signature hereafter."102 After this initial, apparently
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successful, trial Herschel started requiring all suppliers
and laborers to similarly print their hands or fingers
across contracts entered into with him.l03 Herschel saved
and annotated many of the fingerprints he recorded, and
eventually amassed a collection which numbered in the
thousands.
While Herschel's claims to invention mayor may not be
accurate, the conditions that encouraged him to initiate and
continue his fingerprint activities deserve attention.
Herschel's early India career witnessed the beginning of the
Sepoy Mutiny, an uprising of Indian army enlistees that
spread out into the civilian populations in some areas
including Bengal, where Herschel was stationed.l04 In 1860,
recently transferred to a new post, Herschel directly
encountered the aftermath of a related rebellion of indigo
cultivators. These rebellions were violently put down by the
British. Even though a commission later found the powerful
European planters at fault, the reforms enacted as a
response to the rebellions further repressed the cultivators
by requiring, among other things, a new contract form and
stricter adherence to contractual arrangements. At his new
post, Herschel found forgery and perjury "rampant" in the
administration of all documents, including, possibly, these
new contracts. In response to these conditions, he writes,
"I was driven to take up finger-prints. "105
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Surrounded by unrest and haunted by the "indelible"
memory "of the greased cartridges of the [Sepoy] Mutiny,"
Herschel seized upon fingerprinting as a useful, simple
method for strengthening British administrative control over
the local population.106 It is doubtful that Herschel could
have proven identity based on these fingerprints because the
means for analysis of their patterns and for classification
had yet to be developed. Still, he believed his fingerprint
requirement was an effective device for social control, if
only for the intimidation effect it produced. Here in its
first sustained use by a Western government, fingerprinting
was stripped of any of the administrative or humanitarian
justifications which officials would offer later, and was
seen as simple coercion.IO?
Over the years of his India assignment, Herschel
continued his work with fingerprinting and became dedicated
to its dissemination. Later, he wrote of this time,

"The

fascination of [fingerprint] experiments and the impelling
object of them were all I cared about." He believed that the
practice had great potential as a means of social control
and described it as capable of making "a substantial
contribution towards public morality."IOa
Herschel continued to add to his fingerprint collection
both through activities associated with his official duties
and by encouraging friends and acquaintances to donate
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prints. Herschel always made careful entries next to each
print that included the bearer's name and the date the print
was taken. 109 Several people, including Herschel himself and
Konai--the subject of Herschel's first experiment-contributed their prints to the collection several times
over the years. Herschel saved these carefully-annotated
records and began to notice a curious thing: the
fingerprint's patterns remained unchanged, no matter how
much time had elapsed between printings. This finding--the
life-long persistence of fingerprints--provided the first
clue to fingerprinting's wide-ranging utility. Herschel
tried several times over the years to interest British
administrators of the Indian court and penal system in
fingerprint identification, but to no avail.110
Only in 1888 when Galton announced his interest in
fingerprinting did Herschel's collection receive the
attention that he felt it had long deserved.11l Herschel's
collection provided the evidence for Galton's earliest
claims about fingerprints' lifelong persistence and
potential utility. Encouraged by what he learned from
Herschel's collection, Galton began his own collection and
rapidly amassed several thousand fingerprint sets.112
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Fingerprints' Uniqueness
Galton's first fingerprint investigations, however,
ended in disappointment. He had begun his research by
showing that fingerprints could be classified accurately
into three basic genera, which he labelled "arch," "whorl,"
and "loop"--descriptive terms reflecting the basic patterns
formed by the ridges of skin on the finger tips. Galton had
hoped then to show that only one genus appeared to be
associated with a particular racial or social group, or that

genera appeared with variable but predictable frequencies in
these groups. Instead, his experiments showed that there was
no marked pattern in the distribution of genera.113 As
Galton himself explained,
I have examined large numbers of persons of
different races to our own [white], as Jews,
Basques, Red Indians, East Indians of various
origins, Negroes, and a fair number of Chinese.
Also persons of very different characters and
temperaments, as students of science, students of
art, Quakers, notabilities of various kinds, and a
considerable number of idiots ... without finding
any pattern that was characteristic of any of
them. 114

Although disappointed, Galton lost no time shifting his
fingerprint inquiries to another tack. If the features that
made up the patterns of fingerprints did not vary according
to some discernible pattern, and thus could reveal nothing
about human types, criminal or otherwise, perhaps, instead,
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they were demonstrably unique. In this case they could be
used as Herschel long had claimed they could be: they could
prove individual identity claims--in particular those made
by criminal suspects. Galton reflected on what a functional
criminal identification system would require. Certainly
fingerprints would have to be proved to be unique markers.
They also should not be subject to change under any
circumstances. And finally,

they should be classifiable: the

police should be able to store and retrieve fingerprint
records easily, dependably, and rapidly. As permanence had
already been demonstrated, and a classification system would
be worthless without the proof of uniqueness, Galton set
about on that work first.llS
In Galton's preliminary fingerprint research he had
divided fingerprint patterns into the three genera that were
distinguishable by the overall pattern of the lines on a
finger's tip. Upon closer examination, he discovered that
the evenly-spaced ridges of skin that made up the genera
patterns were far more complex than he had presumed. On
first glance, they had appeared as continuous lines. Closer
examination, however, revealed that the lines looked more
like "footways across broken country, which, while they
follow a general direction, are continually deflected by
such trifles as a tuft of grass, a stone, or a puddle. "116
Galton labeled these details "fork," "island," "end," and
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"inclosure"

(now known as "Galton's details"), and grouped

them together as minutiae.117 Galton applied probability
theory to the occurrence of these minutiae to prove
fingerprints' uniqueness, in much the same way Bertillon had
combined series of measurements to prove uniqueness of an
individual's anthropometric measurements.
To begin his proof, Galton divided the fingerprint into
equal-sized squares. He then calculated the likelihood that
one could predict the arrangement of adjacent squares based
on the arrangement of a chosen square. Galton settled upon a
grid of 24 squares, while other more recent researchers have
chosen to divide a print into 100 squares. While nearly all
subsequent researchers interested in the uniqueness proof
for fingerprints has relied on Galton's minutiae for
probability calculations, later researchers have rested
their proofs not relationships among squares, but on the
arrangements of minutiae within squares. For two
fingerprints to match, the same set of features would have
to appear in the same square of a print. Galton's
calculations predicted that the chance of this happening was
one in 64 billions. Later work decreased this figure to one
in 10 to the 59th power. Still, Galton's results permitted
him to assert that, for all practical purposes, fingerprints
were unique.
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This accomplished, Galton set about fulfilling the last
criterion for a useful criminal identification system: easy,
rapid classifiability. Although he tried several different
systems, Galton ultimately failed at this project. The lack
of an easy method for classification forced the British
government to forego temporarily the adoption of
fingerprinting for criminal identification.118 The problem
was not solved until E.R. Henry, a British civil servant
stationed in India, took up the challenge.
Henry had been stationed in India for several years
(near where Herschel had lived, although Henry was ignorant
of Herschel's work), before he learned about fingerprinting.
As Inspector-general of the police in Bengal province, Henry
had been using Bertillon's anthropometry for several years.
In 1893, a copy of Galton's 1892 book

Finger Prints came

into Henry's possession. Learning that Galton had failed to
devise a classification scheme, Henry started work on one of
his own.119
Henry started with Galton's three genera, whorl,

loop

and arch, and added one more--composite--for difficult to
classify prints. Henry assigned a number value for each
genus appearing on a particular finger and established a
standardized order for taking and recording prints. Henry
also established the practice of noting pairs of prints in
fraction form. Thus, for example, using Henry's system,
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"16/0" appearing in the first column of a fingerprint code
signified "a whorl on the right thumb and a loop on the
right index finger." A series of five fractions represented
a complete set of prints.
Once the prints had been analyzed and expressed in this
code, Henry's method called for summing the numerators and
denominators, resulting in one final fraction. This fraction
indicated the proper fingerprint-card storage-drawer in a
specially-built fingerprint cabinet. For example, a final
fraction of 16/32 indicated a storage place in the 16th
horizontal drawer of the 32nd column of drawers.
As prints of all ten fingers were not always available
and because, later, Henry wanted to extend his
classification scheme to incorporate unlimited numbers of
prints, he eventually developed procedures for
subclassifying prints. These procedures called for counting
ridges in the center, or "delta" area, of the print, or for
analyzing the occurrences of "Galton's details." For these
classifications, Henry developed a numerical coding scheme
compatible with the one just described. With these
procedures in place, the Henry classification system could
expand to accomodate fingerprint collections that numbered
in the millions.
Practitioners apparently found Henry's system simple to
use. However, because reading fingerprints required more new
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skills than had taking anthropometric measurements, learning
fingerprint analysis probably required more initial training
than had Bertillon's system. But once understood, the entire
operation--from printing to encoding to filing--could be
accomplished in a matter of minutes. Henry's system spread
rapidly. Within a decade, most European nations had adopted
it for their fingerprint collections, as had the United
States and many Latin American nations. As late as the
1960s, Henry's system, with few modifications, provided the
classification system for most of the world's major
fingerprint collections.120
The strength of Henry's system, however, lay not only
in allowing officials to be able to efficiently store
millions of prints, but also in providing a simple,
dependable method for them to retrieve any single print.
Henry's classification system achieved this in much the same
way Bertillon's anthropometry had. Fingerprint operators
retrieved prints as they stored them. With a fingerprint
code in hand--received either in completed form from some
other record, or derived through analysis of a fresh print-a fingerprint operator could read off the print's storage
location and check to see whether a prior print had already
been filed there. If so, the operator,

in the process of

filing a new print, would have found an earlier print and a
criminal record. As with Bertillon's system, so too with
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Henry's, the process of storing a print was actually the way
in which officials learned about a person's past. Also,
mirroring Bertillon's method, fingerprinting's retrieval
process was straightforward and rule-governed, and required
no prior knowledge or personal experience of the person
whose identity was in question.
While fingerprinting's classification scheme shared
many similarities with anthropometry's, fingerprinting
itself offered certain advantages that the earlier technique
lacked. Anthropometric measurements were derivative
constructs, vulnerable to frequent error. While fitting
instruments to a

(struggling) body, reading off numbers and

recording measurements, operators easily could, and often
did, make mistakes. In contrast, fingerprints were a direct,
if physically reversed, bodily trace. The identifying
markers they contained did not have to be fabricated or
elicited, as with not only anthropometry, but virtually all
previous identification systems. Rather, their collection
required only a simple, relatively error-proof imprinting
procedure. This imprinting created a mirror replica of the
original, not an estimation. Operators could always return
to this replica to correct a possible classification
error.121 It stood as a record of itself. Moreover, the
original never changed. A repeat print would always produce
a replica of previous prints. Furthermore, the
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classification of fingerprints required analysis of discrete
variables

(the presence

continuous variables

o~

absence of features)

rather than

(as with anthropometry's finger length

or head circumference). This also greatly reduced the
likelihood of error. In sum, fingerprinting offered by far
the simpler, more dependable method for criminal
identification.
Fingerprints provided another, critical advantage.
Whereas anthropometric measurements could be taken only with
the suspect present, fingerprints could be collected in the
absence of their owners. Called latent prints, these traces
left on any smooth surface by an ungloved hand, became one
of the most important uses of fingerprinting. Any chance,
carelessly left print could be used to discover a possible
suspect's identity. Crime scenes, long since deserted, could
now provide specific and damning evidence.
Nevertheless, the easy acquisition of latent
fingerprints did not alleviate entirely the need for people
to pass through the fingerprint system. A fingerprint,

with

a name attached, collected during a personal encounter with
the individual, had to be filed somewhere as a record
against which to compare a subsequent print.

(This is a

necessary condition often overlooked in fingerprint paeans.)
Still, latent prints did end anthropometry's requirement of
a suspect's physical presence to prove his or her identity.
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Importantly, latent prints only prove that a particular
digit came in contact with a particular surface. Additional
evidence is necessary to prove the time and circumstances of
that contact. This feature of fingerprinting--the ability to
identify people by their traces rather than through physical
contact--accounts both for an important aspect of
fingerprinting's utility and for some its problems in being
accepted by the general public. In the early 1900s various
groups resisted an identification procedure that was
technically valid despite the absence of the person being
identified. 122
With Galton's three conditions now fulfilled-permanence, uniqueness, and classifiability--fingerprinting
spread rapidly. First applied by the British government
against the native population in India, then against the
Boers and the Blacks in South Africa, and then established
as the primary means for identifying criminals by the London
police in 1890, its efficacy and simplicity soon made
fingerprinting the identification method of choice among
police of most western nations. News of fingerprinting's
advantages spread to the United States in 1904, both through
the IACP report already mentioned and through a similar
report submitted by the New York City police chief.123 By
the mid-1910s most US police departments had established
fingerprint departments.
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Fingerprinting's early institutional history in the
United States conformed largely to the path already
described here for Bertillon's anthropometry. The penal
organizations showed some interest, but the most important
strides were made by the police, predominantly the IACP,
although several local police departments, including New
York City, Washington DC, and Chicago also made significant
contributions to fingerprinting's dissemination. The federal
government remained largely disinterested for several years.
It established a system at Leavenworth penitentiary, but
refused to fund a national fingerprint system until 1924.
One novel trend did emerge in the US along with
fingerprinting. While not entirely a new idea--anthropometry
proponents had proposed it too--the notion of a universal
identification system really took hold only with
fingerprinting's introduction. According to proponents, such
a system could have far-ranging civic applications, such as
curbing voter and insurance fraud,

assuring that pensions

went to the right recipients, returning lost children to
their families, and helping amnesiacs. This plan gave new
meaning to the phrase "national identification system." No
longer did "national" refer to the reach of a system-incorporating all of a nation's jurisdictions--but also to
the membership of the popoulation being surveyed: the
nations's entire population. Chapter Five explores the
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movement for a universal fingerprinting system and other
aspects of fingerprinting's dissemination.

Conclusion
In completing the present chapter, it is important to
summarize how statistics helped proponents to achieve their
earlier, more modest version of a national system--one
defined by reach. While not inherently dependent on
statistical theory, it is difficult to imagine how a system
of so vast a scope (an entire nation) and so narrow a focus
(a particular criminal) could be implemented without
statistics.124 Statistical thinking permitted officials to
organize, strengthen, and extend established insights about
identity.
The earliest official means of identifying criminals-branding, ear-notching, and amputation--distinguished
criminals as a class, not as individuals. Officials cared
little about specific criminals. The markers that officials
used, which were also part of the punishment, were intended
to denote similarity: all men and women bearing the letter

"B" on their foreheads,

for example, were convicted

burglars. While this marking may have been effective as a
warning to others not trust a person so marked, or not to
contemplate acting as he or she had, the mark really could
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convey only limited information.

(What if the person

committed multiple crimes,or was later found innocent?) As
penal theory became interested in the context of a crime,
in the criminal's personal history, and in his potential for
reform, identification needs superceded these early methods.
To serve the new penal interest in life histories of
specific criminals, officials had to develop descriptive
techniques which would allow them to distinguish one
criminal from another. Paralleling the same insight
expressed in the Edgar Allan Poe story cited earlier (but
which certainly long pre-dates Poe), officials focussed on
certain kinds of features to create these new descriptions:
features that combined universality and variation, such as
hair color, height, or foot size. Working with this kind of
feature, officials found they could describe individual
differences effectively from a comparative base. The
features they chose were shared by all human beings

(to the

point that if absent, that absence became part of a
description), and offered enough variation so that an
accurate description could distinguish an individual in a
cursory sort of way. As Chapter Two explained, this type of
description has serious limitations. Still, when officials
felt compelled to push on to more powerful descriptive
methods, they did not do so by abandoning the basic
underlying principles of universality and variation.
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Instead, they simply sought different features that met
these criteria.
Bertillon tried and failed with anthropometric
measurements, but Galton et al., applying Bertillon's
insights to fingerprinting, triumphed. Fingerprints fit the
criteria superbly: they are a universal aspect of the
species, yet are of such dizzying variety that they defied
classification even by some of the best scientific thinkers.
Although officials had long been aware of fingerprinting's
potential, if only intuitively, the realization of its
potential awaited the application of statistics. By

furnishing a way to reason about probability, statistics
provided a way to tame the extreme variability of
fingerprints. Without understanding how statistics could use
the variability of fingerprints

(both as a proof of

uniqueness and as the basis for a classification system),
Galton would have discounted them as too complex, too
random, or too cumbersome to be of any use. With Bertillon's
model of eliciting uniqueness from diverse anthropometric
measurements in mind, Galton could move quickly from
thinking of fingerprints as traces of group identity (e.g.
certain racial types) to seizing upon them as the key to
individual identity.
Statistics, which originated in the 17th century as a
tool used by emerging states in the the study of natural
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resources

(including analyses of the labor and military

potential of available populations), had until this time not
been applied to individuals. This innovation, born in a
crucible of considerable social upheaval and failed attempts
at social control

(such as Galton's eugenics and the French

"Regulation Law")

inaugurated a new chapter in the history

of the relationship between the state and the individual.
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Chapter Five

The Application of Fingerprinting to Domestic Surveillance

Introduction
Bolstered by an efficient, reliable classification
system, fingerprinting held great promise for enacting the
wish expressed in 1889 by France's prison director, Louis
Herbette, that the state "give to each human being an
identity ... lasting, unchangeable, and always recognizable."l
In theory, a well-run fingerprinting system indeed could
encompass a nation's entire population with little danger of
confusion. Many countries quickly embraced the concept of
universal fingerprinting, notably among them, Argentina.
Others, including the US, moved more slowly.
Suggestions for a universal US fingerprint requirement
were voiced as early as 1911, but did not gain popularity
until after World War 1.2 This war had radically altered
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both public and government perceptions of the necessity of
domestic surveillance and the utility of fingerprinting to
enact that surveillance. Previously, officials had perceived
fingerprinting narrowly as a measure to help control common
criminals. During the decade following the war, however,
officials began to envision fingerprinting instead as a tool
of routine civil administration, in particular one which
could be aimed against political dissenters. By the early
1930s, considerable progress had been made, primarily at the
instigation of the FBI, toward integrating fingerprint
requirements into widely varied spheres including employment
and welfare eligbility, military enlistment, immigration,
and registration for insurance and at maternity hospitals.
By the late 1940s, the FBI's fingerprint collection
contained over 110,000,000 fingerprints,

representing a

large portion of the US adult population at the time.3
Fingerprinting had become an acceptable, if still
somewhat controversial, practice. Through the FBI
collection, the US government had built the capacity to
individually monitor the actions and beliefs of its
citizens. It was not a capacity the government used often,
(at least relative to the total number of records it held),
but the repressive threat that its existence implied
embodied a powerful tool of domestic control.
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This chapter begins by reviewing the early applications
of fingerprinting by both local and federal officials. It
emphasizes the relatively limited sphere officials marked
out for fingerprinting in the pre-WW I era. This account
serves both to fill in the history of fingerprinting from
its invention to its subsequent widespread dissemination,
and to explore reasons why officials could not always
prevail when attempting to introduce fingerprinting.

This

account also provides a backdrop against which to consider
the changed atmosphere fostered by WW I in which
fingerprinting finally did become an accepted and popular
practice. The chapter explores how key events of

WWI

encouraged these changes and goes on to describe both how
the government enacted its new fingerprint policy and how
the public responded.
This phase of identification history is important both
for the technological advances which occurred:
fingerprinting did represent a leap forward in the state's
ability to easily and quickly distinguish one citizen from
among millions by using a method which required no personal
knowledge and could be effected across great temporal and
spatial expanses, and for the social and political changes
which took shape: the idea that the state has the right and
the obligation to keep track of individual citizens gained a
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wide currency which, while often challenged and occasionally
denied, indeed has never been eliminated.

Fingerprinting's Early Police Applications
During the very early 1900s, fingerprinting remained
largely within the criminal identification niche created by
Bertillon's anthropometry. The social trends of the mid to
late 1800s that had fostered a central role for
identification methods in police and penal affairs had
carried on into the 1900s and assured fingerprinting an
enthusiastic reception in those quarters. Urban crime
continued to be a public issue and preventive policing had
become the accepted response. The beliefs that linked
knowledge of a criminal's identity with successful crime
prevention remained strong and helped to underscore the need
for an improved system of certain identification.
Furthermore, police were still seeking, and to some extent
had attained, professional status. Police were attracted to
fingerprinting with its statistical and scientific trappings
because it helped project the desired image of a modern,
professional corps.
The IACP membership first heard about fingerprinting in
1904 and over the next few years witnessed several
demonstrations of the new method. In 1911 the NBCI
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officially began to accept fingerprint cards from its
members and its collection grew rapidly. Several large
cities and at least one state also established independent
fingerprint bureaus and during these early years built large
collections, as well. Although these various fingerprint
bureaus often competed with one another, their
administrators also understood the importance of sharing
identification information and occasionally did so. Within a
few years. national fingerprint exchange began. 4 The first US
criminal conviction based solely on fingerprint evidence
occurred in 1911, and it helped to assure that the
fingerprint evidence being so enthusiastically collected
could be usefully applied.5
Still, there were naysayers among the police, many of
whom voiced criticisms very similar to those made of
criminal anthropometry. Some rejected the statistical
reasoning on which assertions of uniqueness were based,
others argued that fingerprints were too easily forged to
supply reliable evidence, while still others simply looked
on them as unnecessarily replicating what anthropometry or
collective memory already provided. None of these criticisms
appear to have seriously limited fingerprintings'

spread,

except perhaps for the final one. Several police departments
did balk at adopting yet another technology which promised
to solve criminal identification problems once and fOr all.
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Still, fingerprinting's simplicity, low-cost, and
reliability eventually won over even these departments.6
Despite its efficacy for the identification of
criminals, the legality of fingerprinting did not go
unchallenged. New York City police pursued one of the most
aggressive fingerprint campaigns and predictably became
embroiled in some of the earliest legal actions against the
practice. The first appeals case decision--Gow v. Bingham
(107 N.Y. Supp. 1011)--that spoke explicitly about police
authority to fingerprint suspects was handed down in 1907.
The decision rejected police arguments that the fingerprint
process ought to be thought of as standard police procedure
sanctioned under the ill-defined, but accepted, concept of
police power. The judge harshly criticized the police for
fingerprinting Gow--an accused felon--at his arraignment and
thus before a determination of guilt. The judge
characterized this fingerprinting episode as an "indignity"
and "a startling invasion of personal liberty" that
contravened a citizen's "natural right" to "complete
immunity" and "to be let alone."7 The judge saw no merit in
the police defense that they ought to be allowed to take and
keep fingerprints of any suspicious person simply on the
grounds that this sort of general information provided a
necessary resource in their struggle to prevent crime and
protect the community.
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Defying the courts' condemnation, the New York police
continued to fingerprint suspects and even expanded their
fingerprint operations.8 Still, the Gow v. Bingham decision
provides an important guidepost in tracking the vicissitudes
of opinion concerning fingerprinting and official
identities. Whereas by the 1930s, programs for the routine
fingerprinting of employees, schoolchildren, and immigrants
were legally sanctioned and rather popular among both
government officials and the public, in the early 1900s, as
Gow v. Bingham demonstrates, fingerprinting was still a
controversial practice. Even the police could not yet
clearly establish their right to fingerprint criminal
suspects, traditionally a group with few rights.
Many fingerprint supporters argued that fingerprinting
could be fruitfully applied outside of police work, as well.
These enthusiasts suggested that banks and employers should
use fingerprints to guard against fraudulent check-cashing
practices and that local governments could use fingerprints
to help solve problems with voter registration and licensing
applications.9 Some went a step further and proposed a
universal fingerprint program which would require all
inhabitants to submit to fingerprinting. Such a system, they
believed would alleviate the problems of unidentifiable
dead, amnesia victims, and baby-switching at maternity
hospitals.10
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But precisely because fingerprinting's initial support
came from police, the dissemination of fingerprinting into
other spheres was curtailed. These suggestions often met
with complaints that fingerprinting was a mark of
criminality and was not appropriate for routine
administrative tasks. Taxicab drivers in both New York and
Cleveland went on strike when city officials added
fingerprinting to the requirements for licensing, and bank
customers reportedly bridled when asked to submit to
fingerprinting before being permitted to cash a check.ll For
some people their reaction against fingerprinting was so
intense that they even condemned its requirement for certain
criminals. For example, these critics believed that it was
unfair to fingerprint young violaters or people guilty of
minor crimes, such as disturbing the peace. They believed
that fingerprinting implied that these people were dangerous
or habitual criminals, when, indeed, they were not.12
Police and other fingerprinting proponents repeatedly
beat back these complaints, sometimes by simply asserting
that fingerprints did not stigmatize people.13 But often
they launched more elaborate defenses, such as the one put
forth in a 1913 New York Times editorial. The editorial was
written in support of an article published that day in which
the New York City Chief of Police suggested that universal
fingerprinting was a good idea.

(This statement represents
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one of the earliest published assertions to that effect.)14
The editorial suggested that the major reason fingerprinting
had not spread more rapidly, thus far, was its association
with crime. They condemned this reasoning by equating it
with another belief that they considered equally illogical:
that physical labor was abhorent because of its association
with slavery. Instead of concentrating on fingerprinting's
ignoble past, the editorial exhorted, people should look at
the advantages accruing from fingerprinting. Beyond catching
criminals, it could be very useful in facilitating
deportations,

"the exclusion of undesirables," and the

identification of unidentified dead. Indeed, fingerprinting
really would be "inconvenient" only for the "evil-disposed."
The editorial continued, "There should be nothing of
humiliation in having prints taken," or in the "brief
biographies" added to them. Instead, the fingerprint cards
could be a "permanent source of pride,"

at least to those

"who chose to lead worthy lives."
Proponents of non-criminal fingerprinting made this
argument again and again in their continuing efforts to move
fingerprinting out of the criminal realm. Fingerprinting,
they asserted, benefitted the common good and resisting
fingerprinting indicated not a defensible regard for one's
own privacy, but guilt.15 However, despite strong and
frequent editorializing, the association between criminality
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and fingerprinting remained unchanged during
fingerprinting's early years and created a stigma which was
difficult to overcome. Through the early 1920s attempts to
move fingerprinting out from police departments and prisons
into financial and bureaucratic applications largely failed
and fingerprinting remained a tool of local police.

Pre-WW I Federal Interest in Fingerprinting
During fingerprinting's introductory phase, several
federal agencies initiated fingerprint collections, but the
government made no effort to centralize these efforts. Three
offices in particular adopted fingerprinting almost
immediately following its introduction into the United
States. These included the criminal identification bureau
housed at the federal government's Leavenworth penitentiary
which added fingerprinting to its anthropometry collection
as early as 1904; the Office of Indian Affairs

(in the

Interior Department) which began collecting the thumbprints
of Native Americans in 1908 to help deter fraudulent
financial transactions; and the War Department which began
fingerprinting enlisted men in 1906 as a measure to prevent
deserters from re-enlisting.16 Officials in the Bureau of
Immigration and the War Department also contracted with the
NBCI to provide fingerprint and anthropometric information
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to them as needed, although these arrangements were shortlived.17
While these fingerprint programs demonstrate a clear
interest in fingerprinting by federal officials, they
represent somewhat limited applications of the new
technology, especially when contrasted to other fingerprint
plans being suggested at the time. In 1909, for example,
Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte tried to convince the
government of the advantages of transferring the criminal
identification records stored at the Leavenworth Federal
Penitentiary to Washington DC, thus laying the foundation
for a national system.18 A few years later, IACP officials
began pressing the DOJ to completely take-over its NBCI
collection. Little is known about the justifications for
trying the move the Leavenworth bureau to Washington, but
the plan to donate the NBCI collection to the DOJ is well
documented.
Believing that the NBCI offered a service which the
nation desperately needed, IACP officials had been asking
the federal government for support almost since the
inception of the NBCI. In the mid-1910s, however,

IACP

officials reached the more extreme conclusion that they
wanted to donate the entire collection to the federal
government. They offered, as well, to help the DOJ
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administer what would then be a truly national
identification system.
More than altruism motivated their offer, however.
Although the NBCI collection had continued to grow, its
support among IACP leaders was not as strong as leaders
initially had hoped it would be. The identification bureau
had begun to slip into decline. Ironically the introduction
of fingerprinting created part of the problem.19 The NBCI
had spent many years convincing members to adopt the
Bertillon system, only to decide in the early 1900s that
fingerprinting offered superior dependability and
efficiency. Not wanting to alienate members dedicated to
criminal anthropometry, the NBCI continued to use both
systems and allowed members to choose which they wanted to
use. Indeed, on occasion they tried to convince members to
use both systems! The burden of administering two completely
different systems diminished the NBCI's quality of service.
Poor service led members to withhold dues which, in turn,
further compromised service.

Many officials believed

fervently in the NBCI and did not want to see it shut down.
They hoped that its mission could be salvaged by the
federal government which could use its greater resources and
legislative authority to assure that the national system
realized its full potential.20
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Both the Leavenworth and IACP plans to establish a
Washington-based national identification bureau called for
combining records from local and national collections and
for regularizing access to the collection for local, state,
and federal officials. Attorney General Bonaparte--a
supporter of expanding the Leavenworth collection--went as
far as physically transferring the Leavenworth records to
Washington in preparation for a Washington-based bureau.21
But neither the Leavenworth plan nor the IACP plan could
find sufficient Congressional backing. Several months later
Bonaparte was forced to return the files to Leavenworth.
Another fifteen years would pass before proponents could
successfully convince the federal government of the
necessity of a centralized national criminal fingerprint
system.
Two factors explain this apparent disinterest at the
federal level in centralized criminal fingerprinting. First
the federal government itself was relatively small and its
law enforcement activities narrowly focussed. The DOJ itself
was not established until 1870 and there was little support
for the construction of a federal penitentiary until the
mid-1890s. Federal crimes were limited primarily to currency
and postal law violations, some tax evasion (there was no
personal income tax until 1913), and a small but growing
body of inter-state commerce regulations. Crime detection
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and prosecution were dispersed among several small forces
including the Postal Inspection Service and the Treasury
Department's Secret Service. In 1908, there were fewer than
2,700 federal prisoners, including several hundred offenders
from the District of Columbia.22
The response made by Attorney General Griggs in 1900 to
a bill pushed that year by the IACP to establish a
federally-funded national criminal identification bureau
probably remained accurate until the advent of World War I.
When approached by the president of the IACP to lend his
support to the bill, Griggs responded by saying that he
really did not think that such a project was "so closely
connected with this department [the DOJ] as to call for my
official support or particular recommendation." Griggs
thought that the enterprise was probably worthwhile, but of
far greater utility to states and cities where the bulk of
criminal prosecution took place.23
This attitude speaks to us from another era--one when
the federal government remained within closely defined
arenas of authority and was not involved, as it is today, in
wide-ranging, detailed regulation of financial,

cultural,

and social activities. However, while the federal
government's minor interest in crime accounts in large part
for its refusal to act on suggestions for establishing a
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national criminal identification bureau, it does not provide
the entire answer.
Although the debate over Attorney General Bonaparte's
attempt to move the Leavenworth identification bureau to
Washington apparently left no records, we do know that it
took place at the same time that Bonaparte was embroiled in
a debate with Congress over an even more critical issue: the
establishment of a DOJ detective force,

a force which

eventually became the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In
the early 1900s, the DOJ had no detective force of its own
and had to borrow agents from Department of Treasury's
Secret Service. Several Congressmen fought vocally against
giving the DOJ the right to establish its own detective
bureau.
Other federal agencies had long had their own detection
capabilities without creating such controversy, but these
agencies differed from the DOJ's proposed detective bureau
in that they had very narrow and specific law enforcement
mandates. For example, the Postal Inspection Service
investigated postal fraud and the DOT's Secret Service
concentrated on counterfeiting. Given the broader mandate of
the DOJ--to enforce all US laws--a detective agency attached
to it could legitimately involve itself in multifarious
affairs and become very difficult to oversee. Indeed, the
oversight issue was what led to the hearings about the DOJ's
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right to establish its own detective force in the first
place. Investigators contended that the DOJ had borrowed DOT
detectives to trail political opponents of then Pres.
Theodore Roosevelt.24 Although such a practice could be
outlawed on paper, legislators feared that the wide province
which the DOJ rightfully could claim would make any serious
enforcement impossible.25
Critics of the plan voiced their opposition clearly by
likening a DOJ-run detective force to the political spying
system purportedly strong in Tsarist Russia. Congressmen
debating the issue called the plan inimical "to American
ideas of government" and "opposed to our race."26 Another
critic dramatically asserted that if Anglo-Saxon
civilization stood for nothing else it was the right of "the
humblest citizen" to be safeguarded against secret
surveillance by the government.27
Attorney General Bonaparte's decision to move files
back to Leavenworth, which he made only a few months after
the controversy over a DOJ detective force first erupted,
may have been a response to these growing fears about state
power.28 As Gow v. Bingham also had demonstrated, such
monitoring was not yet acceptable as a standard governing
procedure in the US. Still the DOJ detective plan was
passed. Starting in 1909 the DOJ established its own
detective force named the Bureau of Investigation,
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colloquially known as "the Bureau."

In the 1930s the name

was changed officially to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).

German-American Alien Registration
The first time that government surveillance did gain
public and Congressional favor was during World War I and
fingerprinting played a central role. America's 1917
declaration of war against Germany cast German-American
aliens living in the US as potential spies and saboteurs.
Although there were few incidents to indicate that GermanAmerican aliens constituted a serious threat to the war
effort, public and Congressional sentiment began to build
against the group and action was demanded. Many plans were
debated and various measures taken, in particular a massive
registration of all German-American aliens.29
Starting in early 1918 all German-American aliens had
to report to either their local post-office or police
station. There they filled-out personal information forms,
supplied several photographs of themselves, and submitted to
fingerprinting. They were given an ID card that featured the
carrier's name, address, photograph, and thumbprint, which
they were required to carry at all times. Aliens had to
report to officials if they changed their address and had to
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acquire special certification if they needed to enter, work,
or reside in or near certain war-sensitive areas, such as
harbors or industrial parks.30 Through these measures
officials sought to prevent espionage and sedition.
Officials believed they could identify possibly hostile
German-American aliens before they acted by reviewing ID
cards of laborers or strangers. Officials then could deport
or incarcerate these people, or at least keep them away from
vital resources.31

The registration process proceeded

without incident and estimates based on the 1910 census
indicated a near total compliance of the target population.
within a few months nearly 500,000 German-Americans had
reported to registration centers.
While earlier debates over the establishment of
government surveillance capabilities in the form of a DOJ
detective bureau had raised strong opposition, the bill to
fingerprint and monitor German-American aliens passed with
only moderate criticism. Those who did have reservations
made clear that only the threat of sabotage and espionage
had moved them to act. Although some Congressmen favored the
generalization of registration to all aliens at all times,
the words of another summarised the majority position when
he described the act as "purely an emergency measure." As
others made clear, these restrictions would be lifted when
the international conflict ended. Critics also voiced their
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opposition to another option, mentioned in passing: the
extension of registration to the entire US population. As
had been the case in the criticism of the DOJ's proposed
detective force, such monitoring was perceived by some as
un-American. One Congressman summed up this position with
the following comment:

n •••

when people come here from other

countries they have the idea that this is a free country and
they do not want to feel that the police are tagging after
them. "32
World War I's alien registration requirement (and other
surveillance programs discussed briefly below) netted few
people who actually were guilty of sabotage or espionage.
Whether this speaks to its deterrent success or its excess
is unclear. Still alien registration represents a critical
step in the federal government's interest in fingerprinting
and in its attempt to establish fingerprinting as a routine
administrative tool.

A New Kind of Surveillance
The alien registration program put into place for the
first time an explicit, broad-based civilian surveillance
program. It is unclear how often fingerprints were relied on
to make identity checks but, for the first time,
fingerprinting demonstrated its potential for
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individualized, routinized tracking of large populations.
While fingerprinting's capacity to identify a dangerous
criminal with a chance latent print was perhaps more
dramatic, officials' claim that fingerprinting could oversee
the monitoring of citizens during daily movements such as
changing residences, finding jobs, or visiting friends
signalled an even greater display of state power.
The system had at least one major flaw. Unless laws
required all US inhabitants to carry an ID card, failure to
produce one was without clear meaning. A questionable
individual could as easily be a German spy as a loyal
American. Still, the flaw did not undercut completely the
system's surveillance capacity. If a person detained could
not produce an ID card and was later shown to be a GermanAmerican alien, he or she was automatically guilty of a
crime: failure to carry an ID card. This infraction was
punishable by a fine of up to $2,000 and imprisonment for up
to five years, as were most registration act violations.
This rule greatly expanded the sphere of deviancy which
demanded state attention and intensified surveillance by
justifying constant, unpredictable intrusions: ID card
checks. But providing grounds for questioning and arrest did
not exhaust the functions of the ID card rule. As with other
rules constituting surveillance, such as those discussed in
Chapter Two for for Walnut St. prisoners, this rule helped
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to generate information about the people required to follow
it. In this case, the ID-card rule distinguished compliant
from non-compliant (and therefore potentially dangerous)
German-American aliens. Although an ID card infraction might
mean very little in the short-term, it could provide the
grounds for opening a file about an individual and for
initiating a "record." Any subsequent infraction, also
entered into this record, would no longer be seen as an
isolated event but as part of a pattern of resistance or
deviance.

A Novel Function for Fingerprinting
Although few subsequent fingerprint programs included
an ID card requirement, the link between fingerprinting and
compliance introduced in the alien registration program
continued. This link represents a critical transition for
fingerprinting and surveillance. Previously fingerprinting
had signalled only the stigma of criminality--a bodily trace
taken over

protest, sometimes violent protest.33 However,

under the German-American alien registration program,
fingerprinting came to represent something altogether
different. Virtually all German-American aliens had reported
promptly and without complaint to registration centers and
throughout the war they dutifully carried their thumbprint-
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photograph ID cards and produced them on demand. By
symbolizing German-American aliens' willingness to help the
US government keep track of possible wrongdoers and
facilitate administration of the war effort, fingerprinting
took on a new connotation of conformity.
The German-American alien registration program ended
with the war, but the kind of surveillance that it
introduced survived and prospered. Whereas, previously
fingerprinting had been limited to criminals (with some
jurisdictions allowing officials to fingerprint only
convicts), following the war, its non-criminal
administrative applications multiplied. Starting in the mid1920s, with the official establishment of the Bureau of
Investigation's Identification Bureau (later renamed the
Identification Division), the government began to extend
fingerprint requirements beyond the criminal population to
include military enlistees, immigrants, and federal
employees. At the same time, the government started a
vigorous campaign for voluntary contributions from
civilians, including school children and private enterprise
employees. By 1939, the Bureau's collection numbered nearly
11,000,000, representing a ten-fold increase in little more
than a decade.34 Within another ten years, the collection
had swelled to over 110,000,000.35
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As with the German-American alien program, peacetime
fingerprint programs targeted individuals not because of
some past criminal act, but because of their membership in
broadly defined social groups: workers, immigrants, youths.
These new programs also followed the principle of
fingerprinting people during some common procedure, such as
applying for a job. This tactic helped to establish
fingerprinting as an ordinary occurrence, deserving little
comment. Officials rarely offered explicit justifications
for these programs. Generally, they claimed the programs
were useful in weeding out criminals from the ranks of the
military or from various New Deal programs, and they often
characterized them as providing a "humanitarian" service by
helping police identify individuals found dead or suffering
from amnesia.36 (Ironically, the Bureau's own figures do not
show much success for these much-touted humanitarian
applications.) 37
While locating fugitives and aiding amnesia victims
apparently sufficed as public justifications for these
programs, other motivations are clear. As will be discussed
below, these programs increased the state's capacity to
mount ongoing surveillance of worrisome populations and to
locate possible individual troublemakers

(a real ability,

but one which bureau cheerleaders often exaggerated). This
new surveillance capacity contributed greatly to a changing
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face of the federal government as an authoritative and
omniscient body and helped to usher in a new concept of the
relationship between the state and its subjects. These
programs established the expectation that all people--not
just criminals--should be assigned official, fixed
identities that would be permanently inscribed in a
centralized, national record-keeping system.
Post-war fingerprinting programs will be discussed in
detail later, but beforehand it is important to examine the
path by which such surveillance came to seem acceptable,
even desirable, first during war and, more importantly, when
the country was at peace. This examination concentrates on
selected aspects of World War I which supplied not only the

model for peacetime surveillance but the motivation, as
well.

World War I: A Model for Surveillance
World War I was unprecedented, as its name implies.
Never before had so many countries engaged in one protracted
conflict at the cost of so many lives

(nearly 8 million

soldiers were killed and hundreds of thousands more perished
from disease), and with such wide-ranging consequences.
Empires were dismantled, new nations were created, and war
was outlawed. Because of its

magnitude, the war became a
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reference point, marking critical changes in many arenas. Of
course, the conduct of international affairs was permanently
altered, but so was the task of domestic governing.38 To a
greater degree than ever before, the US government came to
see internal political dissent as a dire threat, and
squashed it with impressive speed and thoroughness.39 The
leftist political threat constructed during the war became a
permanent feature of US domestic and foreign policy, and the
wartime measures taken against dissent provided a model for
peacetime programs.
World War I was the first confrontation in which
several critical, new military practices--which had been
evolving over the previous century--were finally brought
together in an awesome display of destruction. 40

In

particular the industrialization of weapons production
combined with the relatively unlimited flow of soldiers
sustained by new mass conscription practices

(World War I

witnessed the first nationally-imposed conscription in US
history), permitted the expansion of warfare beyond
previously understood limits.
claimed 700,000 lives.)

(Alone, the battle of Somme

What seemed a minor conflict

between two nations quickly became a war among many, fought
with few restrictions or rules

(or at least not the

traditional rules) in which both the "ends and means" could
escalate "without apparent limit."41
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An engagement of such magnitude demanded a complete

economic mobilization of all the nations involved.
Railroads, telegraph, shipping, textiles, food, and steel
companies all turned their attention to equipping the
millions of soldiers sent to fight.

In the US, the newly

formed War Industries Board took over control of production,
redirected supplies, set prices, and enforced priorities.
Factory production was increased, and women and retirees
brought in to replace enlisted men.
To sustain compliance with the demands created by this
kind of "total war"--demands that far outstripped any
previous foreign entanglement in US history--the government
enacted
program.

a massive propaganda, surveillance, and censorship
The Congress passed the Espionage and Sedition

Acts, which essentially outlawed criticism of government
leaders and war policy. These laws made acts as minor as
encouraging draft resistance or criticizing the sale of war
bonds illegal and punishable by large fines and jail
sentences of up to 20 years. The German-American alien
registration program was an important part of this overall
effort.
In addition to official DOJ actions, an independent
surveillance organization--the American Protective League
(APL)--began monitoring the population for possible anti-war
activities. The APL created its own citizen-run surveillance
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network that encouraged members to spy on their neighbors
and to look out for possible draft evaders. In spite of its
occasionally criticized excesses, the APL enjoyed popular
support and government approval for most of the war.
Accusations made by APL members and other citizens often had
serious consequences. Local courts jailed dozens of people
for minor criticisms of war policy. Mobs tarred and
feathered,

and in one instance murdered, people who were

believed to be guilty of treason, but who were never
tried.42 No serious treasonous threats were uncovered, but
that lack may have served more to convince people of the
success of surveillance measures than of their exorbitance.
Many of these repressive wartime measures drew
complaints. Critics, however, trod carefully for they could
easily have found themselves imprisoned for speaking out.
Later, during the safety of peacetime, many leaders did
strongly criticize the excesses of WW I domestic policy,
singling out various practices, such as the legitimation of
independent surveillance bodies like the APL, for special
condemnation. In spite of these criticisms, other aspects of
WWI's domestic policy would later be viewed as models for

strengthening social and economic controls during wartime
including temporary government control of vital industries
and, of interest here, alien control measures. The
experience of waging World War I had provided the useful
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lesson that surveillance could be deployed on a broad scale
among the US population and it also gave some practical
indication about how this could be carried out.

World War I: A Motivation for Surveillance
While waging the Great War stood as a flawed, but still
valuable, example of how to extend domestic surveillance,
its outcome provided ample motivation to continue such
surveillance. Going into the war, loosely-defined European
empires held political and economic hegemony over the
Western world. At the war's end, a new group of nationstates with internationally-adjudicated boundaries emerged.
Although the implications of this transformation were more
directly felt in Europe--where actual boundaries were redrawn and nation-states created--this novel arrangement
affected the US, as well.
The demise of various European empires permitted the
United States to move into the international economy with
great force.

The demands of supplying Allied troops even

before the US entered the war fostered impressive economic
growth. Furthermore, as Great Britain became preoccupied
with war, its control over the seas--once practically
impregnable--waned and finally disappeared. This change left
the US free, as never before, to expand into world
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markets.43 By the war's end, the GNP of the US had nearly
doubled and it had attained economic dominance over its
former superiors.44 As the post-war years passed, the US
desire to maintain this dominant position became clear.
While on the one hand, there was a strong isolationist
movement opposing any future international entanglements, on
the other hand there existed a clear pragmatic commitment to
do whatever needed to be done to remain on top (be it
invading Nicaragua or putting down labor unrest at home)
The US sense of itself as the world's new political and
economic leader was brought into sharp focus by another
result of World War One. Not only had the war's end
witnessed the enshrinement of the nation-state as the
prevailing political form--a transformation that helped
define the new US and and its relationships to European
powers--it had also witnessed the birth of a new enemy: the
USSR. This event profoundly shaped US domestic politics.
Containment of the development and expansion of this new
communist nation--which avowedly opposed the capitalist
system that had fed US expansion and was being counted on to
sustain Europe's recovery--became a focal point of US policy
internationally and domestically. The need to limit, even to
eradicate, communism at home and abroad became an accepted,
if sometimes criticized, tenet of US policy. Thus, the war
provided the government with a model for extending control--
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the repression of civil rights during wartime (in particular
the treatment of German-American aliens)--and a motivation
for doing so--the control of communism and the maintenance
of US domination.
Immediately following the war, however, few government
officials called for the extension of wartime surveillance
measures and many looked forward to their repeal. With the
end of the war, the German-American registration program was
suspended. The DOJ's Bureau of Investigation which had
administered the German-American program, and which had
tripled in size during the war, was scheduled for severe
cutbacks.45 It would take the events of 1919, a year that
arguably ranks among the most politically tumultuous in US
history, to give birth to the commitment to surveillance
conceived during the war.

The Post-war Emergence of Domestic Surveillance
1919 witnessed a wave of strikes and protests of
startling strength and violence. Buoyed by the impressive
advances made during the war when threatened strikes could
not be tolerated, the union movement pushed ahead in the
postwar era, wanting to assure that its gains would not be
lost. Over 4 million workers went out in thousands of
separate actions, many of them successful. While these

275

strikes initially enjoyed considerable public support,
positive sentiments began to wane as the strikes continued.
A series of anarchist bombings in the spring, aimed against
high government officials, brought an abrupt halt to public
support for radical causes, although the anarchist bombers
had no direct links with the strikes.
Some accounts began to attribute the strikes to
Bolshevik agents.46 The situation had become so chaotic that
some believed, especially after the bombings, that the
communist revolution had started in Arnerica.47

One of the

last bombs was detonated on the front lawn of US Attorney
General A. Mitchell Palmer's house. With this direct assault
against him, Palmer, who was already hostile to radical
activities, vowed to act.48
Palmer responded by organizing the Radical Division,
later renamed the General Intelligence Division (GID),
within the DOJ's Bureau of Investigation. The GID was
mandated to collect information concerning radical groups
and individuals with an eye toward making mass arrests.
Palmer limited the action to alien radicals both because of
the firm belief that most radicals came from immigrant ranks
and because aliens were easier to deport.49 He chose a
young, but proven, clerk to administer the program: J. Edgar
Hoover. Hoover had already shown himself responsible and
competent in his work with the Enemy Alien Bureau. There,
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his job had been to investigate the need for alien
internments and deportations and, significantly, he had
helped administer the German-American alien registration
program.50 The GID job provided Hoover with a position and a
role in which he could hone his anti-radical beliefs and
tactics. He developed voluminous files against leftist
groups and individuals, and learned to rely on
administrative procedure to side-step legal entanglements.
The GID's high profile anti-radical campaign did not
fare as well as Hoover's career. Gross civil rights
violations led to a decrease in public support of antiradical activities. with the repeal of wartime sedition
laws, anti-government speech regained its Constitutional
protection and removed the legal basis for many of the GID's
actions. Nevertheless, despite the official return to free
expression, the GID and the Bureau continued their antiradical activities. In permitting this to happen, and by
using Bureau agents as spies in a variety of political
intrigues that were unrelated to federal law enforcement,
the directors of the Bureau brought frequent scandal to
their office.51
After one particularly infamous incident--the Teapot
Dome scandal, in which Bureau agents had played a role--the
new Attorney General, Harlan Stone, briefly considered
abolishing the Bureau. Instead he sought a sound
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administrator who could bring its activities under
control.52

Finding no one who really fit his requirements,

Stone finally promoted Hoover from his GID position to be
the Acting Director of the Bureau. Several months later,
surprisingly pleased by Hoover's performance, Stone promoted
Hoover to the Director's position, a post which Hoover was
to retain for nearly a half century, until his death in
1972. Although Hoover eventually built the Bureau into an
enormous and enormously powerful office, he began initially
with a much narrower mandate and range of action than any of
the preceding directors.
Harlan Stone had been one of the loudest voices
criticizing past GID anti-radical activities and he made it
absolutely clear that under his administration the Bureau of
Investigation was to cease all domestic political
surveillance. As he saw it, seditious speech no longer broke
any federal law, and thus was not the concern of a federal
law enforcement agency. He stated clearly:
... the Bureau of Investigation is not concerned
with political or other opinions of individuals.
It is concerned only with their conduct and then
only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws
of the United States.53

Thus, a condition of Hoover's promotion was that he
give up an activity which he considered to be of almost

..
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sacred value: the elimination of communists from the US.
Hoover, complied, at least publicly, declaring in 1925,
Our bureau carries on no invesigations of matters
that are not contrary to federal statutes. There
is no federal statute against entertaining radical
ideas, and we are wasting our time collecting
information that we cannot use.54

Stone told the Bureau to concentrate on improving its
image by regularizing Bureau procedures, professionalizing
its staff, and catching common criminals. The Bureau began
to comply with Stone's directives. But the bureau did not
stay as far away from domestic surveillance as it may have
appeared. While the Bureau discontinued its traditional
overt interference with leftist politics, it did not cease
its surveillance activities altogether. Instead, it began to
evolve a new strategy for monitoring political deviance: It
began to expand a critical new resource inherited from the
Bureau's previous director: a national criminal
identification bureau.

The Establishment of a Federal Criminal Identification
Bureau
Under the Bureau's previous director, William J. Burns
(purportedly the "world's best detective"), the Bureau had
finally achieved the centralization of criminal identity
records under federal control that proponents had first
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pushed for 15 years ear1ier.55 Burns oversaw negotiations
with both the IACP and the directors of the Leavenworth
collection to transfer their records to Washington.
Unfortunately for Burns, however, the Teapot Dome scandal
forced him from office before the identification bureau
began operation.
Although Burns had participated knowingly and
enthusiastically in anti-radical activities, it seems that
his interest in establishing a national identification
bureau did not originate with anti-radical concerns. Burns
saw the system instead as a cost-cutting device--helping the
federal government to attain a greater coverage of the
nation by establishing alliances with local police--and as
an aid to crime prevention by helping to identify habitual
criminals.56 Other interested parties, including IACP
officials, who supported a national identification system
saw it as a tool against anarchists and other leftists,
although even for them this was not its most important
function. They, along with Burns, saw its primary function
as collecting and disseminating information about habitual
criminals.57 According to Burns, he planned to confine the
new bureau's activities to "collecting and finding
photographs and fingerprints of important criminals
throughout the country, of felonies

[sid." 58

Under

Hoover's direction, however, the Bureau built the
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fingerprint collection into a powerful tool for political
intimidation and surveillance. Expanding on the system that
Burns had founded, the Bureau's Identification Division soon
possessed the world's largest fingerprint collection.

The Attraction of a Large Fingerprinting System
Even though Hoover was destined to become one of
fingerprinting's greatest champions, he was noticeably
tight-lipped in explaining his reasons for directing Bureau
support toward the method. In part, of course, his support
required no explanation. Fingerprinting was the most
reliable identification method at the time and elsewhere
Hoover had loudly voiced his support for scientific police
methods. But as to why he chose to pursue building the
world's largest fingerprint system, Hoover remained
silent.59
Hoover's initial attraction to fingerprinting may have
had something to do with his positive experience
participating in the World War I German-American alien
fingerprinting and registration program. The orderliness and
completeness of this program certainly would have appealed
to him. Perhaps its apparent success--few of these aliens
ever gave serious cause for official concern--might have
inspired Hoover to try the same strategy on radicals.
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The German-American registration program had required
the fingerprinting of all German-American aliens, thus
creating a universal identification system for that
particular social group. If any crime had been committed by
a German-American alien and fingerprint evidence found,
officials, in theory, could have immediately and reliably
learned the perpetrator's identity. Little is known about
how well this fingerprint system actually was organized.
(For example, whether the prints were classified and stored
centrally.) But the program brought closer than ever before
the potential for rapid and certain identification of
individuals by the state.
Such an identification system--where fingerprints can
function to discover someone's identity, as opposed to
simply verify it--requires universal compliance of the
population in question, whether it be all criminals, all
employees of a particular company, all radicals, or all
Americans. A universal system is the most powerful form of a
fingerprint system.
It is important to understand exactly how a fingerprint
system's power depends on its size. When fingerprints are
found or made, no matter how clear or how plentiful, they
must have an identified match on file, or they are virtually
useless. Repeated identical fingerprints will confirm the
repeated presence of a particular individual, but without an

...
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identified print on file against which to compare the found
print, officials know nothing more about the owner's
identity and possibly only little more about his conduct.
The more identified prints on file--drawn from whatever
source--the more likely it is that officials will be able to
match a found print with a known print and discover the
print owner's identity. Thus, every move to increase a
collection's size expands its potential power enormously. 60
Each contribution to a system brings it closer to a
universal system that allows authorities to discover, not
just to verify, identities. Although Hoover never succeeded
in building a truly universal system, understanding the
significance of sheer numbers of fingerprints to the power
of a fingerprint system helps to elucidate Hooover's
fingerprint strategy.61
Instituting such a system against radicals would have
meant establishing far-reaching identity requirements. As
incidents of domestic disturbance during and following World
War I had indicated, radicals could emerge from any of
several large groups, such as workers or immigrants. A
successful anti-radical identification system--one capable
of discovering identities--would have had to include them
all. In the Harlan Stone, post- Palmer-raid atmosphere,
however, Hoover scarcely could advocate that the Bureau of
Investigation be placed in charge of a national, universal
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identification system. Developing a universal system limited
to criminals, in contrast, was acceptable and that goal the
Bureau openly pursued. At the same time Hoover quietly
sought the extension of fingerprint requirements, as
mentioned earlier, to several groups including immigrants,
soldiers, and federal employees. As well, he encouraged
large scale voluntary programs gathering contributions from
school children, mothers and new-borns, and the population
at large. As will be described below, de facto,

over time,

the Bureau achieved vast coverage of the US population,
putting into operation a fingerprint system theoretically
capable of determining the identities of a large portion of
the US adult population. This capability provided a key
element in the emerging image of the FBI as an omnipotent
force opposing common criminal and political subversive
alike. 52
Bureau officials made no attempt to conceal their
intense fingerprint activities, but in the early years they
were very careful in how they publicly described those
activities. Hoover and his associates consistently cast the
fingerprint system's purpose in only the most general terms:
it was a defense against crime and an aid in cases of
amnesia or unidentifiable dead. 53 Apparently, to the extent
that the public or other government officials knew of the
Bureau's fingerprint program, they did not perceive it as
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constituting domestic political surveillance; thus, they
found it acceptable within the Bureau'snew mandate.

Toward Building a Fingerprint System Capable of Discovering
Identity (1): Administrative Innovations
A number of actions by the Bureau during the 1920s and
1930s can be interpreted as attempts to build a large
fingerprint system, including three critical moves to expand
its supply of fingerprints. First the Bureau pushed for the
extension of fingerprint requirements for criminals.
Fingerprint law varied by jurisdiction along two main
criteria: the type of offense (such as, misdemeanor or
felony) and the status of the charge (the right to
fingerprint upon arrest or only after conviction). The most
restrictive laws limited fingerprinting to convicted felons
and the most liberal permitted fingerprinting of all
arrested persons, regardless of the charge. The Bureau's
mandate limited its collection to convicts, generally
felons.64
Late in 1924 Bureau officials began collecting
information to support a strategy to expand the scope of the
Bureau's criminal fingerprint collection.65 The final result
of this effort was US v. Kelly (55 F. 2d 67), an appeal of
US v.Kelly (51 2d 263). The latter case disputed the right
to fingerprint individuals suspected of Prohibition law

•
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violations on the misdemeanor level, such as selling a quart
of gin. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, these violators
constituted a rather sizeable group.
Kelly had been arrested for allegedly trying to sell a
quart of gin to federal agents, a misdemeanor offense. Upon
arrest, officials insisted that Kelly submit to
fingerprinting, which he did, but not without complaint.
Kelly then sued for the return of his fingerprints, arguing
that federal officials had no right to fingerprint him as he
was charged only with a misdemeanor offense. The trial judge
agreed with Kelly and described the fingerprinting of
misdemeanor suspects as an "unnecessary indiginity" which
served "no useful purpose either to himself or the
government. "66

The United States Attorney General's office

appealed the decision, and won. The appeals court handed
down a a strongly worded decision--US V. Kelly

(55 F. (2d)

67)--that negated many fingerprint precedents.
The judges in both of the Kelly cases knew that the
government saw this legal action as a "test case" over the
right to fingerprint misdemeanor suspects, not only
Prohibition law violators but "any misdemeanant prior to
conviction."67 Unfortunately tracking down additional
information about how the Bureau of Investigation might have
conveyed the intensity of its concern to judges hearing
these cases has been unsuccessful. It is clear, however,
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based on the results of the appeals decision, that the
Bureau's interests triumphed. The appeals decision
established the federal government's right to fingerprint
the largest group of wrongdoers--misdemeanor suspects--and
it did so in a way that greatly advanced fingerprinting's
legitimacy. The justices found that fingerprinting "as a
physical invasion ... amounts to almost nothing" and is "no
more humiliating than any other means of identification."
Most importantly, the judges rested their decision that the
police ought to be allowed free reign with fingerprinting on
the premise that the procedure was part of the sanctioned
exercise of police power, and thus required no statutory
authorization.68 This conclusion effectively reversed Gow v.
Bingham and removed a common complaint that police were
acting beyond their authority when they fingerprinted
suspects. Subsequently US v. Kelly

(55 F(2d) 27) became the

standard citation in cases where the police asserted their
right to fingerprint without express statutory authority and
to fingerprint in advance of a defendant's trial. The
appeals decision had the effect of securing fingerprinting
once and for all as a standard and nearly unassailable
police procedure. 69
Although, available figures do not permit calculating
the extra number of fingerprints generated for the Bureau by
this liberalization, the number most likely was large. Not
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only did it assure that all Prohibition law violators now
could be fingerprinted, it also lent support to moves at the
state and local level to expand fingerprinting for minor
violations, such as vagrancy and disturbing the peace. The
then frequent Depression-era demonstrations produced many
such opportunities.70
While the Kelly decision helped to establish the right
to collect prints from anyone arrested, it did not settle
another equally controversial issue--whether officials could
keep all the prints that they had collected. Historically
the return by police of identification records had created
considerable controversy. particularly when the records in
question were photographs stored in publicly accessible
rogue's galleries, the practice of retaining identity
records drew criticism.71 Many jurisdictions specified that
defendants, if found innocent, could request the return of
photographs, anthropometric measurement cards, and
fingerprints. However, often the procedures for the return
were left unspecifed or unclear, making return practically
impossible.
Whether federal officials ever returned the records of
people found innocent is unclear. Several sources state that
at least initially the Bureau did return fingerprints of
people found innocent, but available evidence offers little
support for this assertion.72 From as early as 1924, none of
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the tables that described the sources and numbers of
fingerprints that appeared in Attorney General Annual
Reports or in Congressional Appropriations Hearings for the
Identification Bureau mentioned fingerprints returned by the
Bureau, only those accumulated. Nor in any of the frequent
and protracted discussions over how to set up the new
federal identification bureau was there any allowance made
for how or under what conditions prints would be returned.
It seems unlikely that few if any ever were. Still, Max
Lowenthal, a respected FBI historian, asserts that the
Bureau did return prints until sometime in the mid-1930s
when the Bureau decided to reverse the return policy and to
keep all fingerprints sent to the Bureau.73 In any case,
whether this indeed was a new policy, or an established one,
its benefits were great.
Returning prints not only would have subjected the
Bureau to considerable additional costs, it also would have
severely constrained the Bureau administratively. For
example, if prints had to be returned pending a trial's
outcome, would the Bureau have been able to circulate
fingerprints to check on the defendant's past? Not being
allowed to do so would have deprived the Bureau of one of
the main advantages of being allowed to fingerprint prior to
trial: Determining whether the defendant was an habitual
criminal. But equally important, returning fingerprints
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would have depleted the Bureau's collection and that
certainly was an undesirable outcome.
Whatever its history, the Bureau's resolve to stick to
its no-return policy was strong. For example, in the mid1930s, the Federal Communication Commission wanted to submit
fingerprints of communications workers for a one-time
background check by the Bureau to detect any subversives or
wrongdoers among the industry's ranks. The unions and
companies represented went along with the plan, but
stipulated that the fingerprints be returned. The Bureau,
instead, insisted that it should be allowed to retain the
prints. After much wrangling, the Bureau prevailed and
250,000 fingerprints of radio operators, telegraph and
telephone workers and other members of the communications
industry joined the Division's permanant collection.74
In addition to expanding its right to take and retain
fingerprints, the Bureau also had to assure itself a
constant supply of fingerprints. Because the majority of
criminal violations occurred at the local level, this meant
encouraging local police to participate in this new national
enterprise and to start fingerprinting all suspects and,
most importantly, to send those fingerprints to Washington.
Local contributions were essential to creating and
sustaining the image of the FBI identification system as a
centralized, national clearinghouse. Consequently, the
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Bureau worked hard to foster close ties with local police to
assure that contributions flowed in from states, cities, and
small towns.
As a part of this effort, Hoover maintained amiable
relations with the IACP and often addressed its annual
convention.75 He exhorted members to encourage their local
departments to contribute fingerprints regularly and
promptly to the new bureau. The Bureau facilitated such
contributions and encouraged local police to rely on the new
federal bureau by eliminating the old NBCI practice of
requiring a membership fee to use the identification
services. The new identification division provided
fingerprint cards, franked envelops, and quick responses
with no charge to local police.76 Fearing that voluntary
contributions still might fall short of the Bureau's goals,
Hoover asked the IACP to support legislation which would
have required all state identification bureaus (the number
of these bureaus was growing rapidly at the time) to
automatically forward to Washington a set of all
fingerprints taken.77
Starting in mid-1930s, to further facilitate nationallocal cooperation, the Bureau began holding schools to train
local police in the most recent fingerprint techniques and
applications. Initially the schools were held only in the
Washington DC headquarters, but within months the Bureau
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began holding regional schools across the United States.78
The Bureau also made available a carefully compiled list of
recent local court challenges to fingerprinting and
responses to the challenges, and a general information
pamphlet entitled, Fingerprints.79 Local police responded to
this supportive treatment and began contributing
fingerprints in record numbers. By 1937 over 1.1 million
criminal prints were pouring into the Bureau annually, which
represented nearly a five-fold increase over the previous
ten years.80
Within a few short years, the Bureau had made three
pivotal moves to assure a large fingerprint collection: The
inclusion of misdemeanor suspects in federal fingerprint
requirements, the refusal to return fingerprints, and the
establishment of strong links with local police. This threepronged approach undoubtedly helped the Bureau build a
numerically large collection--one of Hoover's stated goals
and a critical feature of a powerful identification
system.8l At the same time, the Bureau began to pinpoint
particular populations whose members were of special
interest in building a domestic surveillance capacity.
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Toward Building a Fingerprinting System Capable of
Discovering Identity (2): Broadening Fingerprint
Requirements
First among these groups was immigrants.82 In the Fall
of 1924, Bureau lawyers began exchanging memos with
immigration officials over the issue of whether the Bureau
had the right to collect fingerprints from immigrants. After
finding out that they did not have the right

(at the time

the Bureau was strictly limited to criminal affairs because
of the fallout from the Palmer raids), the Bureau pursued
legal reforms that would permit wider fingerprinting of noncriminals. This took several years.

(It was not until 1939

that all aliens were officially required to be fingerprinted
and the fingerprints deposited at the Bureau.) 83

In the

meantime, then Acting Director Hoover pointed out to
immigration officials that nothing legally prohibited
officials from making unsolicited contributions to the
bureau's files.84 This strategy--of encouraging voluntary
contributions--was used repeatedly over the years by the
Bureau, thus circumventing legal limitations on the scope of
the fingerprint collection. With efforts underway to bring
immigrants into the fingerprint collection, the Bureau
turned its attention to other potential donors.8S
In 1929, a new law required that all civil service
employees be fingerprinted. By 1939, this new law helped the
bureau's files swell by over a half million prints. In 1937,
the Civilian Conservation Corps began submitting
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fingerprints for all of its enrollees. By 1939, the total
contributions, which came primarily from young men at, or
just under, draft age, reached over 475,000. In 1939 the
Works Progress Administration followed suit and in just one
year the contributions from New York City alone topped
25,000. In the late 1930s the Bureau began encouraging
cities to submit fingerprints of transient relief (welfare)
applicants.

(Bureau reports contend that these programs were

successful in detecting criminals among the applicants,
although they list no overall numbers of prints they brought
in.)86 In the mid to late 1930s, each branch of the military
began sUbmitting fingerprints of its enlistees to the Bureau
for background checks against its criminal files,
contributing hundreds of thousands of prints yearly.87

Toward Building a Fingerprint System Capable of Discovering
Identity (3): Voluntary Contributions
The Bureau did not concentrate only on workers
associated with federal agencies. Unable to publicly support
legislation requiring fingerprinting by private enterprise-an unpopular position except for a brief period in the early
1940s--the Bureau resorted to the notion of voluntary
contributions here, as well. It succeeded in fostering
programs that eventually brought hundreds of thousands of
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prints into the Bureau, many from private, war-related
industries.88
These voluntary programs went far beyond soliciting
contributions from war-related industries and also began
encouraging the general population to contribute their
fingerprints. The justifications for these programs included
protecting citizens against kidnapping and amnesia, and
improving the state's ability to locate subversives.89 Such
programs enjoyed considerable popularity, more than one
might have predicted based on public reaction in the 1910s
to civilian fingerprint programs. These earlier programs had
foundered because of fingerprinting's criminal stigma. But,
in the 1930s, the terrain which fingerprinting inhabited had
been altered. Many people sought, rather than resisted,
inclusion in a centralized identification system.90
The city of Berkeley, California, for example, became
particularly "fingerprint-minded" when it undertook a 1935
campaign to achieve universal fingerprint registration for
the city.91 The campaign enlisted help from the girl and boy
scouts, American Legion, police and fire departments, and
local merchants. Fingerprint workers set up booths to
collect finerprints in libraries, schools, theaters, banks,
and clubs. For people who couldn't corne to them, they sent
out visiting horne teams and mobile units to factories.
Merchants offered discounts to those who could show a
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fingerprint card. In less than a year, over 52,000 sets of
prints had been collected, representing near total coverage
of the city's population.92
Berkeley may represent an extreme case, but during the
inter-war period fingerprinting did enjoy widespread
support. A national Gallup poll conducted in the late 1930s
showed that 71% of the people surveyed believed that all US

inhabitants should be fingerprinted,

a stand that then

President Franklin Roosevelt also supported. 93 While
opinion opposing fingerprinting remained strong even at the
height of the practice's popularity, evidently, at least
some of the stigma traditionally surrounding fingerprinting
had diminshed and new, positive connotations had appeared.

Understanding Compliance With Fingerprinting Demands
The popularity enjoyed by fingerprinting at this time
can be attributed in part to publicity efforts on the part
of the Bureau. Press releases and speeches usually
emphasized the problems of unidentifiable dead, amnesia
victims, and kidnapping.94 Given the positive strength of
the public's response, however, it is also clear that
fingerprint rhetoric tapped into powerful public concerns.
Part of the explanation of the success of these programs lay
in their characterization as patriotiC. After only a brief
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respite the world seemed perched on the edge of war once
more and voluntary fingerprinting was cast as a way to help
protect the nation in that eventuality.95 Some of the
slogans that advocated fingerprinting included "Uncle Sam
Wants Your Mark" and "Be Respectable. Be Fingerprinted. "96
As with the German-American alien registration program,
these slogans cast fingerprinting as an act of compliance
and benefitted from its association with loyalty.
The fear of war was not the only problem confronting
Americans during this period. The late 1920s and the 1930s
also witnessed severe social upheavals, including the
Depression and Prohibition. The Depression caused
unemployment and transience, broke apart families, and
accounted for an increase in petty thefts. During roughly
the same period, Prohibition ushered in one of the country's
most violent crime waves. The FBI exploited the latter
especially, by using Prohibition-related crimes as a way of
building the appearance of the need for public protection by
the government.97 In the midst of such insecurity, real and
imagined, fingerprinting apparently offered some kind of
protection.
One book expressed this aspect of fingerprinting
particularly forcefully. Published in 1934 in Philadelphia,
a book entitled, Thumb-o-graph: A Family Album of
Fingerprints encouraged its purchaser to record the prints
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of all family members on special pages provided at the back
of the book and to store the book in a safe place. The
introduction dedicated the volume to "the advancement of
perpetual peace and rest in the greatest institution of the
world, THE HOME. "98 The book's publishers wanted purchasers
to feel that fingerprints could help to protect them in
uncertain times: that they could provide security in the
form of the knowledge that your loved ones would be kept
track of, somehow, even if you could not do it yourself.
The campaign for voluntary fingerprinting did have its
detractors. Prominent among them, the ACLU, which published
a 1938 pamphlet, "Thumbs Down." The pamphlet recounted
various instances where people who refused to participate in
"voluntary" fingerprint programs were discriminated against,
and went on to characterize the voluntary fingerprint drive
as "part of general scheme for the compulsory regimentation
of the entire population. "99 Eventually criticism by the
ACLU and others managed to force the Bureau to reign in its
program. Throughout the war years, however, fingerprinting
remained popular. In 1939 the Bureau received 546,991
voluntary civilian fingerprint donations, representing a 37%
increase over the previous year. Throughout the late 1930s
and early 1940s, voluntary donations continued at a rate of
one to two thousand daily.100
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Thus, in a brief 15 years (1924-1939) the Bureau had
built its fingerprint holdings from a small collection
gathered primarily from convicted felons to a massive,
widely-varied collection topping 10 million.l0l Sometime
during the 1930s, Hoover had installed at Bureau
headquarters a giant register on one wall that resembled an
odometer and that turned over a new number each time another
print was processed.l02 Over the next decade (1939-1949),
the register flipped over new numbers at a frantic pace, as
the collection increased more than 50 times, to 111,450,000.
Although duplicates and foreigners' prints accounted for
some portion of these prints, the Bureau had advanced far
toward achieving a universal fingerprint system.
As shown, while the Bureau obviously spent considerable
effort increasing the sheer bulk of its collection by
expanding its right to take and retain fingerprints and by
encouraging voluntary contributions, it also took care
choosing the groups that it targeted. High on its list of
priorities were: 1) immigrants, believed to be the single
greatest source of radicals in the US; 2) draft-age youth-programs to fingerprint school children and Civilian
Conservation Corps workers brought in hundreds of thousands
of prints from draft-eligible or soon to be draft-eligible
young men; and, 3) workers, especially labor union members
and employees of war-related industries. When and if war
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broke out again, the Bureau would have at its disposal
extensive files covering most of the groups identified as
critical to monitor: radicals, workers, and conscripts.
Even before war became a prevalent fear, the files were
being used to locate or discredit radicals. President Hoover
called on the Bureau in 1932 to supply background
information from fingerprint files on members of the World
War I Bonus Marchers, who had organized a massive protest
against the government for failing to keep its economic
promises to veterans. In the mid-1930s, members of a large
western manufacturer's and merchant's association sought
help through the Bureau's files to identify employees with
criminal or subversive backgrounds.103
It was these kinds of tasks that the large, centralized
fingerprint files could serve so well. Having collected
millions of prints from immigration officials (which might
include deportation information and thus possible comments
about political affiliation) and from local police
departments (which might include information about arrests
in political demonstrations, as well as other crimes), the
Bureau often could produce a record that supplied exactly
the kind of information President Hoover or an employer was
seeking.
As war threatened in the late 1930s, the government was
willing to officially re-admit the Bureau (now the Federal
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Bureau of Investigation) into the realm of domestic,
political surveillance. When this happened, the political
control function of the fingerprint files became manifest.
104 Starting in 1940, all applicants for jobs in war-related
industries

(by then a large portion of US industries were

considered war-related) were fingerprinted and checked by
the Bureau for criminal or subversive activities. lOS

Conclusion
Following World War I, with the help of fingerprinting,
the state's ability to establish the individual identities
of its citizens took an enormous leap. Fingerprinting became
routine and widespread. The FBI incorporated widely diverse
groups of people into its fingerprint collection--from
school children to taxi drivers--although it focussed
primarily on groups thought likely to contain high numbers
of dissidents. The impulse for this project derived from
World War I, which had greatly expanded the state's
commitment to track and control dissent from all quarters.
Politically and practically unable to track only dissidents
(if only because it was not always clear who they were), the
identification system invented had to be broadly inclusive.
The state strove to construct a universal fingerprint system
by proliferating requirements which extended far beyond the
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criminal population, which was once the state's only
statutorially-sanctioned domain for identification demands.
Peacetime fingerprint programs signalled important
changes for the state and for identification practices.
First, for the state, they heralded the incorporation of
domestic surveillance into routine governing. With these
programs, the government tried to establish the capacity and
the right to identify and monitor all of its subjects, not
only those suspected of crimes. Second, for identification
practices, these systems signalled an impressive advance
toward the replacement of personal experience by written
records on a vast scale. Fingerprints are unique,

life-long,

and easily classified. This made them particularly amenable
to record-keeping techniques that permitted officials to
incorporate near limitless numbers of subjects and to make
identifications across vast spatial or temporal expanses.
Both were basic requirements for a large-state run system
and neither could have been achieved without fingerprinting
and the years and years of record-keeping progress which had
proceeded it.
Building a universal fingerprinting system capable of
discovering identity on a national scale remains an
unfulfilled goal in the US and elsewhere. Nevertheless,
while a true universal system remains only a potential, the
efforts dedicated to seeking such a system produced far-
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reaching consequences. The drive to build the FBI's
fingerprint collection did succeed in incorporating large
numbers of individuals into a centralized, national
identification system. In so doing, the FBI succeeded in
constructing a capacity to identify individuals that was
strong enough that the intimidation caused by the threat of
involuntary identification had to be taken seriously. This
threat--that the FBI could locate and identify individuals-reached its height during the proliferation of fingerprint
requirements from the late 1930s through the early 1950s,
however it remains strong today, supported by ongoing
fingerprint requirements and a fingerprint collection which
has reached nearly 200,000,000.106
The fingerprint system alone is not responsible for
this perception of state omniscience. Still, the fingerprint
system's wide reach (fingerprint requirements include
military enlistment, arrest, civil service and many other
jobs, and many professional licenses) and its definitive
grasp (if an identification is made through fingerprints, it
is virtually unassailable) has contributed centrally to
creating and sustaining this illusion. As suggested in
Chapter One, some degree of self-surveillance now has to be
deployed given the government's apparent ability to know who
we are, where we are, and what we are doing despite any wish
to the contrary.
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Conclusion

This dissertation has traced the emergence of
centralized, state-run identification record-keeping
systems. It has concentrated on describing both what
motivated officials to establish these systems and what
methods they employed. It has argued that the growth and
increased sophistication of these systems was motivated by
an ever-expanding definition of the population deemed
necessary to monitor. This expansion took place in three
phases. Systems concentrated first on incarcerated
prisoners, then expanded out to include first local and then
national criminal populations, and finally moved to
encompass the population as a whole.
Each one of these expansions owed its initiative at
least in part to a parallel expansion of the state's
commitment to crime prevention through surveillance. Crime
prevention was not a wholly new goal--previous governments
had sought to prevent crime by maiming or killing its
practioners. Enlightenment beliefs about the malleability of
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human beings, however, fostered the development of new
approaches to crime control. Instead of chopping off a
malefactor's head or hand, officials decided to try
incarcerating the person and carefully re-forming him or her
through discipline and training. The belief in the potential
for wrongdoers' reform supplied the first long-lasting
justification for individualized surveillance. The desire to
track the trajectory of an individual's moral development,
in turn, created the need for official identities--how else
to be sure that the person standing before a magistrate was
a new prospect worth saving or .a degenerate recidivist
deserving harsh treatment? The mandate for incarcerative
reform persists even today, along with its need to carefully
distinguish first-time from repeat offenders, and hence the
need for official identities (which of course exist today
for more reasons than criminal sentencing) .
Beliefs about how best to prevent crime, however,
continued to evolve and in the process produced
justifications for even greater surveillance and
identification capacities. With the mid to late l800s'
efflorescence of the middle class, moveable wealth and new
methods of stealing it, came loud demands to improve crime
control. The response was the formation of a new kind of
police dedicated to preventing crime before it happened.
This they tried to accomplish through careful surveillance
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of crime-prone neighborhoods and the delineation, tracking,
and control of populations thought likely to commit crimes.
Toward the late 1800s, these local concerns became national,
which reflected both a greater awareness of the nation as a
salient unit and of the national character of much criminal
activity. By the turn of the century, crime prevention
through surveillance enjoyed wide acceptance as a plausible
and necessary solution to the growing concern with crime.
Preventive surveillance had been an established
response for several decades when events of World War I
inspired officials to try to apply the concept to GermanAmerican aliens as a means to limit possible sabotage of the
war effort. As the war's conclusion put in place deeper,
longer lasting fears about the dangers of social unrest, and
in particular of communism, the generalization of
surveillance through wide-ranging identification
requirements seemed a useful and appropriate response.
Each expansion of the population deemed relevant to
watch demanded the elaboration of new identification
methods. Walnut St.

jail officials faced the first

challenge, that of creating ex nihilo the procedures for
monitoring inmates and for creating stable, accessible,
official identities as locations for storing surveillancegenerated information. Over several decades they modified
and improved techniques, creating for themselves a greater
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and greater capacity to identify recidivists in spite of
time passed or disguises employed. They did so by
elaborating writing through the application of various
record-keeping techniques including tables and logbooks. In
so doing they created records increasingly capable of
providing independent verification of a wrongdoer's
identity, thus increasingly assuring the utility and
efficacy of long-term surveillance.
When the desire to monitor criminals outside of
institutions emerged, the police relied upon techniques
similar to those used by Walnut St. officials. They also
invented techniques to help them overcome not only the
temporal challenges faced by early prison officials, but
also the spatial challenges of tracking an unconfined
population. The development of publicly-displayed rogue's
galleries and the practice of "taking a spot" helped to
spread identification information over a large contingent of
officials.
Similar practices served the late 1800s' demand to
elevate criminal tracking capabilities from a local to a
national level, but with limited success. The challenge of
identifying a quickly growing group of wrongdoers spread
over an increasingly large territory could not be met by
existing methods. Demands to extend surv·eillance over a
national jurisdiction were finally fulfilled,

instead, by
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the invention of statistically-based systems. Rather than
being overwhelmed by the extreme range of human variation,
as had all previous systems, these systems benefitted from
it.
Statistical systems, in particular fingerprinting, both
allowed and required a higher degree of centralization than
previously imagined. Once established and functioning
properly (a process which required several decades and is
still not without flaws and gaps), they provided to the
state an astonishing capacity: the ability for a single
office (most prominently the FBI, but also important are
several other identification bureaus including those
controlled by large urban police departments or the
military) to store sufficient information to allow
consistent, reliable identifications of millions and
millions of individuals. The identifications, moreover,
often far surpass the simple supply of a name and physical
description by also providing detailed life histories.
It is important not to lose sight of the caveat
detailed twice earlier here that these systems can succeed
in identifying only people who have already been identified
within the system at least once, and that correct
identifications depend on proper record-keeping techniques.
Still, the national fingerprint system represents an
impressive resource for state surveillance.
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Through this system the state has extended its eyes and
ears over a vast territorial expanse and has provided to
itself a depth of memory unmatchable by recollections of
individuals. With fingerprint records, and other similar
individualized records, the state can enforce official
identities which allows the state to exert control over
economic activities, limit geographic movement, and monitor
social deviance, individual by individual. Such records
constitute a critical element of the state's power base.

As a contribution to the field of communications, this
dissertation stands first as a case study of the
relationship between political power and the means of
communication, concentrating on the memory functions of
communications. Working against the notion that literate
practices prevailed because of writing's inherent
superiority, the dissertation has carefully outlined both
how writing was made powerful

(record-keeping practices

legitimized and strengthened writing and in turn led to an
important division of labor whereby clerks created
organizational memories on which officials relied) and how
that power served emerging state interests of discipline and
conformity. In particular, the dissertation emphasized how
the components of a new type of memory had to assembled--an
organizational memory that takes individuals as its subject.
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In tracing this history of organizational memory, the
dissertation has mapped an alternative path for research
into communications and the state. Moving away from
traditional approaches that assumed rather than explored the
nature of the modern state and its constitutive
communicative practices, the dissertation instead has taken
the modern state as an object of inquiry and asked how
officials used communications to construct its power base.
It stands as an example of how reversing the usual causeeffect approach to communication technology can lead to
radically different questions and answers in communications
research and how communications research can be embedded
productively in history.
Finally, the history of state-run record-keeping
systems is of new relevance during this era of rapid
computerization. Given the frequency with which proponents
cite purely instrumental justifications for extending or
strengthening centralized, state-run data bases that contain
information about individuals, it is important to understand
that the original justifications for these systems far
outstripped simple pragmatism. They were instead
specifically motivated attempts to construct and expand
state power.
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